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PREFA.CE 
Several years of association with the subjoct-matter of the thesis has 
taught the author that he is presenting only a brief introduction to ICiarke-
gaardts Phi1080Ph;y or Religion. In spite of this llrd.tation, however, the th 
sis may ~pear to the reader to be too 1en.gtb.y'. It was thought best, therefor 
to omit an expanded treatment of Kierlcegaard's.llf'e and the background of the 
times in which be l1yed. The interested reader I'IIIA7 find this information in 
the following works. E. L. Allen, Existentialism From Within, (London, 1953), 
pp. 3-7; Walter Lowrie, !. Short ~ £'!. K1erkegaard (Princeton, New Jcosey, 
1944), pp. 1-16J H. V. Martin, Kierkegaard, !h!. Melanchol;r l?!!!! (London, 1950), 
pp. 24-33. Denail Patrick, Pascal !!!.2 Kicokegaard (London, 1941), pp. 1-40; 
Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard.'s Philosophy .2! Religion (Princeton, New Jersey, 
1948), pp. 3-1. 
The word "Bellef" is used in the title to signify that the prima.ry occu-
patlon of the thesis is with the psychological and ontological character of 
human belief', and not wi til Supernatural Fa! th. 
Very special thanks are due to the ReY'erend Robert F. HarV'cu, S.J., ot 
West Baden College and to the ReYermd Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., of 1o)"Ola 
University for their ldn&Iness and helptulnes8, and to Mrs. C. P. Culhane, of 
Detroit, Michigan. t«> undertaking the task ot typing the final copies. 
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Sor~ Aabye Kierkegaard was bom in Copenhagen. Denmark. on May 5. 181.3. 
the seventh and last child of Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard and Ana ~rensdatter 
Lund Kurkegaard. Ane was Michael Kierkegaard's second wite (his first wife 
having died childless atter two years of married. life), and had been a maid-
servant in his home. The father, Michael K1erkegaard, bad risen .from the sta-
tus of a hungry shepherd boT on the West Jutland heaths to a position of 
wealth as a hoaier in the city of Copenhagen. At the age of fortT, thirteen 
years We1"ore the birth of ~ren, he decided that he had 'earned enough money to 
live the rest or his lite in retirement. He spent his time thereatter reading 
and pondering religious and phUosophica.l questions. l 
Michael Kierkegaard was a man of deep and brooding dLsposition,.. given to 
cea8eles8 introspection. As a boy, he had cursed God for allowing him, a poor 
and hungry shepherd to suffer so much without coming to his aid. ae looked 
upon his later prosperi tT as God' 8 answer to his curse, signit)'ing that his 
guilt was 80 great that it could never be atoI8d for in this life, but would 
be punished onl,y in eternitT. When his youngest child was born, he decided 
lJohannes Hohlen.berg, SEen Kierkegaard, trans. T. H. Croxa.ll (Nev 
York. 19$6), p. 22. 
1 
2 
the boy was to be the means of reconciliation between hiuelf and God as 
kind of sacritice. He resolved, therefore, to bring up hie lion to accept 
rom God' II hand. his I113'sterioue fate. 2 
The relationship between father and son became inti.Jllate and rather unusual. 
tu,ture of their companionship was the M in<k>or walks" which they took toge-
r in imagination. During these walks, as they paced back and forth across 
room, the elder Kierkegaard would describe vividly and minutely everything 
ey "saw" and eYer;yone they "met a on the wq. When he was old enough to do 
, the boy joined in the descriptions, and the two would construct a fantasy .. 
• which the;r followed various rat tes through the city, met and conversed with 
rieDds, a'ld "if they went elong well-known wqs, they watched each other sharp-
to see that nothing was overlooked.") The lather insisted that f!Nery detail 
the walk be as sharply' reproduced and as true to life as possible. 
It was during these imaginary walks that young S~ren l1ericegaud developed 
e vivid and f<rceful imagination 1Ih1eh he displqs in all his ~t;lngs .. and 
ch, because or its exactitude, conjures up tor the reader clear cd spontan-
OUB pictures ot real life. His father's insistence upon exactness also devel-
pad in the boy a remarkable precicion in spe ech and expression, which tills 
II lIOrks with the accents of 11fe. 
In addition to joining his father on imaginary walks, spren was also per-
tted to be preaent at conversations on theological topics which his father 
2 Ibid., 2,. 
)Ibid., 32. lierkegaard tells this storr in his own words in his 
ournals, trans. Alexander Dru (Oxford, 1939), pp. loB-lll. 
otten held ~d th others. At these tines, said Kierkegaard later, his father 
"combined with his almibhty imagination an irresistible dialectic,.4 which ~ 
pressed the youth, and upon which he modelled his later writings. 
The third, and most impor'tant, innua'1ce which :U.chael lUerkegaard axel'-
cised upon his youngest son was through training in Christianity. He tried to 
give the child as earJ.,y as possible an It impression of Christ •• > From his fa-
ther's program. of training, K1erkegaard ,farmed two convictials: "First, he 
felt that he was destined to suffer in this world., that he was a sacrifice who 
could not expect to partake in what people usuall¥ understand as a happy liteJ 
and, secordl.1, he felt offence at Christianity end in revolt against God, be-
cause He had nBce the world as it is, and put Sttch de!"tal1ds on men •••• He 
6 
neTer wholly" succeeded in resolving this anom.a.ly.lI 
From his father, then., Kierkegaard received a. vivid and meticulous ima-
gination, a passion for dialectics, and a sense of dedication to sutfering. 
In his own l<fords, he "went into life favoured in every way as :r:egands 1ntel-
7 lectual abilities and outward prosperity," but marred with the inli'eritance 
of his iather's brooding and introspective spirit. This broodiness was to 
color his whole production as an author and to influence proioundly his whole 
8 life. 
4Kierkegaard, !!:! JoUI'IUiU.s, p. 109. 
'Hohlenberg, p. 38. 
6 
Drld., 174 
7 S,ren Kierkegaard, The Point of View For !t Work As An Author, t.rans. 




He entered the U:niversity of Copenhagen in 18.30, but his study was de-
sultory. He finished the prescribed undergradua.te courses, and entered the 
school of theology out of d.eference to the wishes of his father and the example 
of his older brother. He spent most of his time, however, i.n Ita. wide assort-
ment of aesthetic stuo.ies and read much fiction (especially the Gdrman Roman-
ticists),119 and his spare hours were occupied in visits to the Student Union, 
the coffee shops and theatres. dis whole cmduct was that of the typical rich 
man • s son, for whom. study was a bore. 
During his sta;y at the university, his mother, one brother, and two sis-
ters died. (One sister had died JI\8ZQ' years before.) These deaths did not a1'-
feet the young Kierkegaard, but they affected his father proIoundl,Y'J and some 
time between 1835 and 1837, in a drunken state, he revel!l.ed to his son Sp.el1 
two secret sins which he had committed: first, that he bad cursed God in his 
boyhood; second, that Spren t s mother had been pregnant at the time of her mar-
riage to Je{ichael Kierkegaard, and that. the wedding had taken place only a tev 
of 
months a.fter the death of his first wife. The shock of these revelations, to-
gether w.:I.th the sudden recollection that he himself had visited a brothel while 
in an intoxicated state" awakened the young man to the necessity of a JIlOral re-
generation. He turned s eriousl¥ to stud\r; but he studied aesthetics exclusive-
ly, and abandoned theology. 
In 1838 the elder Kierkegaard died. This event proved to be the occasion 
tor a spiritual regeneration in S;ren's life. He returned to the study ot 
9Hohlenberg, p. 16. 
!theology and passed his examinations on July 3, 1840. There i. no record of 
~s being ordained for the ministry at this title, or later. 
During the same year, 1840, he became engaged to Regine Olsen, who was se-
venteen years old at that time; but after the engagement, he found that he could. 
not bring himself to go through with the marriage. .His feeling of guilt for his 
own sins, his supposed sharilg in his father's guilt, md his inherited broociing 
disposition, all hindered him from wishing to share his life with her. Basical-
10 ly", he felt that he had a mission to perform in the wcrld, and that to ask her 
to share the persecution which he was sure would accompany that mission would be 
an injustice to ber. He resolved to set her free tram a:n;r attachment to him b7 
acting boorishly and aoopt1ng a cynic&l snner toward her, so that she 'WOuld 
bane to hate and despise him. 
In 1841 the engagement was broken, with mxch pain on both side., which 
~en tor his part resolved not to show. Regine's attachment to him continued 
~ti1 her death, mare than sixty years later. He remained faithful to her, 
o f 
~ough she rarried ancther and mOlred to South America; an:l mal\Y r1 his writings 
~ cr,rptic messages of explanation to her.U 
Alter Kierkegaard' 8 broken engagement, there tollow-ed a £ruittul period 
~f writmg, largely concerned with anti-Hegelian tracts. This period of Kler-
Fegaard,ts lite will be discussed more fully in a later chapter. 
In 1840 there was founded in Copenhagen a witty &nd impudent newspaper 
alled the Corsair. Its editorial policy was to caricature, tnrough articles 
10 
r1erkegaard, The Point of View, p. 78. 
- --
U See Hohlenberg, pp. 115-135. 
6 
and cartoons, the political figures of the ~, and aqrone else who incurred 
the displeasure of its editors. In 1846, P. L. ~ller, a secret and powerful 
~ember of the Corsair's staff, began a bitter and derisive attack upon the 
[books of Kierkegaard, writing in the pages of a periodical called Gaea, an aes-
Ithetic "annual. Kierkegaard answered through a newspaper called the Fatherland. 
4Pller1s attack apread to the pages of the Corsair, which, under the editorShip 
pf one Meyer Goldschmidt.. began a relentless campaign ot ridicule and persecu-
~ion against Kierkegurd. By' 1848 the Corsair' a ruthless campaign of ridicule 
~ been successful, largely because ICierkegaarc:i's personality, with his pecu-
~ar appearance, dress, habits, and speech, was an inexhaustible aource of de-
~ision. The whole town ot Copenhagen turned against K1erkegaard) but M,Iller 
~. discredited when Kierkegaard made public M/fller's secret connection with the 
orsair and revealed 80me unsavory- facts about MPller's private life. M;ller 
ost his chance to be considered tor the post of Protessor ot Aesthetics at the 
In1versity of Copenhagen. Ooldscl:md.dt, stricken with remoree at his own part 
n deriding a man whom he reall¥ admired, sold his paper, which '!oon. failed and 
peased pUblication. 
His conflict with the Corsair influenced Kierkegaard profoundly. First, 
tle began to realize and formulate more clearly the idea of his "Christian colli. 
sion"; and the persecution which he suffered from the whole populace seemed to 
him the proof that bis life was consistent with his doctrines. Secondly', he 
began to aee h1Iuelf aa "the extraordinary," one chosen for a special task 
outside the fal.e "univeraal1tyH ot organized religion.12 
12 
T. H. Croxall, Kierkesurd Commentarz (London, 19$6), p. xviii 
See also Hohlenberg, pp. 18$-187 
7 
Atter a brief interlude, during which he studied intently the case of 
A. P. Adler, a pastor who had been dismissed in 1816 from the State Church of 
Denmark for claiming to have had a revelation from Christ Himself, Kierkegaard 
meditated and wrote upon the subject of the teaching authority ot the esta-
blished church, and reached the conclusions which were to guide his tb1nldng 
for the rest ot his lifer "The recognition of theae three things, the differ-
ence between the ordinar,y individual and the extraord1nar.r, the dist1netion be-
tween the concepts genius and Apostle, and the antithesis between Christianity 
and Christendom 1fU what nerkegaard gained trom occupying himaell' with the 
Adler affair."l) 
At this point, he gave up writing aesthetic works, except very occasional-
ly, and became an open champion of what he termed "Christian! t1'" in contrut 
with "Christendom." ae set forth the claims of Christianity clearly, showing 
that its appeal was a demand tor personal commitment on the part of the indi-
vidual, in .-Si_clm;;;;;.;,e_s ... s ~ neath, and examined the contrast betw8e!n t~ Chris-
tian1 ty and the meaningless Christendom organized by the state Chunfu of Den-
mark, in Training !!! Christ1an1tl. 
In 1854 Kierkegaard began his open attack against the established reli-
gion of Denmark, and in 1855 he began publishing a series of pamphlets under 
the general title, !h! Instant, to carry his polemical opiniOllll. I!!! Instant 
was published over a period of tout" months, and the last issue was printed on 
l3uohlenberg, pp. 195-196. 
8 
September 24, 18SS, about two months before his death. 
On October 2, 18SS, overworked and overwhelmed by this conflict, he fell 
seriously sick, am was confined to bed in a Copenhagen hospital for a little 
over a month before he died. On his deathbed he refused to receive Holy Com-
~on unless administered to him b.Y a layman; but he p~ed to God to be for. 
given for his sins, and to be free from despair at the hour of death. He ack-
nowledged his trust in God' s grace through Christ, and he died on November 11, 
16,S. 
At his funeral, his brother, Peter Christian Kierlcegaard, an ordained 
minister, conducted the services and delivered the tuneral oration. But at 
the graveside, the ceremony of interment was interrupted by Kierkegaard' s 
nephew, Henr1k Lund, who protested in the name of his uncle, and in his own 
name, against this participation in the worship prescribed b.Y the of'ficial 
church of Den1U.rk, against which Ki.erkegaard had so passionately fought. 
Thus, S_ren Kierkegaard, the focal point of' conflict even after his death, 
. ~ 
passed. away. He was an extraordin&l7 and profound thinker, a an g:Ltted with 
the genius of a vivid and forceful imagination, and wi til outstanding powers 
of speech and argument, a man of brooding and melancholy temperament. He saw 
himself as the extraordinary champion of individuality against the function-
alization of man, as the spokesman for individual commitment to Christ against 
Ithe organized Christendom of the Danish church. He became, like Socrates, a 
sign of contradiction to his contemporaries, and a permanent center of contra-
versy even to our own dq. 
The llterature produced by Kierkegaard is extensive and varied but lIlq' be 
9 
conveniently divided into three categories .. which "follow naturally upon one 
another, both chronologically and by reason of their contents."14 They are 
the PSeudonymoUB, the polemical, and the devotional -writings. 
The pseudonymous works mq be divided into three classes: first, the aes-
thetic works: Either/~ Repetition .. !!!! ~ Trembling, the ConoeE ~ Dread, 
and Stages .2!! Life's!'!!l. These works trace the progress of the spirit (and 
of Kierkegaard t s own spirit) from an irresponsible preoccupation with sensuous 
pleasures to the realization of the necessity 9f religious conversion through 
a personal act of choice. The second group of pseudonymous writings includes 
his strictly philosophical works, Philosophical FrafP11!Pts,15 which states his 
theses on becoming, on historicity, and on belief, and the Concluding Unscien-
16 Postscripts ~ .:!!! PhilOSOphical Fragments, which pre~ents, first, (:Lerke. 
gurd's objections to 8ll1' attempt to systematize thought, am his thesis that 
the relationahi.p of man to God is necessarily a subjective one J secondly, his 
, 1: philosoph1' of religion and. his anal7sis of the concepts of reall tr ·and truth. 
The Postscri:et was originally intended to be the last of ltierkegaai!d's writing 
but it actually occupies the central position in the collection of his works. 
14nenzil G.M.Patrick .. faseal!2! Kierkegaard (London,1947), II, 178. 
lSSee Patrick, II.. 221-230 for an admirable summar,y and explanation ot the 
contents of this work. See also Croxall, CommentarY, 164-194. 
16 See Patrick, II, 230-251, and Kurt P"einhardt .. The Erlstentialist Revolt 
(Milwaukee, 1952), pp. 40-5.3 for excellent lIUJ!Iflaries of thiS York. 
17David M. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (M1nneapolis,1948), p. 92. 
10 
After the attack upon him. b;y the Corsair, which followed the publication of the 
Postscript, he decided to abandon pseudonymity, but to continue writing in his 
own nane as a champion of true ClJrist1an1t;y against the emasculated Christian 
religion as organized in Denmark. A third group of pseudonytllOUlJ writings ap-
peared. later, however, in the .form o.f polemical. tracts. These included Train-
ing .!!l Christianity, Sicknees ~ Death, and. !!2. Ethico-Religious Treatises. 
The second. category' o.f his writings, the strictly poleMical werks, fol-
lowed. the CarseJr incident: !!£ !!!!-Examination, Judge l2! Yourselves (which 
was not published until 1876), !!l Attack 2£2!! Christendom, !!!! Present Age, and 
the issues o.f The Instant .. 
-
The third, and most interesting, eategoJ7, the d.8V'otional. lI) ms, inelude 
the large number o.f Edi.t)'inJ Discourses and Christian Di.scoUl"ses, together with 
three Diseourses .2!! Imagined Occaeions and !!!!. Works 2!!e!!. tierkegaard was 
eare.f'ul. to usue these devotional d1aeourses in his own __ • When one of his 
pseudonyJlOus works vas published, a little devotional work accompanfed. its pub-
of 
lieation. nerkegurd continued. this practice throughout the whole period ot 
his authorehip, .from his .first v<rt, Either!2!:, until the publication o.f I!!! 
Instant. 'fb.e reason .for this vas ltierkegaard's anxiet;y to show, when he .final-
ly revealed. hiJlsel.f' as the author of' the pseudoJ11D1Ous works, that he had been, 
tram. .first to last, a religious thinker and writer, eontlerned only with the 
18 problem o.f becom:1.ng a Christian. 
l8Kierkegaard, ~ Point ~!!!!, pp. 13, 22, 42-43, 92, 149. Se. also 
Patrick, II, 159. 
11 
In an ad.cl1tionsl appendix to his Conelud:!.ng Unscientific Postscript, en-
titled itA First and Last Declaration," I1erkegaard formally acknowledged auth-
orship of aU his pseudonymous writings, and frr the benefit of those who won-
dered at this stranf:.,'8ly involved type of authorship, explained that his pseu-
do~ty was essential to the production of his writings, which "poetically 
req.lired regardlessness in the direction of good and e"fil, of contrition and 
high spirits, of despair and presu.'!lption, of suffering and exultation, etc., 
which is bounded only ideal.lT by psychological .consistency, and which real ac-
tual persaul in the actual moral 11m1tatiClls or reality dare not permit them-
selves to ind1Jlge in, nor could wish to.,,19 
The reuon, therefore, for the pseudoJl11&Ous character of nerkegurd's 
earq writings lies in his own literarr plan: to present, viewpoints consistent 
with the characters of imagined speakers taking metre_ poa:i.tions with regard 
to the topics under discussion. These clul"acters, completeq determined but 
imaginar,y, would present the aesthet1e and ethical viewpoints of 11fe unt11 
of 
I1erk8gaard vas prepared to produce hiSOWIl wom, !!! Point ~!!!! .2!!1Z ~ 
!! ~ A ...u",.:t...,ho..,r .... , in which he rendered an account of the plan and cohesiveness of 
his wark, but which was not published until 1859, four years atter his death, 
although a abort 8UDJIII8l'1' of it was published Wring his lifetime under the 
t1tle, 2!!!1Z ~ !! !a Author. 
Perhaps a more profound Meaning of this involved an mysterious method of 
writing 11es tirst of all in his basic point of view, which demanded that a:tf3 
19 
S,aren K1erkegaard, Concludil;Jg Unscient1fic postscr~ to the PhUoso-i11f& Fragments, trans. Walter t~Tae and tiaVid §Venson (Pr eton;-1iew Jersey, 
9 ), "iF'Irst and Last Declaration." 
12 
author present himself to his readers as actually existing 111 his own t..~ought, 
20 
and liv1ng out his ideals in his own life. He complained of the divorce ot 
life and thought in his OlIn da.T, sqing that. the phUosopher built a beautiful 
palace of thought, and. ;ret lived in a kennel nearby. Therefore, only the ideas 
which he himselt tried to live out to the fullest extmt were to be written in 
his own name) his reflections on the aesthetic and ethical life were embodied 
by' suitable characters, aJ¥l he claimed no responsibility for them. He tried 
even to disassooiate himself as much as possib~e from. his work, and even when 
he vas busiest he ahowd himself for a tew moments each evening at the theater, 
in order to perpetuate the impression that he was a mere idler.2l 
A second reason tor the pseudoJ\YlllOUS authorship 1.,. in the tact that as a 
modern Socrates, he was convinced. that the tntth of ~ doctrine, as a living 
and personal reality, Ct>uld not be communicated directly as a doctrine, but 
only indireotlT, "as an "l;ternative to be chosen, as a possibility to be real-
22 iled." "Thus, the aesthetic V&'J' of life, presE'llted without epmpmmise or 
confusing admixture by an author who himself assimilates it and lives it and. 
exhibits its nature not only in thought but in teeling, is placed before the 
reader. The same thing is done tor the ethical attitude toward life, the 
religious lite as universally conceived, and finally' the specifically religious 
20 




F.duard O. Geismar, Lectures on ~ Religious Thought or Spren Kierke-
gaard (Minneapolis, 1937), pp. ~5-2o. -
13 
mode or existence. The reader is thus confronted with a choice between altern-
atives, and compelled to tind. the answer to life's riddle for himself ... 23 
After the brief exposition of the life of ICierkegaard and of his writings, 
given in this introduct<ry chapter, there remains the task of presenting the 
precise problem to be treated in the ranainder at thi s thesis. 
The primary' object of this thesis is to present and explain Kierkegaard t • 
definition of faith. "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-
process of the most paasionate inwarctness.n24 In order to explain this doctri 
and its Significance, three chapters will be necessazy. The following chapter 
will present the sources at Kierkegaard's CDncept of bellet in the theological 
teac~s or Luther cd the Phllosophical teachings of Kant. Then Kierkegaard' 
reaction to Hegelian Determinism. and to Romantic Aestheticism will be discuss 
in order to provide the mer e proximate sources of his ideas regarding ballet'. 
Hext, ltierkegaard's own positive solution to the problem of belief will be pre-
sented-a solution to be found in the .freedom. of belief, throug:q a study of 
the nature of lUll as Kierkegaard conceived hint, and of the necessiti of the act 
of fa! th as lierkegaard' s expression of man' 8 freedom and fulfilment. 
The final chapter will contain a summary of the thesis, a criticism and 
an evaluation of Kierlcegaard' s ideas. 
23 6 ~., 2. 
2' ~erkegaard, Postscript,p. 182. 
CHAPrJiR II 
THE SJffiCES OF KIERKEGAAP..DtS CONem OF FAITH 
In the precedL'lg chapter, Kierkegaard and his wri tioga were brhflj intro-
duced, and the general plan of the thesis was outlined. The task of the pre-
sent cha.pter is to present the sources of Kierkegardts concept :;i' belie!. 
Si.'1ce KieI'kegaa.x'd· s doctrine of belief is not irJ accord uith Cat.'lolic teaching, 
a !:>rief outline of the Catholic doctrine of Supernatural F'aith will be present-
ed, after which Kierkegaard I s theological sources for his concept of belief 
as they are found. in Luther will be discussed. The lat~er part of this chap.. 
tar will be concerned with the philosophical sources of Kierkegaardts concept 
of belief in Locke, ltume and Kant. 
A presentation of the sources of Kierkegaardts ideas is especiA1l1 neces-
of 
sary because tds doctrine seem to many renders to be completely foreign to tra-
ditional. modes of thought. The d1!ficulty lies ehie.fl.y in his strange termin-
ology. One should not, however, contuse novel terminology with outlandishness, 
the <:be trines of Kiarkagaard become intelligible when viewed in the light of .. 
common tradition. 
Catholic teaching on the subject of SUpernatural Faith differs essentlalll' 
from that of Kierkegaard in its insistence upon the role of the intellect in 
the act of faith. According to traditional ani universal Catholic teaching. 
1 
supernatural Faith is an act ot assent to dL v1neq revealed Truth. Accord-
ing to St. Thomas, this act of assent is essentiallT an act of the intellect, 
performed under the influence ot the will.2 The activity ot the will is re-
quired by the fact that the intellect, in positing an act ot faith, is not 
moved directly by evidence Which is intrinsic to the object to which the as-
sent is given. The object ot divine revelation (according t.o its very defini.-
tion) cannot be penetrated. by' human reason. But though it cOlllPlete].y trans-
cends the understanding, revelation is not al tt!cether foreign to the understand. 
ing, and. though the object of divine revelation bas not that colllPel.lin.g influ-
ence over the intellect which .t1rst principles, immediately sel.t-evident prin-
ciples, and objects of immediate experience exercise oyer it, still the intel-
lect can be scientifically directed to the establishment ot the tact of r .... 81-
atioo. This tact is established by means of extrinsic evidence, chietq mira-
aele. which accompaxv the revelaUon aDd serYe as testimoniala to it. Miracles 
proTide motive. ot credibility sutticient to permit assent, but. insUfficient 
to demmd it. ThUll, in perforllling an act ot faith, the intellect, \hough it hal 
rational grounds for a ... nt, 18 not determined by the intellectual clarity of 
the truth presented; it is rather C01llUnded treeq to act bT the vill, which is 
~oceedings ot the Vatican CouncU, Sess.III, "Constitutio Dogu.tiea de 
Fide Catholica,1I sec. 3, April 24,1870. Manai. L, 431-436. See also St. Thom-
as Aquinas, S. T., II-II, q. 2, a. 1, c., Parma ed., III, 10. 
- -
2 St. ThOJll&s Aquinas, S.T., II-II, q. 4, a. 2, c., Parma ed., III, 20. 
--
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a.ided by grace and innuenced by motives of credibility. 
The act of faith induces in the subject a state of mind called "bellef." 
In the scale. ot the attitudes which the human mind can adopt towards truth, 
bellet stands between opinion and scientific cert! tude. Beliet ditfers on the 
one hand trom opinion (which 15 characterized by an act of assent which is ac-
companied by a tear that the opposite l'IU\Y be true) in the firnmess or certainty 
of its adherence to its objectJ on the other hand, it differs from strict know-
ledge in so tar as a direct intellectual Tisiv~ of the object is lacking. 
Divine fa! th 1s more certain than either opinion or knowledge, however, 
because "the tirst Truth which oauses the assent of divine faith 15 stronger 
than the light ot reason which causes the assent of kncwledge.1t3 
This, in brief, is the teaching ot the Catholic Cbyrch regarding supernat-
ural :I1.th: It is an act or assent to divinely revealed truth, essentially an 
act of the intellect pertormed under the influence of the will, aided by divine 
grace, an act accompanied by the highest cert! tude. 
Although orthodox Catholic teachers, under tho innuenee ot St. A.ugustine, 
had discussed, used, and valued subjective criteria tor faith, and had proposed 
motives of credibilitY' based on the d;ynamism of the h'Wll8n spirit tor God, 4 
nevertheless, they had emphasized the tact that faith itself is essentially a 
3St• Thomas Aquinas, 
228. 
~ Veritate, q. 14, a. 1, ad 7, Parma ad., IX, 
4 Jean Guitton, Actualite de Saint A~stin (Dijon, 1955), p. 138-139. 
Fulbert Cqre, InUtalion.l La PhUosoph eI5a §aint AUgustin (Paris, 1941) J 
pp. 284-281. - - -
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tional act. But trom the earliest dsI's of Protelltantia, its teachers haTe, 
n the contra..r), emphasised the inability of human reason to penetrate and un-
rstand the truths of faith. 
We JIlU8t credit Martin Luther, an apostate Augustinian monk, with inaugu-
ting the fundamental error of Protestantism. From the time of his entrance 
to the monastery in 1505 he vas "troubled by fear of God' fl judgement, by 
oomy thour,hts on predestination, and by the recollection of his own sins." 5 
s early as 1515 he Pagan his campaign to prove that "justification is by fa1th 
6 . 
one." This doctrine !.a.d its proximate origin in his reaction to OcCamiSlll 
in his attraction to the l'IlJ"sticism of his Geman forebears; but a deeper 
lanat10n lie. in his own tortured mind's search for assurance of salvation 
in his eonv1etion ot men's radical. corruption. 
The "Scholasticism" which Luther knew, and against which he reacted vio-
ently, vas a debased torm of Scholasticism-in reality a superficial IiOminalia 
ich Luther's contemporaries inherited from the philosophers of.tha.tourteenth 
Ri fifteenth centurie.. Known to history as Occa:mism., this movement was char-
terized at first by a critical attitude towards the basic principles of the 
raditional metapby'sics. By' Luther's time it had "degenerated into a form ot 
7 heology show1ng great signa of decadence." From talse speculations concerning 
nature of man, the school of Occam was led to an excessive est1m.ate of the 
5 Hartmann Grisar, S.J., Luther, trans. E.Jt.Leonard (Lomon,1915) .. 1,9. T 
orJc, in six volUJll8s, is the authoritatiTe study of Luther in the English lan-
e, and ¥ill be used in this thesis as the source of information concerning 
uther's lite, ideas, and writings. 
6 Ibid.. I, 94. 
7 Ibid., I, 120. 
8 powers of nature and an undervaluing of grace. In his search for justificati~ 
Luther lost confidence in the Nominalistic theoloi:::r of Jcca.llism, and "in hit ex 
aggeration, he went to the t;leo1ogicsl extrema contrar.r to Occarrism.,,9 Luther 
complained, at first, of the rationalistic treatment of the truths of :f'aith in 
10 
Occamism. Later, however, he became an extremist" bnd rejected. all use of 
man's reason in matters of faith.ll 
From the writings of' the mystic Tauler, Luther learned to love the inwa.rd-
12 
ness of faithj a.ncl. thourh he later gave up all atta:'llpts to l€ad a spiritua.l 
life" he retGined the respect for interior religious experiences l-1hich he hEd 
learned from the m;ystics. 
Hore profoundly, the doctrine of luther that "Justification is by faith 
alone, It had its origin in }lis own search for an assuranee of salvation. In-
deed, his doctrine has been called merely a Itumversalization" of his own e.:x-
13 . 
perieneea. His early brooding on predestination and his consciousness of 
personal. sin influenced his denial of man's free will and bro~t about his 
theory of arbitrary imputation by God14 of the mrits of Christ Itwit'hout an;y 
cooperation on man's part or any bu.l'J1ar1 work of merit • .,lS 
8 
~., I, 132. 
9~., I, 120. 
10 Ibid., I, 136. 
11-
Ibid." I, 158. 
12 
Ibid., I, B8. 
13-
Jacques Maritain, Three Refornters (New York" n.d.) p.l". 
14 
lSGrisar, I, 383. 
Ibid., IV, 433. 
19 
Furthermoret according to Luther, human nature has been essentiall;Y cor-
16 iUpted by Original Sin, and henceforth man can neither attain any knowledge 
(f the divine nor perform any good act. Thus, 1£ man does perform a good act, 
his is due to the d~rect action of God;17 tor nothing in man's nature bears 
fitness to Him. 
The only hope for mankind in such a predicament, according to Luther, lay 
n an appropriation of salvation through blind faith, and in a personal certain-
18 
y of the assurance of divine favor as the result of such blind faith. There-
ore, in the individual, the objective criterion of faith is the indwelling of 
.he Holy' Spirit in the soul; the subjective criterion (the only one man can ver. 
~) is an 1ntemal., M1'stical experience which that testimon;, begets in us.19 
8ith itself became for Luther nothing lIlOre than "an art1f1cially st1mulated 
ope that the mrits of Christ obliterated f!lf'ery sin.,,20 
The legacy of Luther, then, was a skepticism, a fundamental m:1strust of 
he intellect, from which subjective experiences alone could save man in his 
. ~ 
latural ignorance of God. Luther's preoccupation with his own interior states 
21 
aused the absorptiCin of his whole theology in the doctrine of salvation, 
md his dogmatic substitution of subjective certitude for objective certitude 
dth regard to salvation transfers to the individual's subjective state of as-








I, 98, 140. 
I, 207. 






Two dominant themes emerge trom this Lutheran anti-intellectualisM and 
merge in the writings of Kierkegaarda voluntarism arnEmotionalism. 
As a Lutheran divinity student, K1erkegaard could not help but be 1ntlu-
enced by the strong voiluntari2$ic element in Lutheranism, which substitutes the 
activity of the will tor the activity of the intellect in the perception of and 
the assent· to the obj ect or faith. 
But an even stronger element than voluntarism in Kiericegaard's writings 
is his elllOtiona.llSJlt. This, too, was part of his heritage from Luther, as a 
second substitute, atter voluntarism, tor intellectual activity in the realm ot 
faith. Evangeli_, or emotional religion, has been an important tactor in the 
developing attitudes of ProtestantiSll, and represents "an aspect ot the spiri-
tual histor,y or modem Europe whidl has received scant official recognition, 
22' 
but in tact constitutes its most significant future." It is bard to overlook 
the emotionalism of ~erkegaa:rd, especially in new of his continual emphasis 
upon "passion" in the detemination ot the true Christian through the act ot 
• 
faith. 
'!'he following chapters will attempt to show more clearly the Lutheran 
elements of voluntarism and ellDtionalia in Kierkegaard's writings, as they-
exhibit his Lutheran preoccupation with the inwardness ot faith, justification 
through faith a1. one, the universalization of personal experience as a rule for 
faith, the appropriation ot suntion through blind taith, and a passionate 
search tor certitude in spite ot a fundamental anti-intellectualism. 
22 
Patrick, II, xi. 
21 
Although Lutheran Protestantism, witll its overtones of voluntarism and 
emotionalism, were important sources of KieIkegaard's thought, his philosophi-
cal sources were equally important, and contributed much to the formation ot 
his basic anti-intellectualism. A discussion of Kierkegaard's philosophical 
heritage reg81'ding the notion of belief will t.he:ce.tore be pre8ented in the fo],. 
lowing pages. 
The rise of the natural sciences in Europe and the Empirical philosophies 
which originated because of them did not af'fect in arq large measure the Scan-
dinavian countries until some time after the upheavals of 1848;23 but the in-
fluence of the Empirical philosophers, particularly through the writings of ~ 
1'l'l.anual KantJ reached Denmark: at an earlier date, and made a pro.tound impression 
on the rrdnd of Kierkegaard. It will be worth while, therefore, to sketch 
briefly the non-theological opinions concerning belief current in Europe belon 
1855. Most non-scholastic philosophers of that period, under t~e iQ£luence 
either of the rational skepticism of Locke, Hume, and Kant, or the dnti-intel-
lectual1sm of Luther, tended to replace all judgements •• even all knowledge.. 
wi. th belief. 
The non-scholastic explanations of belief n1a3 be traced from the school 
of Empirical philosophers, since they, l'OOre than others, had need of justifying 
inference and evidence not intrinsically verifiable. John Locke, for example, 
considered knowledge to be only "the perception of the agreement or dieagreemen 
of two ideas,n24 __ ..a 
-.uu. truth a8 belonging only to 
23 , Hoh ... EI1berg, 9. 
. 24 John Locke, An Ess 
Alexamer Cutpbell 11'i8.~s.~r~~~""""~ij" IV. i. 2, ed. 
22 
proPOSitions.25 True knowledge a.l1d certitude therefore, according to Lock., 
are found only in the cont(l1"platior. of our abstract ideas. 26 ~Je have, to be 
sure, "knowledge of our own being by intuition;" and the lteaistencEl of a God 
21 
reason clearly makes known to us;" but since, Locke claims, ideas do not 
connote existence, lithe knowledge of the existence of aIV other thing we can 
. 28 have only by sensation." However, testil:l0IlY to the existence of anything 
other than our own being extends only to the actual moment of sensation of an 
29 JO 
object. For the knC'wledge of wl other thine~, belief, or "faith" is nec-
essary. Faith, s'Vs Locke, "is nothing illt a firm. assent of the rrind. ,,31 
25 ~., IV. v. 2, Fraser ad., II, 244. 
26 Ibid., IV. vi. 16, Fraser ed., II, 266. See also.. IV. Idi. 7, Frasor 
~d., It;3'46-341. 
27Ibid., IV. xi. 1, has.r ed., II, 32$. Locke offers two proofes tor the 
~xistenee of God, both renective in character. -:me is an "ontalo,_,ical" argu-
~nt, airdlar to that employed by Descartes and St. Anselm. His proof di/rers 
~ro~ the purely contological argument, however, in tt.at Locke nowhere deduces 
~wledg. of realit ies of any 1d.nd from abstract ideas, but proceeds trom the 
selt-intuition of a contingent intellectual being to the conclusion 'bt the 
!Mcessity of the existence 0'1 God as f1rst cause. The second proot which Locke 
a.ttempts is that ,,*,-ich is called the proof "from contingency." In this he is 
iless successful because his knowledge of the contingent world is onJ.7 a udiu 




29Ibid., IV. xi. 9, Fraser ed., II, .33.3-.334- See also IV_xi. 1, Fraser 
ed., Ii,""12' • 
.3OIbid.,p. 324. Here Fraser commente. "It is curious that Locke holds 
the existence at God to be 'Wi. thin the sphere at our unconditionally certain 
knowledge, and that he excludes from that sphere the phenomena and laws 01 Da-
ture, and that ltant an the contrar,y vindicates a pure a priori P~SiC8, aDd 
~en1es that the existence af God can be known by pure reason.* 
31Ibid., IV. xvU. 2), Fraser ed., II, 413. 
_.'/ 
23 
ruth and reason although they cannot contradict one another, according 
to Locke, haTe di.tinct province.. DReason is the discover.r ot the eerta1nt7 
or probabillty ot sueh propositions or truths which the mind arrive. at b.r d ... 
duction made from ••• ideas which it has bl' the use of its natural facultie.J 
32 
viz., by sensation and ranectlan." In other words, reason is concerned 801e-
l.y with the truth or talsitl of propoaitions. Faith, "on the other side, ia 
the assent to 81:fT proposition not thus made out b7 the deduction of reuon, but 
33 tupon the credit of the proponr." The ground of probabilit7 for our as.ent 
to &rI3 proposit.i.on is det.er:m1ned by the agreement of the testiJDon¥ of others 
fwith our own experience, general testimoDT, and revelation • .34 
In Locke'. estimation, then, certitude is found only in our knowledge of 
abstract ideas) we muat believe in the existence of all other things. Locke's 
asaertion that reason clearll malees known to us the existence of God cannot be 
[upheld, given Locke's preaupposit101l8. His reluctant skepticism with regard to 
our knowledge of real existing objects vas t ranaDdtted through ~ -.d laat to 
Kierkegaard, who, it will be shown, continued the _pirical error of" 8ubstitutin 
~eliet for knowledge in dealing with ex1atence. 
Darld'Hwae'8 consideration of belief, an import_t outgrowth of his Jhmcia.. 
mental preoccupation with causality, parallels Locke's d:l.scusa1on. HuM's dia-
32 ~., Ir. :x:rli. 23, Fraser ed., II, 413. 
33Ibid., This "faith," however, refers only to the miracu.loue interventiOA 
of God iii tile universe, which is called Revelation. 
34IbidfA IV. XY •. 4, Fraser ed., II, 36S-)66. Thus the notions "belief" and 
"falthft In e writings of Locke haYe separate functions. Faith is reserved for 
our acceptance of truths revealed b.r God, belief, "the firm assent of the mind" 
is our attitude towards fact. in the realm of senee experience. 
---
Unction between knowledge of "matters of fact" (existential objects) and know-
ledge through "relations of ideas" (affirmations which are "intuitively and dem-3, 
onstrably certainlt) i. wall known. He reached thia distinction in his attempt 
to work out two basic, but mntrad1ctcry, principlesl The firat, "that all our 
distinct perceptions are distinct ex1stences,,,36 or, in other werde, that what 
we can distinguish in perception is distinct also in reality, is a subjective 
principle which l'IIIke s the dis tinetions in real things depend upon the distinc-
tions of the m1al. The Hcrod principle, "that. the mini never perceives &'lfI' ~ 
37 
real connection DOng distinct existences," is based on tt. opposite, objecti1' 
assumption. Hi. whole account of causaliV depends upon the latter pr1neiple, 
ani he af't1ma that causality is not a relaticn between the mind. t 8 own ideas 1Zl 
such a 11.,- that subjective cOservation or reflection will jueti.f)' the notion ot 
real causality. HUIIle admitted that he could mt reconcile these two principles, 
but that be could not renounce either. 36 
In deaJ.1ng with our knowledge through "relat.i.one of idea8,~ therefore, HU1II 
encountered no problMl. He applied his .fl.rst principle, and calcluded with 
Locke that our judgments are only additions cd subtractions ot concepts accord-
ing to the law8 ot association, md are concerned only 14th °Qlantit7 and nua-
ber.o39 He further concluded tn. nothing except 8the science. of quantity aDd 
3, 
David H1.1JIM, An ~ coneenUS'! Human Understanding. iv .1, Library of Lib-
eral Arts ad. (lew rork~~195~), p. 4 • 
36navid Huae, A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix. Everyman ed. (New York 




39uume, Ea8!l, xii. 3, Liberal Arts ed., p. 171. 
number. • • UT safely. • • be pronounced the only' proper object of knowledge 
40 
and denxmstration.1t 
In dealing with our knowledge of "matters or fact,· however, Hume encoun-
tered a serious problem. He applied his second principle, and insistecl that 
knowledge of "matters or tact," or real existmg things, implies S01lll reference 
beyond the mind, and is onl¥ interred from "cause and ettect observed emp1ri-
41 cally." Furthermore, in treating of cause and effect, be asserted that lIall 
our reasonings ccneernillg Callse. ar¥i effects are derived from nothing but cus-
tom.; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitiTe, than the cog-
nitive part ot our nature .... 42 
Two thoughts are cmtained in thi. statemnt. The tirst, that we are de-
termined bT custom to inter a necessary connection between two impressions Uld 
to call the second one an effect, introdllces the second thought, that belief i. 
43 
nothing more than a teeling which accoupanies our idea of any existing thing. 
This cbctrim ~ belief" i. based on Hume's notion that the validity' ot OUl' 
knowledge is tb und only in the viv1dneaa of our impressions. Beliet., he insist, 
i. notbi~ but a more vivid, lively', tcrcib1e, firm, steadT conception of an 
Lh 
object than what the imagination is eYer able to attain. Since the viTdnes. 
of ou" impressions is the onl¥ true criterion far reality, and since it i. the 
40Ibid• 
-~Ibid., xii. 3, Liberal Arts ed., p. 171. 
HUIle, T_tise, I. iv. 1, :t..'veryJll8l ed., I, p. 179. 
43 Ibid., Appendix, Everyman ed., II, 313-314. 






only thing which separates fact from fiction, belie! must be the attitude of 
the mind tCMards all "matters of fact," or realq existing t.hings. 
Hume, like Locke, credited only mathematical propos! tions with providing 
real certitude. He substituted belief for our knowledge of existing things, 
and reduced belief' itself to a feeling. Hume'. reluctant skepticism with regarc 
to our knoWledge or existential objects was transmitted. through Kant to narka-
gaard, who...as will be shown-continued the error of' the Empiricists in substi-
tuting bellat tor knowledge in dealing with ~tence. 
Immanuel Kant contributed much to the erroneous substition of belie! for 
true knCllledge or existential things; but his concept of belief was more volun-
taristic, ald based less on feeling than was that of HUIle. 
Kant must be regarded as a thoroughgoing empiricist., just as Locke or 
Hume, in spite of the importance he placed upon intellectual categories; tor 
no more tha1 Loeke or Hume could he deal intellect.ua1lT with an,-thing except 
objects of direct. perception-phenomena, subjectivel1' modified b;.y the cate-
garies ot space and time. True judgments, tal! Kant, as for th e othdr empiri-
cists, can deal with noth:1.ng rut ooncepts J tor not even the synthetic, experi-
ential character ot sense perception can ;yield knowledge ot real, or "noumenal-
existence. 
Kant's treatment of judgment in the speculative order allOunted to a repu-
diation of reaaoa in t..'le speculative order; but his rejection of reason in t.he 
fields of morality and religion was equa.lly' strong. His avowed. purpose was to 
4S 
liberate religion from the rat1cnalistic influence ot Woltf'. To accomplish 
10 IDaanuel Kant, Religion Within t.he Limits or Reason Alone, trans. 
Theodore M. Greene and HO,.tT. HUdson TCliicago, 1934), p. XiiiX. 
this~ he divorced religion ent:irely from the innuence of speculative reason, 
giving the religious spirit free scope in the realm of Jraotical reason only'. 
Practical reason m.d the will were to supply for the failure of the speculativ 
re8.8m to attain anything beyond the objects of immediate experience. 
Kant's fundanental moral principle, uooonditional and ! priori, det.r.min-
ing the will absolutely, waSI ifAct so thst the maxim. or thy" will can always at 
46 
the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." This law 
is simply "given· J "it is not an empirical fact, but the sole i'act of the pure 
reason, which thereby announces itself as originallY legislative.n47 
Between this ftmdamerta,l law of practical reason and the postulates of th 
existence of God, of t l'8 immortality of t he soul, and of th e life to cane, 
is a necessary conneetion, since the fulfilment of the moral. law is possible 
46' 
only if sum postulates are given. 
These postulates, it must be noted, are not truths which are known; they 
are rather practical assumptions. In Kant's own words: "F1rst •. in ieligion, 
as regards the theoretical aprr ebension am avowal of belief no ass'rt1onal. 
knowledge is required (even of God' s existence) • • • J rather it is merel;r a 
problematical aSSUlllPt10n (hypothesis) regarding the highest cause of things 
that is presupposed speculativel;r yet with an eye to the object toward which 
our morally legislative reascn bids us strive-an assertOl'ial faith, prac-
49 
tical and therefore tree, and giving promise of this its ultiMate aim.-
46Imma.nuel Kant, Critit!e of Practical Reason, I. 1. 7, trans. Thoma. 
Kingsmill Abbott, 6th ed. ( ndOii, 1948), p. 119. 
47 Ib1d. 
48-Ibid., II. i1. 5-6, Abbott., ed., p. 241. 
49-
Kant, Reli on IV. 1. 1, Greene-Hudson eel. • l42. 
These postulates, then, are found in human nature, but only- as postulates, 
invested with reality through tm activity of the will or the "morally legisla-
tive reasoo. tt They are belipved, with a faith that is merely "8ssertorial." 
It is in this way that fBi th--bellef withOllt objective evidence, 1mether intri.n-
sic or extrinsic-fills the void lett when Teoason abOicates. 
The righteous man, says Kant, when faced with t.he postulates of practical 
reason, "nay say: 'I will that there be a God, that r-r:r existence in this world 
-
be also al existence outside the chain of physical causes, and in a pure world 
of the underotcmd.ing, a..."1d, lastly, that my cruraM.on be errl1ess; I firmly abide 
50 
hI this, and will not let this fait h be taken from me. t" The righteous man 
rrw;r make this "assertorial" 8.Ct of faith because the pure moral law binds him 
an a command, and not as a mere rule of prudence; and he is thereby justified 
in assuming ! priori in nature all the conditions necessar,y for its fUlfilment. 
Clesrly, "Kant's philosophy is voluntaristic.,,51 
The act of the will Wt1ich co~stitutes mants faith in God, ~ th, i~norta1-
ity of the soul a'ld in the after lite, induces in him a state of mind called 
belief, which Kant distinguishes !ron 6pinion and from knowledge. "Opinion," 
he states, "is a consciously insuffieient judgment, subjectively as ~ell as 
~bjeetively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as objective-
$2 ~ insufficient. K...1'1owledge is roth subjectively- am objectivelY' sufficient." 
50 Kant" Gritil}Ue 2!.. Practical R,eason, II ii. 8, Abbott Ed., p. 241. 
SlHugo Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung. trans. JOM E. Smith, (Chicago, 1956) 
p. 6. 
S2IDnan.lle1 K~t, cri~e ~ Pure Reason" "Transcendental Method," 1. 3" 
Everyman ed. (New i~k, 19" p. 4&>:' 
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Here he explail.'E that too objective sufficiency of knowledge arises from the 
,resence of phenomena. In the case of belief, this objective suf'fieiency is ab-
sent. In other words, we believe whatever we cannot perceive through the eats-
~ories of' t re inteUect. The subjective sufticiency, on the other hand, of both 
fmowledge and belief arises in two wqs. In t.he case of pra.gmatic beliefs, the 
~ubjective suf' ficiency is determined by a feeling of corrriction, Which mew be 
false, but is ~lot opposed bY' any known objective facts. In the case of r.oral 
~alie!s, which can in no wa;J' be justified object~vcly, the subjective sufticienc 
is deternuned by the l:loral s611t:Lm.ents.53 
The truth of the !'lind, then, for Kant, lies onl7 i..."l the know-ability of con-
cepts; real. existence lies outside the mind t s reach. For knowledge ot things 
as they exist in reality, Kant substitutes an act of bel~ef elicite<:. by the vil 
w-ithout the antecedent ministration of the intellect. Kierkegaard studied Kant 
seriously, S4 ani imbibed Kant t S empirical.. anti-rationalism, as he had studied 
Luther ani learned from him the unknowability of God and the need. tor an appro-
priation of salvation th:rough the certitudes or blind faith. Spurre~ on by his 
irJler1ted introspective spirit, Kierkegaard, will, like Luther, un1versalile 
his own inward experiences in his reaction to ratioaalisInJ 11I:e Kant, he will 
apply a Lutheran theological concept or faith to the philosophical realm. 
53For Kant's treatment ot the I-toral Sentiments, see Preface to the Meta-
@lsical Elenents 2!. Ethicsl xi. A, in Abbott· s translation ot theCillique.2! 
Practical Reason, p. 310. 
54 See, tor example, his Journals, pp. 3, 96, 330, 358, 364. 
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The following e.hapter will t1rst describe Kierkegaard I s reaction to Hegel.-
!ian DeterminiSM. following the example or Luther's reaction to Occamism and 
lKan t IS reaction to Woltl. Secondly I his reaction to Roman tic Aestheticism will 
!be studied, and in this collision with Determinism and Aestheticism will be 
farmed his own positive ideas of faith. 
CHAPrm In 
KIERKEGllRD'S ATTACK lJP')N DETERMnlISM AND M~ICISM 
In the precedir:e chapt.er, the:. re,:oots sources of Kierkegaard' s docr,rine o:f' 
Paith were presented.. It is the purpose of the present cnapter to ir.dicate the 
positive philosophical ele;nents of his notion of: .faith which arose in his con-
Plict with Det.ermirdsm and with Romar.lticl$m. 
Jean Wahl, in his btudes Kierkegaardiennes, writ.es paradoxically, "Ki.erke-
~aard triumphed over Idealism with the aid oJ: Romanticism., and over Romanticis. 
1 ~ th the aid of Ideali~ j and ttlis statement mIi¥ well serve as a general out-
~e for the present ch'Pter. Kierk&gaard's aim in his double triumph was to 
.Lndicate that there are two W'a¥S of beeOIIlini; a C,hristian, both of which are ne-
cessar,y. The .first wa;y to becan.e a Christian is to abandon the Hegel1an glor1-
of 
fiution of tlJe intellect in matters of fal. the This methexi vas wOl'ked out in 
ICiarlre gaard t sat tack upon Hegel' s Deternlillism, an at Lack made with the weapons 
pfferecl by the aesthetic wq of life. The second wq to become C!. Christian is 
~o transcend aesthetic iMmediacy in existence. This rl9thod was made possible 
by ICierkegaarci's attack upon Romanticism, in which he employed. a modified form 
of the dialectic of absolute Idealism, leading the individual through the stacea 
JJean wahl, Etudes K1erkegaardiennes, 2nd, ed. (Paris, 1949), p. 13. 
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of exist&nce fro1';l the aesthetic, thrnugh the ethical, to the ral:t(inus stare. 
Kierkegatl.t"dls attack upon Hegelianism will be C'A'lsidersd first, together with 
be outlIned together with an account of the JdstentiAl dialectie. 
ll~! .. re a U:l.5CU881on of ltlerkeg&are t s attack upon Hegelianism is undertaken 
50!~ f'Jfmtion of M.s knowledge of and his rel.ati:m to Hegel should be n\ade.l and 
his int,ellectual lnd reli{:iftGs !~;{itives fez oPPoSl.tion to fIegel shQ"ld be luen-
tione(:, tor.ether with the reamn 9 f-r his lnte:fest in individual existence, and 
the so~rces (Jt his B~mantic outlook. 
r,uring Kim"kee:;urd t s lifet:tJr.tE!" the ruling philosophy of ne~; «en more 
than of Ge:rma.I\Y·,w.s that of Ceorg ~;1.1.helm Friedrich Hegel. who died in. tbe 
year 1831, the year after Y.1erke~a.ard entered the University of Copenhagen. It 
f 
is kncwn thQt Kicrltegaarc, even during his 6.rly jears a.t the tuiivereit;r; vu 
of 
\;011 &Cqtudnted ~rith the Hegelian l:U'ld. anti-.Hegolian writings or the 18"'8, and 
2 
t.hat he !at Br read the vcr ks or Hegel carefully. w'f.iether or not he misun-
derstood or rrJ.s.:L.'lterpreted the theories of Hegel 1s not relevant Lere, sinee 
h~ ~f't9l1$ ttl h,.,re been L~terested in Her,el only as the "~ !! ori(;O of a 
3 broad int~llectual &11\ social 1I'1OV'ement," against which he waged a hi. tter one-
.: 2:.ramelJ Coll.1ns, The .Mind .2! ~f:jrkeE!!!!! (Chicago" 19S3), pp. 104-10$. 
'Ibid., lOS. 
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K1erkegaa.rd seldom discussed the subtler refinements ot Hegelian1sm in hi. 
writings, he concentrated his attack rather upon 1ta .tunda1Ilental presupposi-
tlons-or upon what; he thought were its fundaaental pr8fJUpposit1oos. A stud;y 
of the cauUc ant1-HegelJ.an oo_.s 1n bis work suggests that he cona1de1"e4 
HegelJ.an1Iil an objective phenoaenol.ogioal soience, in 1Ih1ch all being and all 
knowledge are reduced to abatracUon and abstract, general categorin. In such 
a q.tem, he believed, realit,. becomes notb1ng ~re than a fI18tem. of abstract 
essences, laD.ledge and being an ld.entitied, be1nt a'Id. beeond.ng are ~1ated 
into a unitT through an abstract, i_nent d1alect1c&1. process which 81T1thes1-
ze. all contradictions. and the 1nd1Y1dual exist.EDt, as a _re IIlOMftt 1n tbe un.. 
folding ot an abstract idea, 1 ... both indi'V'1dual1t,. tI1~ •• It-de~t1on. 
JUIR.OO'ARDt S MOT !VIS 
K1erkegaard' s prot .. t againllt the 1IIposmg intellectual. structure ot He-
gelian tho~t. was based upon intellectual _ religious DDt1Ye.. lntel.lac-
tuall¥, he found the pret8laioDs ot pure thought ridiculous, and hiJ wr1tings, 
part1cu1arlT the Conol.!41nI tJnac1entitlc Poetscri2t, U"e tull of jibes at 
"The Syetea, III aa he called Hegel.1aD1aa, tor ita failure to account t. the in-
diY1dua1 exieting person. As a rel1g1a.:ta writer, his react.ion to Hegel1an1S1l 
has been called by 0118011 -the auperated proteat of a re11g1Cll8 coneeience 
agaiDBt the centur1es-old. auppreaaicm ot existence by abstract tb1n1d.ng ... 4 
Hegel1arda WQ11d bave been ot little interest to him bad it not seemed to be 
the cause of the lack of rel1g1w.s teJ:fOr and ethical reaponei't>1lit7 to wb1ch 
£!"" let 0 w~",~ ,~ V LOYOL.A, . } Etienne Gl1son, Being.!e! ~ Ph1l.osophers ( .~onto~~~IPV 1$3/ 
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his age was prey through its atte:~ipt to r,:,conoile Jfe~.;01iallism with t.he teach-
ings of Ch.rist4n:lt,..' 
His early interect .Ln tile individual. hu:.mm soul and ita athical respon-
hia <wn destin,y instea.d of bein~{ determined by some inoxorabl1 ISvolvi..'lg idea. 
For in 00.1" age it is not ;~l3r(;1;r au l."l\:U.vidual scholar or 
tb1n1ter here and there who concerns l1J.meell with uaivarsal 
hiator;n thu wiwle age 1oucU.1 dewuwds it. laevertheles8, 
Etb.1c. an:! tt. eth1e81., as Calatltut1.ng t.he eS881'1t1&1 an-
chQrat':.e for all. individual exiGtence, have an indefeasible 
cla1a upon e'fIf!f'T existing 1nd1v1dualJ 80 1ndet ... ible • 
claim, that whatever a man r.uq. accantpUtah in the wcrld, 
eft1l to tbt 1IlOet aatonlah1ng ot ach14R ..... tB~ it 1" none 
the less quite dubious in its significance, unless the 
1nd1v1~al bas been ethicell.y clear 1Ih_ he made his ohoiee, 
has et.bic.a.lly clarilio<i !lU eh¢~.lce to l:I.imselt. 'rho ethical 
q1a11tT ls jealous tor ita own integrity, ~ 1s quite un-
1JIi>res5ed by the W'At utwnding quant1t,v.. .• 
Secondly, KierkegurC' s early-a1ll&kened 1nterc:st in individual experiene4t 
and in personal reaponsibUity was a~rpened b;y the great social levelling 
I 
process, to be different is unpatriotic. The herd JKmta11ty cieve.loP5, &nd 
the iruJi vidual will i8 absorbed in't.o the macinea. o£ tohe crowd; the individual 
Spatr1ck, II, )2. 
,j 6 
Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. ll9-120. 
1..,868 hi. Hnse of indiviC1ual rtJeponsibillt.Y, and nis fear of personal. judi-
7 
_nt. Accordillg to IUerkegaard, in modern h\t'llan herds, "that et.ernal respon-
s10111t.,y .... 1d the rliiiJ.,i.c;io\JS U.l.Ilf;li..ng out or t.lle individual before Goel is ie-
a 9' lNl~wo.,tt and us wen/'; 60 far u to • .,- t.b.at lithe erotui is untrutn," , and this 
il,'1"9uponaib1e, 01' at leadt. weakell8 lns senae of ruponaibility by red:ucing it 
10' 
to Ii iractJ.ou.1f 
be wil.l.ing to take the f:.r at stepa toward a rebuilding of persoll4l integrity 
t.hrolCb Christian f>Aroiam; far "Chr1at1an heroism (and perh4's it is rarely to 
be seen) 18 to venture wholl¥ to be o!1enl.f, tUII an indiv.idual man, th1e del-
1n1te ind1daual. 1lWl, alone be.f'ore the face oj' God, alC8l8 in t.his t.remendous 
~ MlJd this t.rel1randous respo.naibility; but it is not Chri:ttiNl hero!_ 
to be hUl'Gbugged b.r t.ae pure iaea o£ lnuvm1ty <Jr to pliv the g .. e of· ..,.elliDg 
11 ~ 
at war l£.l hiatc:lr7.lf 
'l'hua, 1napired b7 hia all-conaUlUing interest in the individual, wi t.h in.-
tellectual ani religious r:rotivation,. K1 .. ke~ beg.an his lifelong war aga1nat 
) 7~)~ren Klerkegaarcl, !!!! iliclc:noss ~ I-tn, trans. Walter Lowrie (Jxford, 
19U), p. 201. 
ti 
S;reD .u .. kegurd, The P1'e8en\!.a- trans. Alexander' IJru aDd Walter Low-
rie (''lXtoro" 191.0), p. )0-:-
9 
K1empard.. !!!! Point .2! View. p. ill. 
---'-, ~ ,fOrbid., l.l.4. 
"'~_/ ......... 
U 
Kieri:egurd, I!! Sickness ~ neath, p. h. 
Il.ertecaard·. bettlewith HegelianS .. 1n bia mature Tears, as not.ed .boYe, 
was tought with the weapons or Rounticu.. What, t.beD, vere \be atUtudes of 
Romanticism which so intl\leDCed the a1nd or w.a writer! The..,.l¥ part of h18 
career, we lcaow, _8 apent 1n ~ aeatbet.1e studte., and he read the worice 
ot Novalia, Tieek, lIoftzaan.. Vakenroder and the hrot.here Sablegel, .a vell as 
those or tbe older Romanticists ot the StlD"Jll!!!! Pre« peri.04, Goethe, He1ae, 
and SehU.l.er. Be had • areat respect for the prtt-l"OIIaDtic pbUo8ophera, Baa_ 
12 
cd Jacobi, and expres.ed hi. adIIdratlon tor tb_. He rNd ... utter of 
ealne the work. of Oebl.euebl.aaer, ])eau.rIc'. area'''' modern poet, aDd v.rote 
a review or one of the boob of another ~ h18 aorltempo:rv1eS, Bane CturlniaD 
1) 
Andereen. 
AU \he .. _i'er8 bad 1n ClOJIIIllOD the tact that tbeT broil. ot~ ftJaUou 1d. tI 
ratJ.onal.1_ and. dwelt in \be 8P1rit at aub..1eeU91tT and 1nd1v1duaU._. Their 
rol8l'ltlc1a ftfDPOIaed 1tselt in delicious oon\ellplation or .,sUe rapture " tJ:a 
influence or the int1n1te and non-raUonal, the .. st.erloua and. inexplicable, th4 
dark am 1ID08ftn7 tm-e .. or the WQl"ld.ft~ r:t.,y objected. to the iDsut£1c1eac1u 
of the apeculatl ... e intell.ec', am. •• pound ·creat.i ... e iMginat10n or tree iMpir-
.• ~. Ullertcepardll P08'"1'12t. p. 224, tC1r example 
".> :US"'_ nark.gurd, From!!,!! pe; of .2!! StJ.U ~. This 10 rt, the 
tirst of Iter.pard·. pubfi'8hed Vd~, 1,!.~~ Udlibr.1n English. 
• 'C:,. '. " .. , .. :,,~~i:;-1W;<:; .. ~."''''!'i''~'! .~'.,..~~ •. ~, ......... ~.c,,_ •. , ._," 
i ;':., ~atr1Ckf II, 1,3. 
ation, teeling, or pusion, :reverie or irony, pure intuiticm or ingenuous epon-
is' 
taneity" 'in tla1r _')proaeh to reallV. fCierkegaard trom. his earliest ,.ears 
was under the s1»11 of ta1e subject.ive emotittlalI_J he rov'.!'" ~~oll7 escaped t~. 
it, although he la.ter trmscended Jar. Romantici_ in 111$ existent1al d1alect1e 
It was this Rrmant1tJ attitude of 1I1nd, however, lII. ttl its tPphasia upon indirl-
chal experience and 1Ii th its nm-ratimal approach to experience, when coupled 
with r1e!kegaardt s adherance to primitive Lutheran intellectual. skept,1cil11l, tba 
proY1ded a plattorm trom which to attack the pretenalona of Absolute Ideal1811. 
I1~RD'S AN'l'I-HmJ!l.IlN THESES 
~1erkegaard. ... b1s mature critieism or Heg&Un Detem1D1_ upon three 
,16 
theses. Firet, Hegel's vcrld-histor.1.cal p:rocus as the necessary evolutiQn ot 
the Absolute Idea is d .. tructive ot tt. ethical lite or lWl as a responsible 
individual becaua8 1t l"e<heea tbe ethical DIl8tl to a _re speetatQ1' of ethical 
principles. fierkegaarti oppoH. Hegel'. position on the grOOMS or huIia tree-
dome Seomd, Hegel,doe. not realize that the existential. act a~ 81Gb camot be 
includ.ed. within a 8,..te or tinite tbouftlt, no matter how all-1nclul1ve and s1's 
tenatic. nerkegurdts objeeUon to Hegel on thie scere is _de tr<D the stand 
point ot ex1etence. 'rtdl'd, HeBel cannot deal with the basic notions of being 
i l 6.rbeH three these. were suggested b7 Janes C:ol.ll.na in his boo Ie The 
'Mind of K1erlceM' 1'1'. U9-l2O. They are to be round in substance i.ll"tbe 
tntrodietion i~rlcegaard.'. concm of Dread. trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeto~ 
New JerseY', 1944) J the actual, aelScl reason::i.ng is to be found in Kierice-
faard'S ujor phUo8ophic.al WOKS, the PbUoeophical Frapents and the 
Concluding Unaelenut1c Poatacr12t. 
being and becOll1ng, 'Mb1ch are non-eeptual. llerkegaard' s objection to Hegel. in 
this thuis l1ea in his existential catfpgorr or conttneenq. These three the-
ses of !{ierkegurd w1U be treated in turn, together with an exposition of lier.. 
kegaard's positlve philosophical doctrine with regard to his own notioDS of 
treed.ODl, existence, and contlngeDC7. 
rierkeaaard.·. first theai. aga1nat Hegel emel'ge. from his emphasis upon 
individual tree40mJ t'or he eon tends tbat Hegel t. theory of world b.1st.ory is in-
Weal to tbe ~eal lite or man u a responeib1e.. free, individual, aDd that 
Begel reduo .. eth1e_ to abatract eont.8I1plation. K1erlcegaard..,...u ot the 
....-ld-historieal view as ·objectivizatlon," and ~I 
The objective tendttnc;r, vb1eh proposes to l'I\ake ft'C'J'one an 
oMernr, ad in lta max1aua to traDlt .. 1'Il hill ·into 80 ooj"ti" 8A 
obaen'er that he become8 almost a giloet., aca.l"Cel;y to be distin-
guished tro. the t."meadows epait. of ttl. historical put-t.h1. 
tendenea naturallT retua.s to lcnaI or Uat.en to aqything excePt 
what etaDd.s in relation to itself. • • • For lt is relarded as a 
.at.ti.e! thing that the objective te.ndetlq in (Ur ec.tton at ;,inte!-
lecrtual. contMplaUoa. 18, in the newer lin,1l1st.1c uRge" the 
etb1cal answer to t.he cp •• Uon of what I ethicall.1 bave ta do, 
and \.be t.uk usigned. to thlt contemporar,r nineteenth eentv,y is 
war-ld hist0J'7. The objective tendency- 18 the wq and the truth; 
th. etJd.cal is, becollling an obaC'!1"4'er. That the 1nd1 v1d:ual auat 
become an obsener 18 the etbical answer to the problem of lite-. 
at" elM ooe i. coarpe1lecl to &88W18 tbat, t.heNl.,8 no et.bical <lUes-
1;100 at all, and in 80 far no ethical aQ.S'WCW. l" 
What nel"ke,urd 18 aqing here, in his indlrect VIII, 1. that the man who 
espo\l8e .. "The 87st..- become8 a spectator at tbe eth1cal lite, am 101" him 
knowledge beeanes virtue. Kierkegaard object.s to this view, uinta11'ling that 
is''I1e ethies tnWIt thereby p&rish. He 1ne1atSI 
It 1& tor this reason that ettt:1.es looks upon all world-historical 
knowledge v:tt. h a degree of 8U.8p1d.OD, because ;1 t mq so eaail¥ 
b8COJ'!le a snare, a demoralizing .esthetic diversion tor the 
knowing aubjoct, in 80 tQ%' 68 tb. diat..iJlCtioo between what Qoes 
or does not have tlistorical 8ign1tl.canee obe)"s a quantit.ative 
d1al~tic. AIs a wusequence of tids tact, the abwlute ethical. 
d1st1nction between good and evU tends tor the b1storl.cal wr-
.... to be MUt.ralJ.aad in the .eathet1c-_tapi:v's1cal c:1eterm1na-
Uon of thl great am 81gn1t1eant, 18 lIbi.ch eategorr the bad 
hu equal ad.I11ttanca with tbe good.. " 
tili __ s that. an &tt~ to lead t.he ethical life bT beeomiD& "an oheer-
er of w\a'ld histo178 18 immoral. l'lot. lood ao.d ~vU, but the "&ignUieUlt" 18 
Par the h:\.atar'1cal. ...... r the aha of aWdcs. The Obs,."er grove incapable 
~ d1at.1nguiahlna et.h1ce.l good and _11 hom the deeire of hiatar~ atature 
, 19 tD:i the magnttudft oC h1a con t.ribut.1on 1:.0 the course ol hia tl'Jrl". 
THi XOTL':Jn 0' Fr~M 
In place fJl Heg,.l f. wrld-b1ator1cal ethics. lieritep.ard ohutpiona the 
rreedom of man I s relationship w1 th God, ad tlat.l¥ cleclue. that t.he t.ruiT e~ 
tical. lit. 1s a matter uf 1nd1v1dual reapona1b1l1t.Y, whereas a ~1d.-llistor1cal 
illUde col\p1et~ invalidates the .aaent,1al individuality am treeciom. 'fof the 
20 
~all1t •• 
nerkegurd t s great ambition to aave et.b108 va_ therefore promplied b¥ bia 
conviction tbat. a free indi"idual baa a decisive role to plq in .naping h1a 
. ··,16 
, . Ibid., 120. 
-
•. 19 : Ibid., l2O-l2). 
-
: 2OIbU•• 131-139 
c wn destil:v'. his relationship to God is a "poss1b1l1ty-relat1onahip.1f wh1ch 
IlUSt be actuallzed l'q '" tree act of the rill. The neD chapter will cluJ. with 
he tree po$itln, of this :relationsh1p by the individual in the ac~ ot faith. 
THE SmlND THESlS 
Uerkepardls seconti thea1s aga1Jl8t Hegel cont.itVi8 that iiegel cannot in-
1ude the exin.ent.ial act as 8uch within a qat •• ot tin1te thOUtiJ1t, and there-
are must content hiuelt with .. purel¥ conceptual, abstract 818tem. To pJ'OYe 
ibis usert.ion, Kierkegaara proposes the dual tact \hat Ifa logical sT8t_ 1. 
21';"·"·~ 
ossibleJ an existel'lt1al 81'810_ is imposa1ble.lI . A 1o{2'1eal "8ta.it It'I.I'3'be 
.nterred, is one that 18 complete and tin1ehect. So K1erkegaard s... to regard 
t wheu he sq. jeating171 
I sball be u 1fil.l.1ng a8 the 11m man to tall down in wrah1p 
b.ron the Sy'atem it only I ec -.nl:lge to 88t .,. •• on 1t. 
Hitherto I have luld no 8uCceU, • •• One. or 'twice I have 
been on the Terge of beDding tbe knee. But at the last moaent, 
wheR I alread1' had. rq hancUcerch1et spread on the 1J'O\lnd, to 
avoid Bolling q troUMr8. and I !"tade a trusting ap~:'Ieal to one 
of tne 1n1t1a:ted w.ho st.ood by. 'Tell m8 nov aincerel¥, 18 if. 
ut1rely f1.n18b.ed; tor it so I v1l1 knMl down before it, .,..n 
at the risk: ot ruining a pair ot tl"Ouse" .... '-I alwa;ya 
received the same anawert 'No, it is not yet ql,lite fi"iahed. t 
And GO thei! vu amther postponement-ot the Sy'atem, and ot 
fft¥ homage. ·2. 
A 10&1081 system, it ma:r also be noted, ia one in which real existence, 






ideal and abstract existence bearing the s tamp or necessity. Kierkegaard warns 
ttl.tl.t ffi,n the mnstruction of a loricsl system, it is neoessary first and tore-
f'lost to take care not to inell~de In it anything whlet. :is s\lbject to an e xi.ten. 
tlal d1alectic,n2) that is, anythinf, which has real existence. CO!:18equentl¥ .. 
Ii. lorical system, tor vhIJt it 1s worth .. ilS, in Kierke.gaard' s opinion, possible. 
It 18 possible to Mall utaoture a completely- articulated, tullY' dfi'eloped system 
L~ pt:re l.y abstraet tc.r;as. But an abstract Wtl:' Id, a world manufactured of con-
eepta, is by no means the real world, the world in which responsible indivi-
duals work out their salvat1m in tear :no. to rcm'Jling. A s7St_ or purel¥ ag. 
strut thought, therefor'e" which pretendz to explain reality is comical; and 
this is "The S,ystem" Which K1crkegaard unceasingly ridicules. 
On the othf'.t" hand .. the i!!tpossib111ty of an existential 8.1stem, that 1s, a 
completely developed and tull3 determined s;rst~l of r ... -:al existence, 1s indi-
cated by iUerker;aard when, tirst. he challenges "The System" to make the im-
mediate beginninr whi<'il it Clai:fUS; and Ncnndl;y, when he challe~e. Jot to pro-
eeed. w1thorrt, pre:mppoaitiona. In other vorda, Kierkegaal"d r1II.inwns'fi;.bat it 
one takes into account the condit1ons of N"al exiutence, it is impossible to 
ca.rry out the abstl'ttct speculations of "1.'he &)rste1l'l," sinee real existence can-
not be known in an abstraet, co:rx:eptual was-. He W~1rns: "Let us then proceed, 
bu., let \1S not tty to deceive one another. I, Johanl'.lAUi Climacus, .. a lauman 
being, neithaJ" more mr le •• ) and I aaaume that. an;yonB ! mq have the honor to 
with tl1,·!t; tor in tbat eaM be instantly vanishes from "!Q' sight, and fro. the 
2)Ibid. 99. 
aaw..e sight ot overy IfDrtal. ~ 
The t1r6t proof. tneraforc, of the impossibility of an existential system 
.i.~ found ill the l.nIpo61S1billt.y of ahat K4"l'kagaard thcu.,;ht lias tl'l.a ,. i!.I'ln€o:i.ate 
t.g1nn1.ngft of Hagel-the !tPure Be.i.nt~tf describoo in Hegel's logic.2$· K1e:rileQ-; 
ee. i.r.. th.& .f''W'c 3ei~ oI: ilegel rAther the term of an entire process of abst.rac-
" d 
tion and re11.fiilctive anal,tsi$, 8ld not em 1r41aadiat.e beg1tmirlf; at all. 'l'he pro-
cua of aqstractJ.on which tenn1ru:;.ta~ i.."l the Aboolute Idea is necessarily, in 
.. k t ~-t i-~- ," .~, __ 1_ l-.._-"' •. " 2-1. .. : 
.. .l.6T egurd IS v.e'W" an J..U.I..I. .. ite 0;£1 .. lone. ~:iebU .cannot ,I_e a VVii).ull'}.l.r:.&:. 
nukegaard's second proof of the impaaaibil1t,y or an existential Sf.tam 18 
concerned with t.be possibilit;y' 01' p:t'Ogr66sin& philosophieal.ly without prasuppoa 
itiolW, th.t is" of neglecting "he iJruwrl presupposition oJ: real existence. 
less ~~o.Ph¥ bwa always EU'1ded-tro» lIeg\:ll to Hussarl-in tJle disappearance 
-, -"! 
Q!.' the 8trtp1r:1coiiil .{.l.Wl'lWl ael..f.' .,,28~' ~t was precisely on ti.tis ground ti1at Kierke-
gaard obJected to lie6el' 8 preaupposi tionleas philosopb;y. It was ,lis t:oncern to 
And. how are the individual partioipants related to tne joint. 
eftortJ wbat are the categories wb1eh mediate 'between the 
) ~'2iIbid. 99. 
-
2SGeora: W1lbelm rre1drich Hegel" The Sc1C1DCe 9! !.:s1c. ",11. 86, trane. 
wUl iaaa wa,ll&ee, 2nd. ad. (London, 19.3Ih p. 158. 
: "?6Kierkegu.rd, Poatscript" pp. 101-102. 
I 27. ~ 
" Ibid., lO~. 
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individual IDd the world..proeeu, and • 18 it aaa1n who 
strings th_ all together on the qataatic thread? Is he a 
human being, or is he apecul&tive philosopb,y in tb. abswact' 
But it be is a human b e1ng, then be 18 alsO' an emUng indi-
vidual. Two wqa, in general, are op_ tO'r an exilti.ng .inI1-
v1d.ual. Either he can cb hi. u~t to torget that be is an 
ex1ating IiiaIv1dual, D7 1fh1cb. he beeo •• a cClllic tipn ••• 
Or he can concentrate bis entire -ru upon the tact that. he 
Ii an ex:1et.'lrlg 1nd1. v1dual. It is troa w.. a1de, 1n the tir.t 
instance, that objection 1W8t be made to I!'I.OQem phllosopb,yJ 
.' •• not \hat. it haa a ldataken prqu,ppoa1t1on ••• blt that 
it has & comical presupposition, occasioned by its having tor-
t:otten • • • ..to it me.. that. ,)'Ou and I and be are humaIt 
beings, each one tor hiueli.ZY '"' 
The torego.ing • ..- be 8\lJIIIVIrl.zed by aq1ng t.hat the attack of nerkelUl"d. 
~ga1n.t Hegel'. NYOea'UoD of ex1steneewu _sed O'n the tbes1a tbat an .xis-
~ent1al erst. 18 iItponible beoaue a1atence car.tnOt be :included w1th1n a tul. 
~ complete am tll1l3 articulated synEll1 or huDan thought, bot only in the lIin<I 
JQ'L') 
pI Gocl~' . A logtoal .,..tem 18 poaaible a8 long as the ..,.1t._at1 ... 1s aVAN 
fthat he 18 dealing mlT v:l.th ccn.c.ta aDd not with reallV. It ol'll7 ~el bact 
regaJ'ded Me qeta aa aD .expen-nt in thought, then "he ~ be the at.roapat 
)l,-~~~ 
""hllrer who baa 11 ••• ; tir in tlplte or K1erkepa1"d~a adlldrat.1oit tOr Hegel" 
of 
~erd.u, he aaw that Hegel' a &'y8t-, 1JIpoa1.ng ... it wae, l1&d to !"e"1'!Ain a qatea 
ot concept.. It COttlc.i not explain the real world) tor the real world 1. an 
existential world, and as such cannot be .Y8tematised. 
THE NOTION or WSTltWCl 
It is the notion ot real ex1ateDoe, therefore, tlhicn Kierltegaard propose. 
in order to desVoY the pretena10na of Hegel's coneeptual world. What, then, 
do_ IU.erk8gaard mean by the term "existence"? 
A fUll treatMent ot the special meaning of t.hilll no tJ.on of ex.1atence will 
be reaerYed tor \he next Ohap\er, where UeJ'kegaard' f' ~ncept ot the nature ot 
all will be diSCU8sed, but 1t wUl be profitable \0 note here tbat es18tence, 
tor X1erkegaard, doe. not mean a _" actuality, •• tand~-outsicie-ot-caU8esJ 
for "not tor •• ~.le ... t 1& 1t torgotten that tne &\lbject 1&1 aD a1eting 
.'~, 1nd1ytdual, aDd that exletence 18. proces. of beoolllin«.tt '\'That ax1atellce 1a 
pr1ur1lT • proce •• ot beoomiDg 18 indicated by the atat .. nt tbat "God do .. 
not th~, be creates, God doe. 1'I>t ext.t, be 18 eternal. Man thinks And 
ex1eta.;;33)··~ i. hDutable. lMt\ SIl, 8.. dU'termt tl"OIl ('.«} 1n.811 ~1n1te, 
<lualitati .... wa,y, 1. a col18taD\~ chang1ng creature. Tbt d1.tferenee ofbetwHD _ 
and Ood, aa expreeHd b.r I1erkelaard, must not. be 1magiDed.e a complete 
"othemeaa,. tor, when apeaJdng ot the true aqateat1c thinker," 1t1erk.,aard. 
aa.ya that ·it. 18 he who 18 outside or ex1etence and. 7et in existence, 'Who 18 
in hi. eternit7 tONY" conplete, an:i ".t. :Lncludu all ex1s\eUce wit.bi.n hiJue 
.l/.I:, .~.~ 
~jl-",,.,, 
--1t 18 God.... rnm 1ih18 stateant" it aq be interred that, in apite of 
narkegurd • s repeated warning to reatember that God 18 completely "other" \ban 
, -.nts ex1st.ence IVq' stID be viewed as a ldnd of pU"tic1pation in etemitT, 
specially when lierkeCurd maintains 'tbat "existence is the child that is born 
t the infinite and the tinite, the eternal and. the terporal •••• ~ '\.~ real 
tterence between fin:Lte beings and the Win1te Oa.i 18 that f1n1te be1n€a 
The a:>tion "coming to be" 18 an 1I1portmt one han, tor " • .una to be" is 
naid.red a proc ... -a proc ... of connet atrJ:~1ng.~1Jneric:eparcl expre .... 
ell moet cl. ... l¥ .eD be ...,.8, 11Th. prine1ple that the .ld.eUIlI eubjecti .... 
h1nker ia conatantlT occupied in atr1Ying, cbe. not aean that he bu, in the 
Wte 8ense, a goal toward wtdch be atri. ... , and tilat he would be 11n1ahed when 
had reached this goal. ., be .t.n.".. inArl1tel.T, 18 ~onatant17 !! em!!! 
becoa1ng •••• Th1.a RJM!H !! ~ !l!!!! th1nlc:er's !!! a1etelle •• ·~~ 
Th. edateDc. ot the tinite 1ndt:t1.dual, than, is a Pl'OC." ot beooIl1ngJ aAd 
om1ng-to-be 18 a process of conatat at.r1Y1ng. Since all beoolldng t8Jc:.8 place 
til tree4Gm,,,36 ~t. lIneond1UonallT excludes the l:iepUaD d.1al.ect.ie o~ the nee-
Hl7 ft'olutlon of the ab801ute ictea. nerkegaard t • conainl-to-ba eon.tit-ut. •• 
discont1nuity in nat11ft, a gap in exi.tenoe which cannot be bridged to" a pro... 
•• s of mecti.aUon, bu.t only' by the leap involved in .. tne dee1a1on. X1erlce. 
pard'. <x>ctriae at b8COftlirJg will be :seen more tUlly in tbe next aecUorl of 
, ''!bid., 84. 
-J&~ren Kierke,aard, PbUoaoehical lraf!!!!ta. trans. David JI'. Sveneoft 
(Oxford, 19)6), p. 61. 
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th1e chapter. the means by which the individual become. will be discU8Hcl in 
the following chapter. 
THE THDID THESIS 
'fhe third o£ Kierkegurd's objections against Hegel is expreased 1n the tba '" 
sis that in tl» metaph¥sical order, He«el CanDOt 4eal vi t.h the baa1c mUons or 
being and becoming, since he cannot diatinguiah between \be.e concepts, pr-4 __ 
17 in their status as ooncepts, and the reality which ttl. represent. iC1erke-
gaard objected that Hegel ignared completely the. tact. that. JIIUl 18 continpAt. 
and, moreover, JUde being and beco1ll1ng eternal aDd neoeuar.r l'Nl.it.1es. 
Uerkegaard apeaks sllghtingl¥ ot the "tnnUt, with wb1ch qat.eu.t.1.ta 
concede that He~ baa perhapa net been successful 1n :lnt.roducing 1IO'I8Il8Dt. .,,-
€'.rywbere in logic, tt~ ~c the who18 .,.stem 111 Suppold ,. be a C01'llP1etel,y 
ae1.t-eY01'ri.ng principle. It the trana1t1on tl'Cft one ata"e to anotber in tlle 
system. i. inexplicable in one case, it 18 entirel.7 :1nn:pl.1cable. neri:eguH 
mainta.1na fu.rther that "Hegel'. unparalleled di8eOftl7, the subject til. 80 -r-
of 
alleled an adJ4rat1on, nanal,y, t;he 1ntroduc~on of l'ID"ement into logie, 18 a 
hOi 
sheer contusion of the logloal acieneeh'" ltierke8aard complains that Hegel'. 
theor;y ot Jad1ation, *ere1>7 two contradiCtory e1--=a can be 8,1Dth .. iaed into 
a new and (litterent ale .. t, cannot explain real iIIOr_nt or chang •• aID our 
t1mu no explanation is torthCOlling as to how Mediation como about., wbether 
- it reaulte flo .. the 1IOYeuut of the two tactcre and in what aeue 1t alread7 
1s conta1Dad 1n ttl_. or vbetber it u _thing .. 1Ihich ~., u.d. it 






so, hov." It the neW' element. is already present. in the synthesizing ele-
ments, there cannot be any real change, an.r actualization ot 8Ol'IlG\hing not 1n 
existence before-tor be change Xierkegaardmeans "the ~e involved in be-
ct'JYIing ••• a tren3ition tram mt bfrl.ng to being, of f'rol'1 possibillty to 
hi ' 
aetual1t.1." If the transition ~ posaibilitT to actualiv is effected b,-
s(J!tething rot present in the two previous elements, then Hegel cannot name the 
causi:t1f, element, II.~ hi. poSiting o£ ~O'V'e.ment is irrational: "the 'NQN trans-
ition 18 a mere ch.1ara in tbe sphere Qf lor;ie and 1+,. true plaee is in thEt 
words, negel's dialectical moven1ellt 1s the mnceptual untolding ot a plan; it 
is rot, am oanmt be, a real *"'elW'lt. 
Berel cannot claim, s~ Kierkegeard, that neee.sit! i8 a qnthes18 of 
poes1biU;ty aM actualitYJ tor "nothing e"t"er co •• into be1ns; with necessity; 
wtmt i8 necetl8&l7 neve" comes into bait'llJ nothing becomes necellS«%7 by coll!1.na 
Lb-' 
into being.- 'In these three stattmenta can be totmd [lerkegaa,rdca 0W1!l phil. 
oeopbieal doe trtne ot change. 
THE lOTION 0F Brer'lMING 
First, "nothing eYer comt. into being with nee.a8itT." This statement 
!las a pa.rtl.y' negative, partly positive, value in Uerkegaardts d.oetrine. Ne-
gatively .. it 1. directed against the HegeUan di.al.ectic of the neee8s&rT 
'/ .. 1il'''' 
; S;ren Kierkegaard. It!f!t1t1Oll, trans. Walter Lowrie (Prineeton, Nw 
Jere.,.. 19L1), pp. 33-34. · 
:'/.1 b;2 
. K1e2"kagaard, Philoso@cal l1':!I!!!n1is, p. 60. 
• .. ' It)aoren lCierkeflard, Tbe C01'1C!ft of Dread, t.rana. 'Walter Lowrie (Prinee-
ton~,~ Jereey, 191Jh), p.'"'"7J. -
'\,' .. lierkelurd, PhUoaopbical ha-~·~. 'D. 61. 
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evolution of the Idea; for flnothuJg t.hat comtiS intI) being d.?es so by virtue ot 
:l loeic.u ground, but only throllth the opera.tion ot a e&u.se."~\:~iu.,el,y. it 
is Kierkepard's introduction to 11:1$ tl1eaiu that If all becom1..ng talces place with 
h6\/F 
!reedOO1." that is, the ultiEte cause of t~ ciJal1ie trom possibillty to act-
ual1t,y is t¥)t an im!'!liUlent evol'.ltionary pri.ncipl~ but If. tree cau.lie. 
Kierkegaard denies ile€ells absurd principle t..rua.t neoessity can Oe a 8,JIlt.hea1a 
1t1 
of possibility am aetuallty. 
Th!rdlT, llnoth.ir.lf, becomes necessary bY' coming into being." To character-
ize contingent beings, that is, thoee which have OOtfte into being, fUerkegaarc1 
48 ~':'~~~ 
employed the term "h1stor1callt , and 1naisted t.bat "historical beooJrU.ng comes 
into being by the operation of a relatively' tree c .. 'Wu~, ,.lIil1ch in turn points 
jJ,(: 
ul t:tt:lateq to • abaolut813' .tre1J cause." . That so_thing happened, t.beret'ore. 
-
is certain, and in a sen .. nacea8at"'TJ that it !!!!! to happen is s1mp1.r not tnte. 
The Tho~1st would S8Y that historl is necessary only with "OOrlsequel1.t neeea-
of 
si t:n" and Kiarkegaartl, in agreeinc wit.h this terndnology, would still ina1at 
that "the pa8t did not become neoess1U7 by coming into being, but on the con-
~,,~. 
trary proved by eoll\ini; in to being tha tit was not neces84X'l'. 8"""'Lt 6fpeakill8 
this wq, Kierkegaard is entphas~ t.lle Coo.tJl1ienc.Y of tile went iii.elt, &nO 
49 
irus1atirlg that. cur knowledge ot t.he past does not conteI' nec •• a1t.y vpon 
;,. ~, 
·ill " 
a historical _8rlt. 1'n.. certainty ot ex1atence and the contingene.r ot co .. 
ir" 1nto e:x1atence _t theretol"8 be d1stingu1ahed. tram one mot-her. 
Th1e C\1J'iou :intdstence upor. the contingency of "tJ.storicaltl facts •• 8IU 
diapropol'tionate, until one r .. :U.ze. that Kierkecaard·. iAsUtenc. bas an ul-
terior -1: vee Hie d) .trine of OOl'ltillg..,- mun b. ual ... tood in the l1ght of 
hi. notion ot phil.oaoph1eal beUt. Which he ill .":me to jllst1.t7. .In the per-
son at Johann •• CliMcwI, K1erfrepard wr1tu, 
The h1nor1ca1 O&lD)t be riven 1aedlatelT to t.t. .... s, since 
t,he elusiveness of 'becoming 11 :Involved in it. 1',be 1'lIned1ate 
iIIpNa.:1on ot a .. tural. t*enOPleftOft or ot aa _alt 18 not the 
ii"!pre881on of the h1stoncal... for tb,e b~ 1!.volved cannot 
be •• nud 1med1ateq, but onl3 the pJ'ennce of _. content. 
But ttle presence ot the td.atl.)1·lcal include. the fact of ita 
__ :Lng, or el •• it 1. not \be :pJ'eBfl'lCe of the historieal u such. 
IlIfIlediate sensation and ~. <:ogn1t.,ton o,annot (leedy •• 
Thi. 1& by it.eU enough 1;0 ahow tm the ilU torica! eaumot be 
tn. object :)f eit.her.. because t.be lli$toric<liJ. ll.U thiili alusivfiMS. 
Vb1eh 18 1tapl1c1t in all becoming. As compared \d.t.b ~ 1mm.e-
&&t., becoliU.ng has an elusiv~s~ boY Wb.icll even t.~:te iaQat c.penda-
ble tact i8 rend.end ~bUul. .!." . 
'to u:pJ.a11'1 the 81gn1.t"1cance ot h15 atateJrlatt, KJaokegaard UNa *he fJXaJ\\ple 
of our .. e1ng ... t.ar. That we .... star, aDd that the .tar l"Nlll' ex1sta, 18 
certain) but .. e-.t kl10w tnm this that it baa come into being. lor our 
kmwledp of betIom1ng. we neacl .c:ae t .. m ef krovledge wb18h is both eerta1n ad 
uneerta1.ft Uke ble'tol7' J.tHlt. ,be ~V of beeoId.ng, GIl" ot the hiater-
:leal, :1a tw1'ol.b "the mtb1ngneu of the antecedent llOA-being 1. OM .ide ot 
it, 1Iblle the .uJlhUa:t.1on ot tt. pou1ble i. mother, the lattv be1ng at tae 
f", . 
... tim. the arm1b1lat1on of flYf117 other poN1b111t7.1t~~'In otJt.er 1ftII"cla, • 
-
So 
certain, it waG only 9 poeaiblHty. In the liaru:d..hilation of tne possible," the 
thmg became a reality} and in so beeortin(, "annihilated" fNfIr1' other poaalb.U-
ity which could hwe been actualized. 1:"or Klerkegaard, then" to come into ex-
istence is to emerge-not from a cootlnu.:UflJ..y- deVeloping necessity, au hegsl 
\'s,')<.::ld have It--but !"'roM possibility. But Itthe possibility from wb.ich that whit"J': 
became actual once M\erged still clin{;:stc it and rEMains with it a~ past, evea 
after the lapae of eenturleSJIf~~ therefore, within flYfIrY existing t:billg 
there is a f\i,nda..~ntal uncertainty, as Kierkegaard chooses to na.'2.e it. 
The only tact:>.lty which can abolish all t.he uncertainty :in"olv~ in beccxn-
$$ ( , 56-I c' 
ing 1.8 belief, or taitllJ ''tor taJ. th believes what it doe,. not 8ee. talt.b. 
"dee e ~t believe that the star 1s there, for that. it sees, but it beliavd thai 
~7' t.he star has CO'Ilf: into heine:.11 ; .~ 
Kierkegaard iru!lifSts \lpol1 the certainty of our belief" al t.hOurJi ..fa CanllOt . 
., 
kr£lw t,htit the tact vh ich we belier". actuallY' came 111'00 ex1.8tence. How 18 our 
-
doubt OYf.Tcome? Through, resolution of .alll When faith resolves to bti.ieve 
that SCA1'!S fnt'lt 1s the effect of a tree Cltuse (and the fa.ct must be such it it 
1s trnly h1storical), ttin, that very insta..'I'\t the indifference of doubt h&& been 
,1 
diltpel~ed ~ it.s equiBb rinm cv~rth!'l"\fn, ret by kncndedge, lrllt by will.uSB , 
belW for knowledge. M.b the !"lI'\piric:ists" K1~rkeeaa:l'd ofters no other det.er-
minant fer belief' but the will; the nrrertaint:r of th;.:; ~Mlect is to., strong 
when taced with the j..nco"M,t)rehensib11itv of t..r,.~ rule 
The 8800nd conclwdon pertillent here is that JClcrk'egau-d does not reall.Y 
abolish the '11M of' the intellect 1.."l dMl:in;" with rell.Uty. he merely 't.reats our 
intellectual. knowledge of reali. as unimportant. We kf¥:)w that this or tJUi.t 
-
thing exiats, our b.eUf!l is directed only to the tact tl141t lt .has co~ into be-
ing. The ~1r1cists, especially ~, pl..!'l;coo belief in the sarle pt)'ltion. 
HurIIe t IS ttleatment of causality is much like r.ierlcegaard· s in t~t ~ fails to 
ft'ind a true cause either in immedia.te cognition or in :lr.tere~e. But lierl~e­
gul"d's problem at this point is 8O~at dir:rerent from that of rru.1l.e. Kierke-
gaard is, In. the Philosop¥cal Frag~ts, constructing '"' philosophy of belief 
~·ich ilEt will later appl¥ to the religious realm. In reli€iousbeliet, he will 
~.wnte..'1d, the CZ2pt.ent or our religion, U.s doctrines Md creeds, !IUV' be t.aken tor 




te-nc&; tllirdl7 ~ that £legel t s dialectic cannot ju.st!.t'.r the prcduction of l"<!al 
int'::'\vidt;.Ql, s'JbjecUve mq:.e:r1a.'1Ce~ e5;'JE'.cl.all.1 :In ita !'::{l1-r.t.tionttl phas'1's--hs 
u;:a;:'l!K1 his battJ.e :4t~l'ijnst Deten115.d.Stn ~m the ~ound!; 0:' htll!!L"l existence, !:Jt 
Idealiem, pr1ma'ily, ';~e r.wJtboriolo"'ical dialectic. 
K1erk:or;nt:rd,,, in attaekinn r~ortJant..ieiern a5 it vlq of lite dtcJ not intend to 
destroy the HOIIIIDtlc viewpoint in ma'l. Hil object was rather to make it SOJ'IMt-
thing botter, to g1ve tom and P1!"poso to the aesti'let1c aspects at We. Tbia 
re-yaltmtJ.on ot the ... tbet1.c wtq of ute vas to 00_ about tbrwgh \he ex1$-
tenUal dialectJ.c of 'he three etae'e. of ._.oe, a d1aleetic Which 1. 'I 'I 
r 
plalltaUTel7 cW'teret trom all other •• 
DIAL&!TIC 8 n. OUfi'JUL 
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All d.1al.eeUo aprings tram contradiction. O.UB"allJr speaking, 1 t i8 a 
.. thad of _king pxvgrea. tbro\tgb opposit.1on. Etqmologtoalll' it originates 1.n 
~alog .. that 18, in usen10n and contradiction. Dial.tic, theretore, 'begina 
!n eonveraaUon, am tbrough co:nrenation aM dlsouaion, b7 COutpllrlQ8 opposite 
riewpointa, beco._ a .eaD. o£ knc¥ledge. When kr»wledge aDd thought adequate-
lY Jd.rrol' realit.,., dialectic , ...... apparent in thing. th8tl8e1. .. , 111 the 
bieral'Ch1cal ordel'ina f4 nality. Tbe real source ot d1alectiC8 is the human 
tpe:rson, 1It1o ach'anua in Ta.rioua 1I'qa 'tv opposi.~ or aaa.i..--tdlating contradiction. 
~'S DIAL.6CTlt 
l!e1"kepard viewed Hegel'. philoaopq as a ~ logical rqat_ hued 
UpoIl • d1alectic of buaanent deYe1.op"" vt.reby the apparent contradieti#,)tls Oil 
one leTel ot beillf; are areroome in a ayntbeais upon a higher leYel, until the 
npreme he1ght of a world new of reality- _" l'eaeb.ed. 1C1erkegaard'. correa-
• 
t10n of liegel'. d1alect1c vas b&aed upon the postulate that actual existence 
camot be trXPlained in a logical .7St... "Lor, ie, " sa:rs one comfil8ntator, "deals 
only with tho ... and mt with ex1atence, an:! all thought 13 of the 8_ qualJ.-
1;,y of being. But where we are ooncerned wi th an absolute differeace L'l quality 
as we are in cle .. U.llg 'td th thOUf,ht and beingJ and nth man and C"Od. ~ a qual-
60 
ltat1ve dialectic i8 teulble." If, then, the dialectic or ut. is trul.y 
-
~ 
existant1al, that is. it .it really produce. qualitatively different beings, 
there is clearly DO place in the lite ot m.al tor a. logical dia.lectic 1n vil1eb 
all being i. cpultativelJr identical in an ideal order ot concepts. But ner-
kegaard aaw that Hepel was right in insisting that SO!!» kind at dialectic 1. 
essential. Therotor4l, nerkegaard cons true 'ted his d1alect1c with a careful eye 
on the basic faults of the Hegelian dialectic. 
Ja.ERlOiXlAIJm t S DIAL.&.iTIC 
Thus, though Kiericegurd opposed the :I.rml1ed~c1 ot the Romantic way ot 11£ 
he still clung to ill. original aesthetic poaition that individual existE'.nce 18 
to be safeguarded at all costs. Consequentl.r his dialect1c is constructed to 
lead the existing indiYidual tt~ the aesthetic th:ropah the ethical, !2 the 
i 6ltn n relig oua," such a WIt'" that the "le~el1an identifica:t-ion ot thought with 
bei,O£, and Hegelianism's cmsequent inability to juatity dialectical movement, 
62 is corrected. 
Kierkegaard's dial4ct1c 1s or a ditfeent Bort trom all others'; Other 
of 
s;{stans after a dialectic or thought; r..1erkegaard offers to the individual a 
dialect1c ot lite. Other &y'8tems em.ploT a IIl8thodolog1eal d1aleot1e at.lI8d at 
the inc"a:;e ot knowledge; the existential dalect1c 1a a spiritual l40remct 
in the eli recticn of decisive choice and religious comm1tatent. The existential 
th1nker 18 laced, mt with a closed ayatall of thought, bI.lt with open poaa1bU-
lt1es f\r good cd evil. 
6l.nav.s.d SWClaoft, SoNt.b1ntfi: ,ben t KieriteGaard, p. 111. See &1eo lUerlce-
gurti, !!!. Point .2! fiew, p. ~6. 
62Dav.1d SWnlOn, Somethi.1)t About Kierlegaard, pp. 118-119. 
SS 
Aga1nat. ROIUIllt1c aut.b.et1clam, with its emphasis upon bnediate experience 
spontaneous teeling, 11erkecaard proposed a dialectic which would lead. the 
1'1dual througb the yarious level. ot existence to the peak of re11g10118 com-
t!lClt. Hi~ cbcmne, like Lll'triler's before hill, .... s a universalization ot b1.e 
life's ape r.lenc... the tJr at stage mirrors his OlCl you thtul phase or qn-
. cal and unco_1tted oba ..... ation of 11£., the second staf,:'8 r .... eals the ooUva-
on 1ft his moral regeneration in 1836, the third stage maJ'ks his own spiritual 
nvel"Sion in 16)8. 
The thre. s'Waf-os ot existence-the aestbetic, the etJ'lk al, and the relig-
OUB-are viewed by K1erlcegaard as baing each the c alcnte embodiment at a total 
at ute, md at. the same time as aUg •• on the road of purposeful. living. 
stage bas its mID particular outlook, each has ita natural culmination, 
ita mo_ltt of dec1aion. Tl:lq are not me re meant s in an evolutionar,y proc •• 
l.irlked 1lcgethel" i.'1 a weU-arUculated. totalitT. Kierkegaard conceive, the 
tages asetClusive and Clcloaed wcrlclaJ each is an independent area of lite, 
lated 1.1'). i t$ a1u cd it.s activities. l'be stages are dlsoontinuoua in th. 
«1" tb& one does not develop tram anctt8r. 
q are completely independent and e&1l be lived in thttr anUret,y independentlJr 
t ooe Clot her} otherwise there wwld be no l'!EiatlS at trane1t1on be"ween thea. 
t must be kept in m1ncl that the three s~es ecnstitute m .xistenU!Il dialec-
, ona which progre8ses tbl"ough a aerie. ot coltrad1ct.1ol'l8. Each higher atage 
COl'18Ututed mt tbrolgh the abrogat1cll of the lCller, but through the aubor-









passion and ethical r.1gbt8CW!JMS8, bta his whole ex:1neneo is reconstituted, or 
repeated, on a higher level. Where liegel, through a process ot Mediation, would 
synthesize the aesthetic stage Cd its opposite ethical. .t.age into the higher 
unity by a Illloath trans! tiro of thflle:ht, K1erkegaard attenpts to -.braee all 
contrad1ct1.oIll in Olle sp1ritual "leap." 
This Q:)ctr1.n:e of the three staees serves as a tram9WOrk 1'Or a d1scU8slon 
c4 Kier.icegaard's doctr1ra or beliet, vh.ioh mIII1 be coosidered as the cratn and 
cul.m1.n&t1on ot the whole existential dtaleette e~.t1tnting the stages. 
THE AESTHETIC STAGE 
The first of the •• three stages 1s that ot aesthetio enjo)"!!lel1t. of I1fe. 
p:t las tlree levels. that ot , .. msual. imed1acy, exer.rplified by the character ot 
pon Juan, that of skepttcal doubt, extnpl1f1en by' the cl'llr,acter ot Faust, ar.td 
t.hat at true d.spair, as t01nd 1,"1 the cwacter of Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jw. 
"hose thl"ee levels c€ aesthetic existence exempl1ty' tbe .-..1ar sensib111t1ee ot 
~e aesthetic 'tWIY of I1to. It vwId 8eem th& Ki&rkegaard thought th. almoet 
'f 
lndispensable as starting point.s tar the existential dialectic, tor he writell, 
The three great ideu (Don Juan, P'8ll8t, and the Wandering Jew) repreHnt, 80 
:.0 Sl»alc, the thl"ge.fold tendfl'lCT at lite outside religion, and onl7 as these 
~eas come alive in ttw indivici1al hwIIan heine II'l db eceme Mediat a, onla' then 
~1l8 s the riO r al mel the rell,1cu8 J 80 my vi ew o£ the S8 thr". 1d. ea. stands in 
6'; 
elation to ~ theolot~cal position.-
In the .ti1'8t. level of aesthetic exi8t.ence, thI1t of sensual t.ed1ac1', nar-
~gaard' 8 anall'a1a renal. t.tat t be per8m what e .018 interest 111 sunk 1n the 
enaual Uv1Jw-tor-the-moDBnt vh1ch characterizes the lowest torm. of .. atbeti-
-$7 
ism. cultivate. 1agination and pl"actical knowledge at the upeue ot reuon 
voUt1on. fbi. stag. t1 ae.thette ex1etence 1& characterised by boredom, 
ich CUll oIll,y be arerccme by' the "rotation _thod ," in whicb, to avoid dleap.. 
intmen.t, the aesthete IltUSt tute the enjoymem or Stlccess1ve moment.., but re-
uncomitted to aqy human rel.&\10118h1pa. 
DortKt))." 800n give •• IV to the a"mel level of aesthetic existenee, vh1ch 
• ch .. actGriaed by a state ot cbubt. The hwun 8pint eanmt be aatiat1ed 
reJ.;r in tlB tlQr ot 1IIned1& e pleutre. The ~Yidual in thie situation 
b t. J he cb •• II)t yet d.apa:1r. K1eric.gaarc1 arn.a tha.t 1 t 1. iflPOrtant. to not. 
the atart that deapa1r 18 not to be contused w1. t.h doubt.. It can be add, 
t 1. tru., that chubt 18 tbe d.eapair oE tbought. But deapa1r in thi. ca •• i. 
nly partial. _ relat1.,.._ It doea mt attain the depth -.4 bl"8adth ot a do-
1r 'Wh:1ch 18 the expreaaian ot a • ..,le. personalJ..tr' and rela\e. to the 
64 bsoluta. 
of 
I' the stat. ot 'W'B"el1eved c.tupa:1r. The aesthetie personality CCIII8S to thi. 
ate vben. the 1IIIpouJ.b11ity of "repetition" beeoIas apparent. The JOW'lg man 
K1erkepard's book Repet1t1on, me l1erkegaard h1lllSelt, aale .. a JOIlrl'1e1' to 
rlin, tries to rapeat exactly fJ'IIery experience he had trmre, and deapa1ra ot 
ing able to recapture the onginal leeUng. he had. What the young an ae.a 
an aesthetic repetitiDn. He know ne1 ther the nature nor the neo.as1 ty or 
petition, although he know it. m.uat t.ake place to insure his happinesa; but 
18 powerl... to eftect. it I and thus he despairs. t1erlregaard. does not 
SPrerl lark.pard, ttr.~2IS A .."l1t 2! Lite, trana. Walter Lclfrie 








explain repet.1.t1on jn the aesthetic sphere of ute, fer it i.e essentiall7 a 
religious category, and aI'1T explanat10n of it 18 reserved until the religious 
stage is reached.. 
THE TRANSITICHW, LEAP 
The individual who finda h1maelt unsatiatied in the aesthetic .tap, .8 
vas IUel'kegaard b1mselt in 18)6, 1e raced with the problem or how to transfer 
h1e !IIOd e at exietence to a higher stage, the stage of the atl'd.cal. The probla 
is present because of the complete d1Icontinu1t,r between the epberes ot ex1s-
tence wh.1ct1 precludes a SMOOth tnnaition fran one to mother. The passage 
from one stage of ewtence to another is .rfected onl¥ bT a Rleap •• 6S lier-
66 
kegaard calls it a ",uallt.ative leaptl. tor it is a tranaltl.on trom pouibU-
67 itT to actual1tJ', a true change, a coming ... 1nto-being. More 1v&portant, the 
68' 
leap is the category ot deeaion and choice. The leap which. bridges the ,aps 
betwen un's statee of ex1at1ng 11, theretore, a choice ....... tree act bJ"'vhich 
a man chooeee to become, that is, to exist on a new ani higher P~ Choice 
as aueh is not present on the .... \betic levelJ tor there choice 1s 4ther lIbol-
69 13' 1IIned1ate a1Xl unreneeU .... , or :tund.uIentallT indec1ei..... One cannot even 
choose to remain on the aesthetic levelJ tor INch a decisive choice would btpl;y 
6SnerkegUrd, Postscript, p. 231. 
66 Ibid., lho. 
67 Ibid., )06. 
68Ibid., 91. 









full refiection, and to choose retlectiTel¥ 111 to enter the aphere of the 
ethi.cal. nerkegaard therefore aciviae. 'Ii.ll& Cleepa1riog aesthete, "So then 
OhOOH despairs tor even deapa1r 18 a choice. for one can doubt without choos-
ing to, but one cannot daspa.1r without choosing e And lilen a man deepairs he 
cboo ... aga1n--and Wbat 18 it he chao ••• ? H~ choo ••• biuelt, not in his imm .. 
diacr, mt as th1a tortu1toWi indivi.dual, but .he choos •• hi1Uell in his eternal 
70 
validity.1I 
To "choose one •• un in this connection is ~1.ailar to the ancient Greek 
adage, "know thyHlt.1t "It 81gn1!1ev that the etb1eal ind.ivid.ual is w know 
biJIl8elt mt in tbe MDS. of mere contGiDplation but in the senae of coming to 
71 hilll8elt .a an inward. action oJ: the personal1V." Cbooei.r.li OIlesel.t in one'a 
etemal Yal1ci1tvr IIl_ cOIling to tNe aeU'-consciouane.s, and. accept.1ng Ol'l8sel.t 
72 . 
as lIa task with manitold elell8llta. tf It _ana that the man lilO has mad. the 
leap to the e'tihical plane baD treel¥ undertaken re.pona1b1l1t,y tar re-Mk1na 
hiuelt upon a _v and ethical pattem. Dr his leap he has bridged ~e lap 
'f 
which •• parates w.. hCBl tItOl"al liviD&, and 'by hi. act of choice be beglna to 
ex1at anev. 
?OIb1de, 177. 
~1dar Tbomte, 11erltegaardt s Ph1lo:r~ ot Re1~1on (Princeton, Ifa Jer-
sq, 1948), p.L9. See lt1erkeparci, @!¥!: ~ ""'!I, 2 • 




THE m.'HICAL STAGE 
The et.b1cal .. n baa thus choSEIl good and evil, and nov has morality as tb. 
chief principle ot his CQlduct and the ult.tmat. end of his acUvity. Obedience 
to dut7 beoo.. the aiIt or the ethical un, tor Uerkegaard t s ethical man is a 
ICantian. The ethical law is both. immanent and universal. It is inmtanent in th 
sense that it is an autonom.oue ethic, in which the individual. tollows the ab-
solute will in all ca ... , aDd refers to no QOm outside ot lliIIselt, it is uni-
veraal b1 the a .. e that it appUes to 111m in tbB .aM •• that it applies to 
everyone e1. .e, azr:l b1. tuk 18 to real. he the universal law. Sin is the contra 
venU(;fi of this UDiYeru.l law. 73 
But the ethical lite, too, bas its limitations, and soon becomes uusatia-
f'actor,y. It founders wiwn ccntl'm:ted witb the tact of s1n, and with the et.hic-
al impos.ib1llV of tJ.ruti.ng fer giVene8S tor sin. Sin, on the one luuld, deprive 
the ethical lite ot its univerSality, and places the simer outside the univer-
sal nom} the impossibility of torgiveness tor a1n, on the other- hanll, 18 ap-
'f 
parent J for the categorical iJIlptrat1ve makes no provilion :tat' any' breach of fen 
eral laws. 
In -7 case, to remain in the ethical ateee would. be 1Dapoa.ible, .. en tor 
the just man, tor there are situaticos in which the ethical 1& inadequate, 8it-
uations in Vdch the ethical, or gmeral, rule. tor conduct cannot appl¥. This 




Abrahut to do Cod'. blddblg vould be to sin ap.1nat tb.e uniTeraal lawa of the Ii 
I' i 
ethie,al lite, to rewa obedience to God lIDuld be a a1D d1rect11' against God. 
---
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~h1s situation poses the three problems or Kierkegaard's book ~ ~ Trembl~ 
In this book, the story o! Abraharn and its significance, is, unfortunately, 
somewhat cryptic) but lU,eric:egaard, epeakine as Johannes De SUentio, intended 
. . .... 
it to be 80. In his PhUosoep.cal P'rapents and in hie Concludi;S Unscientific 
Postecript,-&nd particularly the latter, wr.1ch he called "the turning point ot 
. 74 
my work &6 an author" --he explaine4 m.ore tul:Q' the meaning of his c17Ptie 
doctrines. The cr;yptic story ot A'braham .ust be reYiewed. here, in orde to pre-
sent the tinal philosophical elements of .Kierk.g~' f!I doctrine or belie!. 
TRA.tlSITION T,,) THE RELIClaUS STACE 
!!!£ e. Tftmblini deacribes the transition between the ethical stage and 
the stage o£ absolute religious faith) and in writing the book, Kierkegaard tol-
lowed his uual st,.le ot presentation. Speaking pseu&)1l1~uslT, as Johannes 
E! SUentio, he describes the rel1gious faith not abstractly or logically, but 
ps¥cholog1cally, studying Abraham in the throes ot an ethieo-rel1g1ot18 dilemma. 
Two ob8erva1'J.oDS pertinent. to t bis thes18 may be drawn from the qtudj ot Abra-
banl. 
First, in Abraham's action, there was what iC1erkegaard. calls a -teleologi-
cal 8Ilspenaion of the ethical." fh. ethical as such i8 universal, it i8 duty 
eoncei .... d u universa.ll7 obliging tor .eU-deteJ'lll1ning beings. It do •• Dot 
rater to ind1vidual particular case., to chance, or to exPed1enc7. The eWcal 
law 14 revealed. to man in the Categorical. I1nperative. This revelation of ethic. 
1 ... revelation of purpose. MarltS actions fl\ust tel'll toward the good of the com-
munity. The JUl.n who follows this dictate ot the etbical law ia called the 
"trad.c he!'O," but not a "1tn1ght of '811;h." Aga.melllJ'lOn, when he 8aeritieecl 
74K1erkev.&.arel. The Point ot View .. p. 41. 
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lphegerda for the good. of the whole Creek race, is to be coosidered a J1tragic 
hero. It nut Abnha!ll 1s the 1Jlnigbt of Faith"; for his action was that of an in-
dividual acting ir.d.ividually'. 
Now, Abraham's et..uc&.l duty was to loye and. protect IsaacJ but the higher 
goal of faith comrnarxled the sacrifice of Isaac. Abraham abandcned the univeraal 
commandment; a.nd there.f'ore he began to exist u an individual-a "Knight. of 
F'aitb"--in opposition to the universal. He placed h1.mselt, tbrolJ€h faith, "in 
75 
an absolute relation to the absolute"; and. lIhen he bowed to the 'lIfi11 of God, 
~e reduced ettt1cs 1n ids own life to a rel.a.t.i:,e position. R,1s1ng above mere 
!ethical universality, he ent&~c.Q into a particular, direct relati(;nah1p with CJod 
lab&ndoninp: all mediation at church or society. 
Second:q-, the ;r.eana by which Abraham altered into th~a relationship with. 
r:'<'ld are the means by which IiIl.'f3' individual existing ethica1l¥ must relate h1m.se1t 
to God. In K1al'kegaard. t s teminoloQ', Abraham made an "infinite double lllOVe-
ment" of faith. 'l'r.e "tint movement" ot faith was Abraham'fI infinite'resigna-
of 
pi' Isaac, that 18, l::ds <bnation of Isaac to the infinite Ood. 'I'he "second naove-
Plant" of .f&1th took place lllen Abrabarn belleved. "by virtu. ot t.m absurd" that 
10ci would again restore Isaac to h1.1l. 
It is to be mted bere that Uel'kegaard oppose. faith to reason. Abraball 
belleves on3.T in the tace or an "absurdity .. " His intellect contribute. notb1.ng 
to the act (:£ faith but the realizat.ion that kuo1fl.edge is pit1.tullT inadequate 
'When we are dealing with Cod. 
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SU'!HAR.Y 
It m.ll be the task of the following chapter to explain more fully the act 
Df belief here presented as the means by which an individual leaves the ethical 
~tage, with its dependence upon reason, to exist in the religious star-e in the 
!Pace of intellectu.al absurdity. 
In this chapter, generally speakinf;, Kierkegaard's attacks upon Hegelianism 
~1'1d upon Aestheticism have been reviewed. It was stated that Kierkegaard fought 
~egelianiSI'l with the weapons of Romanticism, an:l. Romanticism with the weapons 
pf Hegelianism. The weapons he chose were a passionate i..'1terest in the individ-
~ality and responsibility of l'lan, al1d the methodological dialectic of existence. 
More partieularIy, this chapter has dealt first with Kier.kegaard's attack 
~pon Hegelianism in three theses: First, Kierkegaard asse~ed, Hegel's world-
rustor1cal process is inimical to man's ethical life as a responsible individuaJ, 
~his idea of world-historicity Kierkegaard opposed on the grounds of human free-
~om, positing the necessity of man's free relationship to God. S~cortdl.y, Kier-
., 
egaard showed that Hegel's system cannot inelude real existence; for the System 
s merely eonceptu.al. Kierkegaard counters Hegelian conceptualism with his own 
~octrine of existeme, explaining existenee as a process of becoming, a contin-
:u1l striving to exist. Thirdly. Kierkegaard pointed out that Hegel cannot ex-
'lain becoming; for the conceptual dialectic cannot justify movement. In oppo-
~ition to this, Kierkegaard proposed his own philosophical dbctrine of becoming, 
~nd its correlative, belief. 
The second part of this chapter has dealt with Kierkegaardts existential 
~1alecticJ tracing the progress of the individual through two of the three 
~tages of existence: the aesthetic, and the ethical. Finally, the cryptic story 
of Abraham was discussed.. in preparation for e. fuller cd.z:;cuaaion of tile re-
ligious st~;a ofax1stance and the act l1fAich ctXlst.itutes tne .i.i.divio.uU ill. t.hat 
lit~,0.. wJ:>.ich will be discusaed in the next chapter. 
I 
CHAPTER IV 
KIERKEGAARD'S OOLUTION: THE lRl!EDOM OF BELIEF 
The preceding ch~ ter dealt with Kiencegaard' s attack upon Hegelian Deter-
minism, and· the philosophical notions of existence, of freedom, and of contin-
gency, together with belief, the correlative of contingenc)", which he developed 
in the course of that attack. Kiel"kegaardts dialectic was also discussed, as 
it led the individual, by means of the "leap of choice," through the aesthetic 
and ethical stages of existence to the peak of the etbical stage, the point at 
which the "leap of faith" placed Abraham in the higher religious stage. 
'l'hJ:ooughout this Whole dialectic, Kierkegaardts preoc~upation with existence 
is apparent. For Kierkegurd, it was explained, finite existenee, or "the his-
torical, n is a process of coming-to-be, a process which is effected through 
free choice on the part of the existing ind1 vidual, a process by" .whiCh the in-
of dividual, as it were, "makes himself anew" as he passes through the stages on 
life' sway. It was alao noted that Kierkegaard' s doctrine replaced knowledge 
of finite existing beings, if that knowledge was to be significant, wi~h belie!'. 
Some care was taken in the preceding chapter to separate K1erkegaard ts 
philosophical from. his strictly religious doctrines) but tho!'! philosophical 
notions which were outJ.ined previously m.ust, in the present chapter, be investee 
with religious sign1.t.1cance because the whole dialectic of existence, as Kier-
kegaard presented it" is the m.ovemant of the human spirit towards a vital 
6S 
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intereOJllllunication nth God in a religious mode of existence. 
It is, therefore, the purpose of the present chapter to outline Kierke-
gurdts doctrine of the religious stage or existence, together with the act of 
choice, or .faith, by which the individual, in bringing the existential dialec-
tic into his own life, bridges the gap which separates him, as an ethical man, 
from the religious state. More particularly, therefore, Kierkegaard'. basic 
problem, "becoming a Christ.1an" will be discussed, together with his denial ot 
1J1:lT "objective" relationship of man to Christianity, and his insistence upon 
"subjectivity" as the mode of the individual's appropriation of the relation-
ship. Under the heading of subjectivity will be discussed, first, the nature 
of the subjective thinker as an existing individual who IIlUst fUrther become 
subjective to a pre-eminent degree tJu:ough the freedom of. 1'aith. Next, the 
need for man t s subject.1ve relationship with God will be discussed, together witl 
both the object of the relationship as a historical fact meriting belief, and 
the means of effecting the rel&tioMhip, through the categolY of l'elig'iousness. 
of 
The diff:lculV Etbe "absurditytt or "pa:r.a.doX") ir:l'9'olved in positing this tree 
relationship will be eJ;>lained, and the occasion upon lbieh the difficulty 
presents itsalt :rl.11 00 brlefl¥ stated. Finally, the act of faith by which the 
individual freely posits the relationship, and t18 nature of the religious 
state which is the immediate result of the act of faith, will be analyBed. 
THE PROBLEM. BEOOMING A CmISTIA.N IN CHRISTENroM 
Kierkegaard's whole effort as a writer--frol'll his tirst book to his last-











a Christian. Why is becoming a Christian a problem? The problem, in narka-
gaarcif s opinion, arises, first, from the tact that people presume that theT are 
Christians as a matter ot cout'se, and, secondly, that they think mewing Chris-
tianity' is the same as being a Christian. 
Whenpeopla presume that they are Christians as a matter ot course, he 
contends, ChristianiV has no meaning in their lives. He explains his own view 
best, when he contrasts true Christianity with the Christendom he knew, and la-
bels the latter "a prodigious Ulusion" I 
EV'ery one with some capacity for observation, who seriously- considers 
what i. called Ch.r1stemom, or the ronditions in a so-called Chris-
tian eount17, l1lU8t surely be assailed b;r profound m1sg!\e"ings.. What 
does it mean that all these thousands and thousands call the_elve. 
Christians as a matter ot COIlrse? These many., many men ot whOlll the 
greater part, 80 tar as one can judge, live in categories quite tor-
eign to Christianity I People who perhaps never. once enter a church, 
neT.r think about God, never mention His name eXcept in oathsl 
People upon. wan it has never dawned that they might have aD¥ obli-
gation to God, people who either regard it as a max1m1.Ull to be guilt-
less ot transgressing the criminal law, or c:b not count even this 
quite necessar.rl Yet all tbese people, even those who assert that 
no God exists, are allot 1hem Christians, call themsebres ehris-
tians, are recognized as Christians by the State, are buriejl as 
Christians by the Church, are certified as Cbr1st~s tor ail eter-
nity! 2 
Kierkegaard's canplaint against Christendom, theretore, is trund in the 
tact that Christian tervar _s at a low ebb in the Der.uurk of his time, and 
this by reascn ot the tact that. becoming a Christian vas made too easy. It 
was Christian baptism that constituted those thousands cd thousands as Chris-
tians; but baptism., although K1erkegaard admits that it "may tor all that be 
lFor example, Kiericegaard, !!!!. Point. £.! View. pp. 13, 22, 42. 92, 149. 
2 Ibid., 22-23. 
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both justifiable and praisewor1lby, partly as an expression of the well-meaning 
interest of the ehurch, partJ.y as a defense against fanaticism, and partly as 
expressing the beautiful oare and forethought of devout parents, ,,3 should not 
be looked upon as one's passport into the cOBlnunity" of believers. It is merely' 
a matter of conv anienee, "in view of the existing pol1ce regulations, .. 4 to have 
a baptismal oertificate to present when one wishes to enter the university or 
to get married. In Kierkegaard's doctrine, one <bes not. beco. a Christian mere 
ly by being baptizedJ the actions of nominal. Christians, as Kierkegaard obserYed 
them., proved that. Rather, i1a agreement wi1h Luther, he insists that the res-
~nsibUity rests with tl:e individual to beccme a Christian by means of a per-
sonal approPriattoo,,5 that is, by a tree and. passionate comitment of one's 
whole being to that transcendent tact which is the heart of Christ1an1ty--1ihe 
Incarnation of Christ. 
The seccnd difficulty in becoming a Christian, according to Kierkegaard, 
raises trom the misunderstanclillg ot spewla.t1ve philosophy, and particular:Q', of 
of 
pourse, the Hegelian ph1losop!v', that religion is a thing to be know, and not 
Il thing to be lived. He canplained that the Hegelianprine1ple of ftobjectiviza-
Uon" was taking cmtrol of religion, and that speculatiVe knOlfledge was usurp-
Lng the place reserved fao faith. 
His condemnation of the objective approach to the truths of faith was a 
3Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 325. 
hIbid ., 328. 




sweeping denial of all abstrollCt tbinJd.ng in religious matters, including the 
extremes ot objectivity as found in the Idealistic thrught of the Hegelian 
"System" on the one hand" and the more realistic conceptions of the Empirical 
6 
schools on the other. His rejection of both extremes is based. on his cansis-
tent <bc trine that all. coo. ceptual knowing necessar~ excludes the notion at 
real existence. Object1ve knowledge, therefore, is of it s very nature onlY' an 
"approximation" or a "hypothesis.1t It is an lip proximation beca1.l~e the existing 
knower, who must COllIe into contact with truth according to bis own mode of ex-
7 1etence, cannot come to know 8'lything of another subject axisting as !3uch. 
It is bn>othetical because it does not refer necasserily to any existing subjec1, 
but only to some imagina.t7 subject-in-general, who need not exist at all. 
While Kierkegaard obj ected violently to the abstrac~ions ot Hegel'" though ~ 
he saw nevertheless SQIle value in abstract th1nldngJ for the value of abstract 
8 . 
thought is that it presents a "possibility of actuali1U''' which Hegelian Ideal-
ism can never attain. "Abstract thOl1ght," Kierkegaard admits, It.em.bN.ces the 
possible. • • • pure thought is a phantom_ The real subject is not \he cogni-
tive subject, since in knCM'1ng he mOV'es in the sphere of the possible, the real 
subject i8 the ethically existing subject_u9 Here, Iierkegaard indicates that 
abstract thought presents to the ethiQall.y existing individual a possibility 
which he, through his subjectivity, can bring to actuality_ He also indicates, 
6 169-170 Ibid., 
-
7 25" 26, 31, 278. Ibid., 
-8 515. Ibid., 




J OW'ever, that abstract thought of itself 18 disinterested, and that contempla-
ion roes not lead to action 'Nlthoot sane higher motivation. For the mating 
[ndividual, however, the motivation for existential progress is found in his own 
10 ~stenceJ whieh is his highest interestJ and in this sphere disinterested 
peculation fails him. To lar:lw the doctrines of Christianity J to know God as an 
bject of thcne-ht, is, fer K1ericegaard, insignificant. His problem arises when 
subject-a "subjective thinker"-attempts to know God subjectively as a Sub-
ect. He best expresses hiw own rejection of all .speculative knCMledge in be-
aming a Christian and his own adoption of subjectivity when he remarks, tlSpe_ 
clative philosophy, as abstrE\ct am objecti.ve, entirely ignores the fact of 
x1stence and inwardness, and inasmuch as Christianity accentuates this fact par-
doxical1y, speculation is the greatest possible m1sunders~ding or Christian-
11 
ty." 
To summarize the foregoing, it ffiI:\V be said that f<r Kierkegaard to know a 
:bing objectively is to know it abstractly; to know a thing abstractlJ' is to 
of 
resc:ind from existence; but to prescind from existence is ~ !§nore !2!.!!2! ~ 
IXistErlCe entirely. Since, in Kierkegaard's opinion, eonctpta ro not even con-
~ote real existence. Thus, abstractim amounts to the annihilation of the :real 
bj act of thcugbt. Therefore, the existing subject must con e to know the Truth 
~t Christianity-Jesus Christ-as an exist1~ subject. To explain how this 
krnwledge" can come abrut thrrueh subjectivity is the {resent task. 
10 
Ibid., 278. 
-11 Ibid., 507. 
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SUBJECTIVITY AS THE TRUTH 
LogicallT, one would imagine, 1f Christianity cannot be known objectively, 
then it must be known subjectively. This is Kierkegaard'& contention men he 
maintains that Christianity does not lend itself to objective observation pre-
cisely because it proposes to "intens1f.r subject1vi~ to the utmost." 12 What, 
then, doe s· he :mean by subj ectivi t,r? 
The conrnon neaning of subjeotivity, as given by Reidar ThOl'lte, a thorough 
student of Kierkegaard. "refers to that tendency which seeks the organ or the 
criteria of religious truth :in the intimat1C1ls of the individual's inner eon-
sciousness rather than in histor:r and objective reve1ation ... 13 This, sqs 
Thomte, is the meaning which Schliermaciler and Ritsch1 attribute to the term. 
BasicaJ.ly. it is also Kierlcegaardts doctrineJ but he develops the notion in his 
own wtI3', beglnning wi th an anal;rsis of truth. 
In his great philosophical wrk, the CmclucUng Unscientific PostscriEt, 
he propounds the thew that "truth is subjectivity .,,14 In his .anal3'sis of 
truth, he finds that truth is commonly defined either empirically, .. the cor-
respomence of thought with being, ar it is defined idealisit1cally as the cor-
respon1ence of being with thcnght., He rejects both def1n1 tions, insisting that 
as an abstraction, "being" correspends onl¥ with itaeU, and either of the def-
initions of truth given is only tautological. He insists that for "the exist.-
ing spirit who 18 mw conceived as raising the qU.~~,t~Cln of truth, presumably in 
12 
!bid., 55. 
-13 Thomte, pp. 11.3-114. 






order that he lUI" exist in it," botb the tJ'Ilpirical 8l'Ii the idealistic doctrine 
ot truth are devoid at signiticance tor Ute, tor such doctrines are tota.llT ab-
stract and have sign1ticance "only tor the abstraction into which an existing 
spirit is transtor_d wen he abstracts troM himself .2 existing individual.,.l6 
Hu own positi'!'e <betrine ot truth culminates in the view, e:xpressed ill 
his w:>rk, Trainir:!£ !!l Christiani!i:, that truth has nothing whatever to do with 
thought; tor truth, "in its very being is not the duplication of being in terms 
ot thought •••• No, truth in its very being is the recb.plication in )¥le, in 
thee, in him, so that '1113', that thy', that his life, approximately, in the striv-
ing to attain it, is the verr being of tlUth, is a ~ ~fe, as the truth was in 
Christ, tor He was the truth."l? Subject.iv1ty- is the truth, therefore, in the 
seMe that there i8 no truth tor the individual except in so tar as he creates 
it in his own lite. Truth is an ethical. am religious appropriation of the 
ideal, an active practice and realization rather than lD¥ndedge. It is· a "pro-
18 
cess ot appropriaticm.ft 
There is a secom sense in which trutl}. is stlbjectivit7 in the dbctrine of 
Kierkegaard.. In dealing with "essential knowledge," that is, knowledge which 
ha.a an essential relationship to existence, he 8.,.S that such knowledge has a 






5th-en Kiericegaard, Training !!! Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie (Ox-
ford, 1941), p. 201. 
18 
Kiarkegaard, Postscript, p. 182. 
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as a vital intercommunication in existence between man and God, is preciael¥ 
the truth.19 Kierkegaarci's teminology is rovel; it must alwa,ys be kept in 
mind, therefore, that when Kierkegaard speaks of the "subjective thinker," he 
does not intend to treat of "thought" in the usuall.T accepted sense of thEt term 
but in the sense of one's active appropriation of, or personal commitment to, 
Eternal Truth. "Knowledge," for Kierkegaard, is not 1:m:;wledge as we usuaJ.l¥ 
reter to it; but rather it is the active rea1.ization in one's own lite ot the 
Christian Ideal. 
It is tor this reason that in Kierkegaard's writings, attention is drawn 
rather to the nature ot man's living relationship with God than to his knowledg~ 
20 
of God. The question tor him is not whether the individual. is related to 
something which is objectively' true, but whether the relationship of the ind1-
vidual ia a true re1 at ion ahip • 21 · 
Tru.th, therefo!\!), is subjectiviVJ and the converse is alao trtler"Sub-
22 jectivity is the truth;" tor "at its ma.ximtlm, this inward. '~,' $bat is, 
the truth ot man' 8 relationship with God is the passion of the 1nt1.Aite, and 
the passion of the infinite is the truth. But the passion of the infinite is 
precisely subjectivity" and thus subjectivity becomes the truth •• 23 
18 Uerkegaard, Postscript, p. 182. 
19Ibid • 









The significance of the notion that subjectivity is the truth becomes 
clear when I1erkegaard equates "truth" with "taith." Existential truth 1s the 
personal, passionate appropriation at man's relationship to Christianity; and 
Kierkegaard's definition of truth, "an objective uncertainty held fast in an 
24 
appropriation-process of the IlDst passionate inwardness," is identical with 
. 2, 
his definition of faith. Thus, the truth-relationship is identical with th. 
faith-relationship for the existing individual, and what is said of truth is 
said about faith. 
The act by which the individual seeker for truth, in his striving to at-
tain eternal happiness, relates himself in his existence to God is a complex 
act, comprising a number at essential elements. Although these elements all 
cOl'lV'erge siJllultaneously upon that "instant" in time when, the individual gathers 
together all his powers to commit himself to God in an act of faith, they can-
not, unfortunately, be explained simultaneously. The renainder ot this chapter 
will therefore treat in turn the essential elaents of the "approprfation-pro-
of 
cess" which is Kierkegaard's act of faith! the subject of faith, the need for 
taith, the object of faith, the means by which faith may enter the lite of the 
individual .. the difficulties involved in the act of faith, the occasion of 
faith, and the act of faith itself, together with the result of that act. 
THE SUBJECT OF FAITH-THE INDIVIDUAL 
Kierkegaard pre.ents a portrait of the subjective thinker, "his task, his 




Ibid •• 312-322. 
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thinker is "an existing individual," and a "dialectician dealing with the 
existential." His equlpmant incluoes "imagination and feeling" dialectics in 
existential inwardness, together with passion. But passion first and. last." 
The task of the subjective thinker is that of "un:ierstanding himself in his 
existence, tI a. project Which has noth ing to cb with thoo.ehtJ for understanding , 
in Kierkegaard's interpretation, is rather ftexistinglt in the fullest sense. 
The subjective thinker must "transfotm himself into an i.''lstrument that clearly 
and defini tel;r oxpresses whatever is essent1allr human." The scene of his ac-
tivity is "inwardness as a human being, tl and his method is that of sujective 
renection. 
First at all, then, the subjective thinker is an existing individual. 'l'hil 
m.eans that his existence is a process of becoming, 8. con~tant striVing, by means 
of his free choices, to be something better than he is I to remake himself in a 
higher realm. of existence. The individual who thus has himself as his task will 
be infinitely and genuine~ interested in himBelf and in the realization of hiB 
21 dest1ny". Such infinite interest is called "the passion of human freofedom." 
Passion, therefore .. plays a vital role in the development of man and in 
his exercise of freedom; for the subjective thinker, says Kierkegaard, needs 
"passion first and last." In his axplanation of the exact natura of human per-
fection, be nates that the natural man 1s made up of feeling and passion, and 




It1erkegaard, !!!! Journala I pp. 102 .. 103; !!!£ !!!! Trembling, pp. 184-
If 
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sian" therefore, which makes a man what he is. Now, when humanity is defined 
according to sensibility rather than reason, hu.'1IS.n perfection Must eulminate 
in the mast energetic exercise of .te.eling. Passion is accordingly considered 
by lC1erkegaare! as the apex of sUbjectiv1ty;29 and it is therefore characterized 
by inward activity d1rected toward selt-integration through the existential 
dialectic.30 It is for this reason t.nat Itfeeli.."'lg'! is distinguished .from "pas-
aion." Feeling is mere emotion; passion, or irw ardness, is true religious 
feeling. 
EXISTENTIAL PATIDS . 
Existential passion, or "pathos," as Kiarkegaare! terms it, manifests it-
self' on three dU'f'erent levelss The Initial Expression, The Essential Expres-
31 
sian, and The Decisive Expression. 
The initial exPression of existential pathos is "the absolute dlrection 
toward the absolute telos e::cpressed :in action through the transformation ot the 
.32 . 
indivicbal's existence," that is, the necessary development of the individual 
~ 
spirit in the direeticn of a relationship with God through his passage" by 
of 
means ot free choice, through the various levels ,of existence. It is passion 
.:- . 
which provides the motivating terce tor action, in Kierkegaardfs doctrine; 
knowledge has ID part to play in tile exf..stential dialectic. 33 
493. 
29 Kierkegaard, Postscript. p. 177. 
JOSee Thomte, p. 86. 
31 




See Kierkeiard, ~ ~ TreJll~, p. 59" n. 
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The essential apreaaion ot exiatential pathos is sutferin g, whether aes-
thetic or ethical. Sutfering is characteristic of infinite resignation, the 
first movement of the infinite double movement of faith, which narked the dia-
lect1.ealleap ot Abraham into the realm at taith.34 
The decisive apreasion of ex1atential pathos is guilt. It Jluat De not ed 
here that for Kier1cegaard "guilt" is rot the aame as NsiD.j.ft "Gullt" in its 
tullest sense 1s a term which is usuallY' reserved to describe man'.. state of 3, 
"untruth"--the state ot Original. Sin, the state ot alienation from God. This 
concept ot guilt 18 Ul'Iierstood in its fullest Lutheran .en".36 "Sin," on the 
other hand, is not viewed 88 the opposite ot "virtue," bt:.t rather as the oPPO-
s1te of "f&1.th." This is also basiealJ¥ a Lutheran conceptJ for Luther claimed 
that salvation eane. through faith alme. 37 Tn. reader do •• not find in the 
writ ings of lCierlcegaard -7 dis cuss:l.on ot good and evil &eta in the sphere ot 
religion, but only in the sphere of ethics, with reprd to the moral law. 
11erkegaard, the Lutheran, ctnsider. the onl.y meritorious act, ~he ?nl1' act by 
which our eternal salvation 1s dnemined to be the act of fa1th. tilt other 
purely "moral" act can have significance ter eternitY'. Kierkegaard sometimes 
marks a sharp dist1nctiCll between the concepts "gullt" and "aiD"; sometime. he 
uses the terms interchangeabl.. But 18 &l.,.s _ aI'l8 e1 ther man I s natural stat41 
or alienation from God or a 0(11 aequent state d unbeliel. 
34 See aboTe, Ch. 3, p. 60. 
3'Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. 185-186. 
)6 See above, Ca. 2, p. 18. 
37 Ibid., Soe also K:1.erkegaard, !!!! Sickness ~ Death, p. 132. 
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It is this decisive ellPl"esaion of existential pathos--a state in which :man 
finds himself estranged trom God by the mere tact of his existence-which is of 
significance for the rel1g1w8 stage of existence. Man's mnsciousnes8 of to-
tal guilt, or otherness from God, in the primitive Lutheran sense, forces him 
to think of this otherness <r separation from the Eternal in CX)meetion with hi 
- 38 
essential· relationship to the Eternal as his ultimate goal. Guilt, sqa lier 
-
kegaard, in attenpting to explain this strange ambivalence, Mis the aprea.ion 
for the relationship by reason of the fact tbl.t it e~reS8es the ineompatib11it 
39 . 
or disrelationship." In mare intelligible tams, guilt is 81 expression tor 
man's radical separation trcm God; but it is in the realization of his actual 
separateness from God that man realizes the necessity of espou.ing a relation-
-
ship to God. The decisive expression of existential passion, theretore, eon-
-
tinuall.y tarces the individual to choose decisively the inf1n1teJ t<r, on the 
40 
me hand, nan t s infinite passion can find coZT8ap<xldence only in the· Winit 
and on the other hand, neither aesthetic ehoice (which. is pse~o-e~oiee, sinee 
the aesthete does mt truly choose, but drifts) nor ethical choice (Which is 
finite, since it deals only with the universal) can fulfU the requirements of 
an infinite passion. The resulting decision ot the individual, as Kurt Rein. 
hardt, ane of Kierbgaardfs astute commentators, remarks helpfully, is "tor or 
against the int1nite, an absolute either/or, all <r nothing; it is a choice 
38 








which male s or unmakes the individual, a choice in which he either truly 'be-
comes what he is' or utterly fails to realize his authentic existence. 'l'here-
tore, Kierkegaard concludes, 'Truth is subjectivity, I that is, the highest de-
41 gree of personal self-realization." 
Such, then, is the nature at the subjective thinker, the existing, finite, 
ind1v1dual~ His task in life is to "become what he iaft_a Christian, an indi-
vidual "existing" in the :f'ul1est sense of the ward. Since bec';)lI1.i.n~ always 
takes place with freedom, this indiv1<ilal must ~e himsel..t by a free act on 
his own initiative. 'l'his act is one in which he relates himself to Christian-
ity, and "Christianity," says IUerkegaard, Itis spirit} spirit is inwardness, 
inwardness 18 subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and in its 
maximum an inf'inite, peraonal, passionate interest in en,e's eternal haPPiness!il 
The inWBE"dnes8 of subjectivity, therefore, is merely Kierkegaardts WIlT of des-
cribing intense religious feeling,. Such religious feeling, or passion, is the 
essence c:L man as nan; and therefore it 1s the property of everT. finite indivi-
dual. But Kierkegaard's intention is to actualiZe this religious fleling to 
such a degree of intensity that it w:Ul impel the 1:rxii. vidual, in the faee of 
all the contradictions rL reuen, to awropriate his relationship to himself 
and to Gal, and to himself before God, in the "highest degree of se1t-realiaa-
tion"-in m act of free choice which is at the same time the act by Which he 
exists as a responsible, Christian indi'ridual. 
U 
See Reinhardt, p. 42. 
42nerkegaard, Postscript, p. 33. 
THE NEm Jt>R FAITH-REPETITION 
Why is it that existential. passion impels the individual to choose the in-
finite? Basically, it is due to the need tor what Kierkegaard calls IfRepeti-
t1on," a renewal of selt, a re-birth of selt on a higher level of existence, a 
re-integratian of an s' s whole 11fe, personality', and activity in the direction 
. 43 
of a newly-appropriated ideal. It was no ted in Chapter Three of this thesis 
that the young man in K1ericegaard' s book Re,petition sought for this in the aes-
thetie stage of ex1stenee, knowing that it was f!,ecessarT tor him but that he 
could not attain it in a lite devoted to the immediaq of Sellse impressions and 
artistic pleas'Ill"es. Aesthetics e.annot bring the individual to the "highest 
degree of selt-realization" of which he is capable .. sinee the aesthetic stage 
18 a state of unrefieetive and uncommitted existence. R~petitiQl is therefore 
a religious C:X)fm ept, and the question remains, If!!'!l is it necessary?" 
It is neeessar,y in Tieli' of mnts verlY situation in existenee. "Existence, II 
Kierkegaard Bays.. "18 a synthe8is of the infinite and th. finite, and t.he ex-
44 of isting individual is both infinite and tinite." This is amther way or s83'-
ing that man :Nnds within his own finite COrJJCiOUSll8SS a relationship to an 
infinite, eternal goal as his ultimate end. 
Finite man, however, is not only a composite of :Nnitude and 1nf1nitYJ he 
is also separate and consciously di.st1nct fran all other existing beings. Mos$ 
43 . T. H. Croxall, Ul his Kierkegaard COJII'II&l'ltg, p. 126, offers an etymolo-
gical analysis of the Danish 'WtI" d lor "R.epetition, If linking the term with th4a 
Christian notion of Itre-birth," the sense :1n which Kierkegaard uses it. 
bh Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 3$0. 
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of all. as noted above, he is separate and distinct from the Eternal, and this 
precisely 1n virtue of his tinite existence. On the one hand, Kierkegaard 
maintained with true Lutheran gril'lll188S, If the existence of a'1 existing being 1s 
characterized as standing in opposition to the truth, .. 4$ and "to come into be-
46 
ing is to becane a sinner" J and therefore to be a man is to be apart from the 
Eternal. ·On the other hand, the truth is prec1se:q his relat.:lonship to the 1';-
temal. 11an is theretore divided against hill8elt 8lld against God. Hence arise!J 
the need for repetition; and it i8 in this con~ext that lierkegaard speaks ot 
man's bEdng his am task, Each individ:ual nan must accept this personal., spir-
i tual dichotom,r a8 a starting point far that dialectical process of becoming 
what he is-namely, a Christ1an. He has need of a personal, spiritual "inte-
gration-repetition--of himaelf' in a relationship to th~ Eternal, a rel.ationshi ~ 
which 1s 2.-ta_c .... to ... constituted by his being a finite individual. but which must, 
it it 1s to have significance tor his eternal. happineaa, be appropriated anew. 
The relationship of the finite individual to the Intinite is therefore 
of both necessary and tree. It i8 neoessar.r because it is t (uM in the nature of 
man as an existing individual (hence the need tor repetition), and. free because 
-
it is a relationship which Illust be appropriated b7 the existing individual. 
The full Meaning of man's rebirth th1'ough the act of faith will become clearer 







THE OBJECT OF FAITH 
The objeet ot man's truth-relationship has already been referred to in 
general terms as man's absolute end, the Eternal, which, when subjectively ap-
propriated, means tar him his om eternal happiness. Kierkegaard speaks of 
this highest end of man's existence as "the absolute telos" which "must be wil-
47 led for its own sake," and in an absolute and unquaillied manner; tor -to 
w11l absolutely is to will the infinite, and to will a.n eternal happiness is 
48 
to will absolutell'." Beyond this, the individual does mt wish to know any-
thing a.bout the absolute t.108 other than "that it exists." 49 
That the relationship of the individual existing subject to himself can-
not be defined wtthout reference to the eternal is a fact which is accepted by 
Kierkegaard with .full realJ.zation ot the d1f ficulties :1nyolved. It is easy to 
see that the true reality of the individual can be found in interested sell-
activity, or coming-into-existence. But when it becoll8s clear that the passim 
ate striving which canst! tutu authentic existential becCllling is no't directed 
of 
towards purely' temporary or secular goals (tor example, mere growth in person-
ality), but is directed towards etemity, Kiezkegaa.rd finds it necessary to 
ref01"lllllate his principles in tel'Wl of a pro~.t namely, how is it possible 
that ".:!:!!.! eternal h!epiness 2! ~ individual !!. decided ~ ll!!. throW ~ 












!! !2 exclude ~ .lli cOEEos1tion ~ which !?L virtue 2! lli a.Mooe cannot 5rr--
~ historical .. ~ ~ therefore become ~!!l virtu. of !!!. absurditt'? 
In other lOrds, Kierkegaard conceives of the object of the truth-relationship 
of the individual as not merely' an absolute, eternal end, but as sonathing hie-
torica.l. It was explained in Chcpter Three that by the "historicallt lierkegaare 
means a contingent fac' ... ometh1ng which COf1eB into existence, and shares all 
the uncert.ainty and contingency of tamporal existence. The reaction of the in-
dividual to a historical fact, furthermore, is not one of knowledge, but ot be-
llef. The Significance of these two statements becomes apparent when Kierke-
gurd further specifies the object of Christian faith as being "the real it,.. of 
51 
the God-man in the sense of his existence." That God became man is certainly 
the object of Christian faith. But according to the philosophical principles 
outlined in Chapter Three, the!!!:! of this event, eVen if' it is taken for 
granted, is not signi.f'icant. What is signi.t:1.eant ftl!: Kierkegaard ia the fund-
f 
amental contingency of the event. Merely to know that Christ _~ born is not 
of 
significant for sal vationJ but the transformation of' om t s life through faith 
in accordance with a living relationship to the Christ who was born is man's 
jbest and greatest task-a task :involving the highest exercise of personal. in-
~erest. 'the difficulty involved in thus relating oneself to Christ rests upon 
~he fact that the birth of Christ was a contingent event; and whether the indi-
rld~l attains a true spiritual rebirth or not depends upon the wq in which 
the individual approaches the fact of the Incarnation. The ways in 'Wh1eh he 





RELIGIOUSNESS A AND RELIGIOUSNESS B 
The problem ot relating oneself to the fact of God's existence is, accord-
. $2 
~g to K1erkegaard, "pathetic-dialectic." It is, first at all, "pathetic," 
"hat is, it deals vi th the ex1atent.1al passion of the individual as it is dir-
~cted to the "what" of the truth-relationship, to the thing which constitutes 
~e individual's eternal happiness. The problfJlll 18 also "dialectic, If that is, 
~t deals with the "how*' of positing such a relationship. 
The pathetic element, explains Kierkegaard, .consists in a more and mo re 
~nerget1c and intense cultivation of inward passion, or religious feeling, in 
~8 di.rection or the eternal; it is thus the existential. condition for the lat ... 
$3 
~r exe.reise of the ex1atential dialectic of faith. The three "expressions" 
p£ the existential pathos--the Initial Expression as the d,evelopment of the in- . 
ti.vidual tovarda the appropriation of the absolute relatl O!lship to God through 
~ lower stages of existence, the Essential Expression as the sutfering in-
olved in renou.ncing the world's attractions in the first D1O't"ement off the in-
~:inite chuble movement or faith, and the Decisive Expression of ex1at~tial 
mthos a 8 guilt, man' s eonsciou mess that he is in a state of total guil. t and 
~strangement from God-these three expressions of existential pathos have been 
!xplatned in connection with the existential thinker himself. This "pathetic" 
~lement of the patbetic-dialect1e mov .. nt of becoming a Christian (Kierkegaard 
alIa it "Religiousness A") can exist in paganism) for it is onl¥ a dialectic 











which subjectivity, or inwardness, is accepted as the truth. A. the rell-
giosi'GY of i.mmanence, it is indeed a dlalectic by wch the individual is in-
wardly transformed; but not because at mything outside the individual. Kier-
kegaard sqs o:f Religiousness A t.ha.t "the individual does not. ba.e his rela-
tionship to the eternal upon his existence in time, but the individual's rela-
tion to the eternal, by the dia.lectic oJ: inward appropriation, determines him 
in transform:i.:ng his existence in accOl'"dance with this relation and expresses 
55 
the relation by the transformation." In other words, the man who is content 
to exist in the state of Religiousness A does not base his eternal happiness 
upon the Eternal !!!. t~, although his relationahip to the Eternal. l:! itself 1. 
a determining factor in the trans/ormation of hi. exiatenee. This kind ot 
religiosity brings a man, in his quest for eternal. happiness, to an attitude 
of complete renunciation or w:>rldl.y goods in an effort to attain that goal, 
and to an attitude or unqu.a1i.Ued rep_anoe for his total. gIlUt-but it i. not 
• Christian, because it lacks the necessar,r relationship to the temporal tact ot 
.. 
the Incarnation. 
True Christianity (Kierkegaard calls it Religiousness B) has, indeed, an 
inner, devotional, subjective aide in common with the religion ot immanence. 
but it also has an outer, transcendent, objective Side, concerned with a real .. 
historical person-the Person of Jesus Christ, the God-Man. The religion ot 
immanence rests upon the supposition that truth is immanent in human subject-
56 
ivity and that the re-integration of the human subject can talce place through 
54 Ibid., l8S. 






an inner effort or concentration of the personality.57 In the state of Reli-
giousness B, hO'iIlevt~r, the individual reaches the conc1u.sion that "Sl.l\)j,.?ct,ivity 
is untruth, ,,58 in the se."lse that the more he COfiC e."ltrates inwardl.f the mar e he 
becomes aware of his estrangellent frolll God .. and of his need for a revelation of 
God in history.59 He must face the absurdity, the contradiction, that he is 
then basing his etGrr...al .happi.'113sS upon san e temperal, contingent" eVent. 
TH£ DIFFICuLTY l"C>Ilo FAITli--:i'HE PAHAlnX 
Kierkegaard pcsed the pro blam in the W'.) ros . already q w ted: "Tha eternal 
_h_ap'-i' P,-.l._· l1e_S_S of the indiviwal is decided in tiJrte thlUUi.J:l the relationshin to some-..... _ __ ...... ____ __ ....... .............. ~.--. Ii. ______ 
thing historical, ..c:w_h_ic.;..fl_o is furtliel"rllOre of such a ch<io.racter as to i!lClude in 
- - -- - -- -- -- .-.. ""-
~ coqposltlon ~ wnich Ez virtue .£.£ ~ as.ance cannoL beccme historical, 
~ ~ therefore bacone ~ ~ virtue .2f: ~ absurditl_ft60 
And, last his readers irll.agine that the absurdity facing tha seeker for 
eternal happin&ss is only an appar6D.t contradiction, he says explicitly: 
f 
Suppose Christianity never intf'.nded to be understood; Suppose 
that, in order to «lq)ress this and to prevent tmy'one from lfds-
guidedly entering upon the objective way" it has declared it-
self to be the paradox. Suppose it wished. to have signi.1'icanc0 
only for existing individuals, and essentially for existing 
individuals in inwardness, in the :inwardness of faith; which 
cannot be expressed nore definitely than in the proposition 
that Christianity is the absurd, held fast in the passion ot 
the infinite. Suppose it refuses to be understood, and that 






60 ~., 31.6 
" ' 
i 
the l'TIAXimlllll of umerstanding which could can.e in question is 
to understand that it cannot be nnderstood. Suppose it ac-
centuates existence so decisively that the individual becomes 
a sinner, Ciu'istianity a. paradox, existence t.he ::>eriod of 
decision.61 
87 
The problem which Kierkegaard here presents poses a triple contradiction: 
The first of these contradictions constitutes the individual';8 breach "with the 
understaniing and with thinking and with imanence.nb2 It is paradoxical, it 
is absurd, it is cant. rary to reason, that a man should expect his eternal hap-
piness to be presented to him in time through a. relationship to some other tem-
6) poral reality. The individual exists; therefore he is contingent; and there-
fore he exists in time. He comes :in time into a relat.1onship llw1th the eternal 
in time, 80 that the rela'tionship is within time} and this rea tionship con-
fiiets equally with all thinking ."04 This is a problEm which does not ex:ist in 
Religiousness AJ for in that sphere, the individual's relationship is to the 
Eternal as Eternal, and not to the Eternal in time. 
It is, secondly, a contradiction to inagine that eternal happiness is 
65 . f 
based upon saneW.ng hi.storical, or temporal, at all. 'rhe subjectof0f truth 
and of faith is Eternal in its very nature; the processes of truth and of faith 











time which must be explained or transcendEld before the subjective thinker can 
hrtegrate them within him.self". f·foreover, the "historical" of its very nature 
is a1w~s contingent and temporal, necessar,y on~ with consequent necessity, 
and alw'ays fundamentally uncertain. Religiou.sness A dee s not face th~ contra.-
diction of basing its eternal happiness upon an uncertainty, although it does 
indeed seek the Eternal in imm.anence; for it o:tJ.y urg$S the individual to trans 
form his own inner existence in accordance with his .2! facto relationship with 
Eternity. Beligiollsness B, on the other hand, must base the individual's at-em-
al happiness upon a relationship to something historical. something outside 
himself. The contradiction here arises in view or the fact that the individual 
is obligated to direct his supreme passion for the L:-.tfinite towards an his tor-
66 ical faet of which he can have only aflproximate knowledge, and approximate 
knowledge is clearly not coJllnE!nsurate with the infinite passion with which the 
1ndi vidual must assert his relationship t,O the historical fact in question. 
The third contradicticn inherent in man's relationship to the Eternal ie 
• f 
frOM in the fact that this bJetorical event, namely, the appearancet of God in 
time as a oontingent beinrs, is "not a simple historical fact, but is consti-
tuted by that which only against its nature can becone historical, hence by 
67 
virtue of the absurd." It is an absurdity, for Kierkegaard, that God "should 
68 
ccme into being at a definite moment in tiMe as an individual. man," precisely 
66 Ibid., ~O~, ~09. 
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because condl'lg-into-existence is the exaot opposite of God t 8 being as Eternal. 
Kierkegaard finds that the first two of these oontradictions, or paradoxes, 
are, of themse1. ves, mt sufficient to repel the intellect with It sufficient in-
tensive inwardness·69 because the Eternal is not of itsel:t paradoxical, but 
70 
only becanlus so when viewed in its relationship to the incH. vidual. Therefore, 
these two contradictions are not sufficient to demand a full ex1stential-dia-
leetical mar.ent of the individual in the direction of God through the act of 
faith; they are cnq sufficient to establish the. individual in the state ot Re-
ligiousness A. There is needed an "absolute" paradoX) and "that God has ex ... 
isted in humm tom, has been born, grown up, and 80 forth, is surel;y the para-
71 dox sensu strictissimo, the absolute paradox." It is this absolute paradox 
which is the condition tor positing the truth ... relations~ .. as it is the object 
of that relationsh:i;p. The absolute parada:l: is demanded. by the ff infinitY" ot 
man's rellgiau.s passion "for the paradox is the source of the thinker's pusiol\ 
and the thiDlcer without paradox is like a lover withcut teeling,- a pUt17 med-
of 
iocrity. But the highest pitch ot passion is alwa;y"s to will its own downfall; 
and so it 1s also the supreme passion ot the rea30n to seek a collis10n, 81-
though this collision 1'I1Ust in me wq or another prove its undoing. The su-
preme paradox of all thought is the attenpt to d1.sccwer something that thought 
72 
cannot think. 'this passion is at bottom present in all th1nldng." 
69Ibid ., 187. 
-
70Ibid• 
71 Ibid., 194 
-72 . 
, Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fra,eents, p. 29. 
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Paradox is, :indeed, present in all the thinking of the individual; for, 
in thinking, he part:J.c1pates in lCDething transcending hiuelf. Thus, truth 
itself m.ust be a paradox. A.nd so it is, if' truth is subjectiv1ty; for, on the 
one hand, the Truth is Eternal, yet an the other hand it has an essential re-
lationship to the e:x:isting, finite, individual. Reason, when it seeks the 
truth, is trying to diseorer sanething that thought cannot think-namely, some-
thing which rea1l1' exists. Thus, reason actually seeks the paradox, the coni:r 
diction, which is its downfall. It finds an ordinary paradox in the "histor-
ieal"; it finds an absolute paradox in the "existence" of God through the In-
eamation--a thing which cannot be proved by reason, sine. reasoning 1a con-
ceptual in dlaraeter and alway'S ignores real existence. While we dally' with 
73 
co neepts, savs Kierkegaard, "existence (bes not CQ1le out" J when w. leave the 
"proof," we leap immediately to existenee, eol'l'Jn1t ourselT.S to it, appropriate 
it for ourselyes. Thus, through faith, we establish a temporal rela.tionship t 
the Eternal, and it is thus that the Eternal antiers time. 
THE AC'l' OF FmH 
The occasion upon which the relationship between the individual existing 
man and Eternal Truth-irt-Ume is cm sU tutad is called bT Itierkegaard "The 
Instant." The Instant, though a moment in time, is a synthesis of time and 
etenlitYJ am in The Instant, the believer become_ S\t>jectively cantem.poraneo 
with Christ-tor, d,. to the nature of our knowledge of contingent existence, 
according to Kierkegaard, we are not less contemporaneous v1th Christ than 




Eternal Truth co._ into beiIl': for man in his temporal existence, as he responds 
to it in the act of faith.74 
finallY', the act of faith itself must be explained. It is best explained 
in the way that K1erkegaard himself presented it, as identical with existential 
truth. For nerkegaard .. the definitim of truth is, "An objective uncertainty 
75 held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate iIWardness;1t and, 
a.s shown above, the truth-relationship of the individual to Christ is identical 
with his faith-relatimship. There are three elements to be considered, there-
taa, in dealing with the act of taith: first, an "objective uneertaintJ" J se-
condl.Y' .. an "appropriation-process" J and th1rdJ,y, a "passionate inwardness." 
The "objective uncertaintY', n as has been shown, is the fact of the Incar-
!nation. This f~ct is the absolute pa~dox, the absurdity .trona which the intel-
Ilect recoils. Yet it is this tact wtJ.ch must be belieVed. Bellet, however, is 
an act adnirably 8U1ted, in Kierlcegaardts philosophy', to assert the reality of 
this tact, since the .function of belief is precisely' to supply to: th, tailure 
of the int ellect to understand an.y' process of becoming. That th1.II particular 
prooess of becoming is unique-even ahsurd--<bes not c~e the attitude of the 
~bject toward the Incarnation a8 the object of faithJ the absolute paradoxieal 
~ture of the Incarnation, however, does provide a w:>rtihy' object for the abso-
~ute infinitY' of t 1'2 irrli vidual t 8 passion ate inwardne ss, that is, an intell8e 
religious feeling. 
7~ierkegaard discusses this point at length in his book, !!!! Concept 2! 
Dread, pp. 74-86. 
75 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 182. 
The procHs b.r which the indiv1.du.al subject appropriates tbe paradox in 
the moment of 8Uprer~e rel1glcns teel1ng 1s the same proeMS by vh1ch Abrahut 
reached tha religious stage of exlsterce, n.el.1, "the infinite double moveMent 
ot faith." The first moveP\ll!lnt 1s the M0V'8rwnt tI resignation; the S"«10 l'IlOV8-
ment i8 t1:8 aot of tait h by whim t1» appropriation is accOMplished. Botb 
tion, It he rtm(Ilnces, tirst, a dependence upon the temporal world and 1t8 at-
tachments,76 but the renunciation cannot be extemallzed except by .. erin, the 
!'ltOnastic lite.. It this is im?08sible, the d •• ire tor the world 18 accentuated, 
and the inner tension alreaa, ex1etiqr, betwetm tai th and ~ea80n is 1nereued. 
A tension of this klnd is not unwelecme to the existential believer) tor it tor-
ee. hiPt at fJ'Iery instaat. to renew h1s abaolute re1atlorahip to Christ. And 
lihUe he struggles to maintain this relationahip, ttres1gnaticn vUl Uke 1ts 
inspection early and late to lee how he JI"(lUterres the lotty 8Ole'llll'l1ty with 
17 
wh1d:l he tlrst acquired the absolute 4irection to tbe absolute telo,?-
In the !'iret act or the 1nfinlte dmble J'!tOIf'e.nt or faith, tbe individual 
alao renounce. his dependence upon human reasonJ tor "faith begins precisely 
78 
where th1.nking leaves oft." For fieric:egaard, as £f# Luther, faith 18 cont.._"'3 
to reason, and not mere17 abav'e reuon. raith 18 t. 4aa\b at rea&m. 79 
il 7~bld.. 362. 3116. 433. !i, 
" ,I Ibid., )67. See alao p. 36hJ.1
76Kierkegaard.. Fear _d Trembl.1ng, p. 78. i l'l 
79 ' -- -' iil!'11 
s,lren K:ierkegaard, For §.!!!.-Exaa1nation, trans. Walter Lowrie (Oxford, II 
-'lQlll\ n 101 . - ill: 
·llli,11 
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After the first movemem of faith, resignation, the individual makes the 
second moveMent, the moveMent of adheranee to the paradox. Kierkegaard clearly 
outline s this m.ovement in his PhUosophical Fragment s: 
But har does the learner come to realize an understanding with 
this Paradox? We do not ask that he understand the Paradox, but 
only that this is the Paradox. How this takes place we have al-
reacly shaW'n. It c:>mes to pass when the Reason and the Paradox en-
counter one another happily in the r10ment; lIJhen the Reason sets 
itselt aside and the Paradox bestows itself. The third entity in 
which the union is realized (for it is not realized in the Reason, 
sime it is set aside; nor in the Paradox, which bestows itself-
henee it is realized in san ething) is that happy: passion to which 
we will now assign a iiime, although it is not the8e-a that so 
much matters. We shall call this passions raith. 
Sine. the paradox is a historical fact neriting belief, the individual's 
adharanee to the paradox will have the qualit)" of belief, tundantentally, a tree 
decision on the part of the subject, an act of the will CD!IIIWld.ed by' the f.~ 
81 
ings-and not m act of the int.llect commanded by the will. Such a fre. de. 
cision is a "qualitativ. leap,1I according to Kierkegaard, an act by vhich some-
thing becane 8, sine. all beeomi!'.g takes place thl'ough an act of ~e .. choice. 
80 
Kierkegaard, PhUosophical. Fraents, p. 47. 
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Ibid., 50. It is important to note that on the same page he says that 
his act is not an act of the intellect, Kierkegaard also sa;,ys that it is not an 
ct of the will. The Question of the meaning which Kierkegaard attaches t.o the 
erm "will" awaits further study. However, far the purposes of this thesis. it 
eems valid t.o remark that. he is only d~ the name If act of the will" to 
his act while the individual i8 yet n in error" 1 fOl' when he 1& "in error .. " man 
annat ma.le anY' true act of the will in the direction of God, and God must b .... 
tow the coodi t.i.ons tor thia act. Thus Kierkegaard considers tal th ultimately 
gift or God. See Kierkegaard .. Frapents, pp. 51-52. It has also been sug-
ested that by "will" nerkegu:rd. means ttant'a "autollO!llous willll of the order of 
thical law and obligation.. and thus of the order of easence and essential oper-
tion. In his denial. or "will" in this s.nse, Kierkegurd is insisting upon 
stential faith aa belonging to an order anterior to the "will" and the 
intellect," in the same way that Pascal's iin;a:rtii or St. Augustine' 8 "memoria" 
r "inquietudo" are anterior to sci.ntific knowledge. 
94 
t is thus th...at the individual renews hi..'Ilself, by Te-creating himself, as it 
mre, before God. And when n.1an casts reason a.side and rejects objective exper-
. ence in order to join hi~se1.f to the absolute paradox of the Incarnation by an 
inward act of appropria,tion which is a free decision, he is indeed a "new man." 
is V(}ry existence is re .. iIrtegrai.ed, and he exists iI1 a new relatio:l1ship of 
faith. His act of faith is a decisive, subjective act of his whole beil1i:, and 
is therefore truly existential in character. 
As a new man, having undergone the rebirth <?f h.i.JTtself, man remains finite. 
He does mt esoape ti.1'!le and l!l9 :'ge with the absol'.lte; and at the IJ(L"I1e time, the 
etl,rnal beeof!\es immanent in him within his own existence through his new rela.-
tionship to the eternal. Man has begun to enjoy his eternal goal in time. 
SUMMARY 
The present chapter has been concerned with the problem of the passage of 
the individual from the ethical to the religious sphere of existence. The 
problem itself was presented as Kierkegaard's prc1blem of "becomi:q.g a~ChriBtia.z!'1 
"r6 must "become what we alread3" are," because. first, Christianity iiJ a matter 
of personal responsibility 81d mt of group practice; secondly, because to k.."lOW 
Christianity is not the same as to be a Christian. 
The solution of Kierkegaardts problem is to be found. in his <bctrine of 
the freedom. ot belief. The basic concept of Kierkegaard's theory of belief was 
seen to be that ot "subjectivity," the active relationship of' man to Christ 
through a. personal appropria.tion of one's !!!. facto relationship to the Eternal, 





Furthermore, man I s subjectivity, his relationship to Christ, was seen to 
be a truth-relationship which 1s identieal wi th the faith-relationship. 
Man, the subjective thinker, was then discussed, and his essential charac-
teristic-pasaion--was explained in its various "expressions," or manifestations, 
culminating in the expression ot guUt, JIWl's realization of his estrangement 
:fran God and from his om tl'lle selt. .Man' s need for faith was then presented 
as his need tor "repetition, n or regeneration .£'n)m that state or total guilt to 
a state ot vital intercOI!Dnunication with God in existence. 
The object ot faith, the Incamation ot Christ, was then discussed. It val 
seen that Itierkegaard's explanation of the Incarnation ot Christ presents that 
fact as an "historical" event, an event subject to all the uncertainty of con-
tingent beings. It is, theretom, absurd, contrad!etolY,to reason, and Para-
doxical, that man must base his eternal happiness upon a matter so unreasonableJ 
but nevertheless, the Paradox is the determining factor tor that eternal hap-
piness. 
Possible reactions to this "Absolute Paradox" were then explorea, and the 
state of "Religiousness Aft was found to be a state of non-Christian commitment 
to God, because, although it forces the individual to a renunciation ot worldlT 
ends in tavar of the Eternal, it does mt demand Christian appropriation, Binee 
it does not face the Paradox that Christ has really' "existed.1I The state ot 
"Religiousness B" alone can be tel"'1lled Christianity, because it seeks the para-
dox in spite of the necessary crucifixion of the intellect involved in accept-
ing such an "absurdity," and reorganizing one's whole existence in tavor of a 
tact so intellectually uncertain. 
Finally.. the act ot faith i tselt was analysed.. in its intini te double move-
mente The first movement, an act of infinite resignation, is the act by which 
man renounces tnth the lI:)rld 81d the demands of the intellect. The second move 
ment, the act of appropriation itself, is the act of faith, by which a JII8.fl 
blindly, but treely, chooses to believe in spite of all contradiction.<J. This 
act has the effect of placing man unrsserTe<D.y in the religious stage of exis-
tence, adrift fl't)m intellectual moorings, but blindly and passionately reat-
firming at each successive instant his absolute relationship to Christ. A se-
cmd effect of the act of faith is to produce the man's own existence. Since 
aDJ' transit trom potentiality to actuality must lJe the resUlt of an act of free 
choice, the act of tree choice which is the faith-act is thus the act by which 
man exists in the fullest realization of his human potentialities. Thus belief 
is an act directed toward "existence," and, at the same time, an act affecting 
"existence. " 
lCierkegaard's own view of the situation of the true Christian is best giv-
en in his own words to conclude this chapter: "Without risk t.be~ is .no faith. 
Faith is precisely the mntradietion betweEn the infinite passion ot~he indi-
vidual t s :inwardness and the objective uncertainty". If I am capable of grasping 
God objectively. I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must 
believe. It I wish to preserve myself jn faith I must constantly be intent upon 
polding fast the objective uneertainv, so as to remain out upon the deep. over 
82 
seventy thoUBal'li tathOMs ot water, still preserving my faith." 
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ICierkegaard, Postscript, p. 182. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
There are many worthwhile elements to be found in Itierkegaard' s doctrines 
of beliefl but much, toOl that is questionable. The purpose of the present chap-
ter is, after a synthetic review 0 f the thesis in the light. at ICierkegaard 1 s 
sources tor his doctrine at beliet, to present. in a positive way his contribu-
tiona to the stud,y of philosopq in the elaboration of the notion d belief and 
in the sphere of Christian action, after 'Which a few negative criticisms will 
be att81lpted, part.icularly the questionable Kierkegaardian doctrines involving 
his denial. at the validity of reason in matters of faith, and his denial of the 
validii¥ of objective truth and objective certitude. 
SUMMARY 
.. 
The primary object of this theais has been t.o present and eacplain narka-
gaarcl'a definition of faith: "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appro-
priation-process of the most passionate inwardness." The explanation of this 
definition has yielded the following particularizations. 
The core of Kierkegaard's treatment of bel1et, as outlined in this thesis, 
was found in his problem of "becoming a Christian," and in his solution of the 
problem by his dtIlial of the validitT of objective knowledge and his defense of 






frame or reterence, through his call1ict with Hegelian Determinism on the one 
hand, and with Romantic Aestheticism on the other, he gathered the materials 
with which he was to solve his problen. FroM his conflict with HegelianiSM were 
developed the concepts which Ronanticism suggested to h:1.m-his notions ot exis. 
tence, of human contingency cd human freedom. frail his conflict with Romanti-
cism was developed the existential dialectic which his studies of Hegel sug-
gested to him. 
When viewed in the light or the sources of his cbctrine ot belief, the 
doctrine itself becomes mere intelligible. It was proposed in the thesis that, 
inn. uenced on the one side by LutheraniSM, which substituted the will or the 
eJlX)tions, or both, for the function at the intellect ~ dealing with religious 
belief, and influenced on the other side, through the wri.tings of Kant, by Em-
piricism, 1ilich substituted acts of beliet fer true and scientific judgments in 
dealing with human knowledge, Kierkegaard came to his great conclusion that 
of 
Indeed, most of his important doctrines, when understood in the light at 
the _-fold source :in Luther cd Kant of his notion of belief, become remarka-
bly cl~. His revolt against Hegelian Deteminism in the religious sphere 
seems nothing more than a re-assertion of Lutheran anti-int ellectualiSlll, a re-
statement of the opposition between the difficulties of speculative or rational 
knoWLedge and the need for a subjective assuramse of salvation--wbich both Lu-
ther and Kierlcegaard experienced strongly in their lives. Again, Kierkegaard'. 
concept of guilt, the consciousness of need, tN! painful realibtion of human 
sinfulness, echoes the Lutheran teaching roncemini the orig1.n of religious 
fa! th in the depravity- of man' s nature. 
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Kierkegaard' 8 description of revealed mysteries-especially the Incarna-
tion of Christ--u paradoxical and absurd seems merely to reflect the theologi-
cal skepticism of Luther and the philosophical. skepticism of Loeke, Hume, and 
Kant; while his response to the :incomprehensible, the leap or faith, reflect. 
the Lutheran non-rational explanation of bellef as an appropriation of salva-
tlon on the. part of the believer. In so far as the lea.p wolves choice, or 
decision, on the part of the subject, it is linked vi th l'Oluntari 21m and empir-
icism; in so far as it reflects a passionate inwardness, an exhil&l'ating sense 
of risk :induced. by the possibility of choice in the face of objective uncer-
tainty, it shows a Cl. oee affinity 1d th the emtionaliS1ll which is a major fac-
tor in the Lutheran cbctrine of assured salvation. 80 dependent was Kiarks-
gaard upon the emotional factor m religious belief that the only di..scemible 
motive for the act ot taith in his writings aeeu to be a teeling of tension 
between the damams of faith and the testimony of reason, a feeling that now, 
in an f'inatant,tt the choice for God lIlUSt be made. 
K1erkegaard I s own de.tJ.nit1on of f&1th as Ran objective uncertai\}ty held 
fast in an at:Propriation-process ot the Jl:)st passionate inwardness," 5UlIIS up 
his own doctrine, that of his Lutheran rore-fathers, and that of his philoso-
phical companions. In his detinition of faith, the "inwardness" of the act of 
taith stands torth as a skeptical protest against all objective knowledge) the 
Happropriaticl'l-proeesa" is the voluntaristic substitution for this knowledge) 
"passion," as the sustaining torce of the decision of taith, is the emotional-
isti.c substitution fat' reasonable oertitude in the act of taith. 
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EVALUATION 
1t1erkegaard's doctrines are intelligible, not o~ in the llght of his 
sources, but alao in the light of the story of philosoplV as a whole. His con-
tribution to the historical elaboration of the notion of belief has not been 
tirelJr original; but it has been a pOllerfUl voice railed in agreement with the 
wark of rhllosophers of all times. 
The foundation of hil doctrine of belief, the thesis that troth is sub-
jectivitq, has not been without precedent in the history of thought • Assuredly, 
the comon-SEIlse n.wof tru.th (and the attitude or ear17 Greek philo8ophers 
points wt this fact) is that truth 18 aimpl,y "wha.t is," that is, fundamentally, 
an object-real or conceptual--of thcught, reflection, or speculation. But by 
the time of Plato t S more 8aphisti.cated treatment of truth, the v1ew was being 
posed that, altho~ truth is earls:i.derecl III object of contemplation whose 
tabllit.y and un1ver8ality senea a8 a norm far the changing and particular 
x.i.stJ.nc objects of experience, yet truth-or the highest truth, .The ~Good-
erves its mast important function as a basis ft:1l' action. 
Ar1atotle, who treated "speculative" truth as d1sti.nct £rom "practical" 
ruth, thereby gave support to the notion "that truth is related to an existing 
ject as a basis fer decision and action. 
After Aristotle, it was cb1efl,y the Skeptics who called attention to the 
bjectivitq or truth ltben they "withheld assentR bom aU propositions. In 
ing so, they unwittingly proved that the act of assent i. really distinct 
om perception or from (xmtemplation. Thil, of i tsel1' 1IOU.ld have been of lit-
e value, had they not at the same ti. shown, again unwittingly'. tllat the act 
assent i tselt involves the will and signifies freedom. They gave, in WI 
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manner, impetus to the notion of subjectivity as truth by linking kncwledge 
with freeclom of the will, zd thus with realitcY, and thus, too" with action. 
As the same time .. in bringing knowledge intD closer union with volition, they 
laid the groundwork tor future studies of tlE act of assent itself. 
Thus the coz&ribution ot the Skeptics to the notion of truth as subject:i.-
vity is mereJ¥ implied from their general position. st. Augustine, on the 
otb.cr hand, &ltbrugh his writi~s destroyed the skeptical positi.on, gave a pos-
itive impetus to the notion tha.t truth is subjectivity when he fronded know-
ledge and certitude upon an initial. state of doubt. He did not, like Kierke-
ga.a.rd and tie modern Elti.stentialists, t1".1 to reach certitude through. despair 
of d:>ubtJ he rather chose a state of. cbubt as a starting-point for certitude 
because in spite of its negation of knowledge and of cEl!t"titude, dwbt still 
contains within itself sane cere of knowledge. Thus, subjectivity, tha.t ten-
dency to 8eek the criteria tar truth within the individual's inner conscious-
ness, gained &SCendIillCY in the wal"ld ot thoo'ght. 
of 
If the influence of St. Augustine had remained as strong in the modern 
world as it had been in the ancient world, present-day philosophers would pro-
bably not be faced with the problelll8 involved in accepting subjectivity as 
truth, since the resurgence of Aristotelian intellectual.ism a.t'ter the time ot 
Augustine tended to break the preoccupation of thinkers with states- of inner 
conscioJ.sness. Subjectivity is baaie to the question ot belief, and after the 
time of Augustine, it was to be discussed in the context of juigm.ent and be-
liet. The problems arose, it seems, £ rom later misinterpretations of the 
cb c trine ot Aquinas. 
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st. Thomas, in his massive synthesis of thought, incorporated an Aristo-
itelian theory of jud&!!';E!lt (which is concerned lnth true and certain judgments 
~llcited by the intellect, moved by its proper object) and an Augustinian the-
pry of belief (which deals psychologically with the act of faith, Lfl which the 
Pbject is not directly or fully apprehended by the intellect, and in which the 
~telleet must be in1.'l.ueneed to act bT the will and the affective powers). 
The treatment of Scholastic philosophers, from the time of Scotus until the 
~nd of the seventeenth eentuX7, of the doctrines of St. Thomas led to the ala ... 
poration of two separate theories--one a theory of judgment, the other a theor,r 
~f belief. The theory of judgment was concemed with true and evident judgments 
lmly, md no special problem i8 encountered in the do ctrines of these philo so-
hers; for their analysis of the act of judgment was undertaken eol.,ly in an at-
empt to explain how and why truth could be formally attained in the intellect 
lone. 1 
In their analysis ot judgments of belief, however, they note?- ~t the ap-. 
~ehen8ion of divine mysteries <be s rot d1sclose to the human mind au~h intrin-
ic evidence as to cause spootaneous assent. Consequently, they recognized in 
Ibe act ot faith an assertiveness attributable to the infiuence of the will and 
~anci8 Martin Tyrrell, The Role of Assent in JUdsentf A Thomistic Stu-~ ~ (Washington, D. e., 1948). W.---r2-7J.' !fhts pUbliShe doctoral diSBerta-
ion has been of great assistance in the elucidation of the nature of belief. 
Wurthermore, trds work, together with an unpublished manuscript, "The Kier-
llegaardian 'l'hesis of the Subjectivity of Truth" by Robert F. Harvanek, S. J., 
J as served as an tAltline for the his torlcal cO:1ID1ents on the notion of subjec-
1 ivity in the presmt cha.pter. The latter work has also been helpful in the 
E valuation of K1erkegaard IS cb ctrines. 
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the affective powers-an element distinct fro1'1 percept1:m or from apprehension... 
2 
and a certJ. "tude not. depende...1'lt upon the clarity of the ev1dl"'nee presented. 
This recognition is not surprisi.'1£" in view of the fact tha t th9 differ-
ence betwee.'1 belief Zl..'1d opinion is not a difference in knowled,ee, but rather a 
dif'ference in certitude. The certitude w:lich follows the judgment of belief is 
CallS ed by the act of assent, which is the forJ'!liI elanent ot the essence of be-
.3 lief. 
In the judgment of belief, the act of appr ,,:heneion msy be clearly distin. 
guished from the act of assent. This distinction between apprehension" the ma.-
terial elemEn t of judgment, and assent, the formal element, seems to hold true 
of all judgments. The 4lprehensive element of judgment is conoeptual, but con-
cepts, whether they have the non-complex character of simple apprehension or 
whether they attain the complexitq of a synthesis of co~epts, are onl1 repre-
se.ntations of the essences of things, and merely c»nnote-but do not assert-
~al existence. Existence, on the other hand, cannot be concept~~ed, and 
Itherefore C8lllX)t be the object of an act of apprehension. 'Ex1stence"must be 
~e object of the act of assent. 
Apprehension, then, the material element of the esse~e of judgment, cor-
responds to the essence of the object of judgment; while assent, the formal 
~ement, correspoms to the existence of that object. The act at assent itself, 
2 Tyrrell, pp. 72, 93, 153. 
3 Ibid., 159, 164. 
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considered in itself and in its relation to real existence. seems to possess 
the tollowing quali ties I tirst, assent is al active operatioo ot the intellect. 
It is mt an :intuition or an apprehension, but a conmitment on the part or the 
assenting subject, intluenced less by' intellectual apprehension ot the objec-
tive eYiticee than by the motives of credibility surrounding the evidence. 
Secondly, the act or assent theretore l..,lies SQ1I.e term ot clecislon on the part 
at the subject, _ points to the activity t1 the will and the affective powers. 
This is moat clearly evident in judgments ot beliet. Third13, the act of aa-
sent is cognitive in the sense that it is Cl act ot the intellect; but it also 
tultills the reqI1rements or aubj activity, in tha t 1 t provide. an enc!:C!!!nt 
ot the assenting subject with real existence.4 
The Thomi.tic philosopher lD8\Y' therefore regard truth as subjectivity in 
this qualitied sense withwt aband.cning the Thomistic posl tion on the primacy 
or the in tell act in man' s nature. 
This same notian or the subjectivity or truth 1s supported -bT -ehinkers out. 
of 
side the Thomistic school, eTtl1 those whose general positions are widely diver-
gent in other respects. 
Wh1le the Bnpirical schools were losing contact with reality in their sup-
port ot subjectivity, subjectivity received important clarification trom the 
resurrected schools ot Realism. Realism bas been ftI-asserteci in modem times 
in doctrines ot "intentionality" bT the late nineteenth centnJ.Y schools ot psy-
chology, which liberated truth trOJll the exclusive control or the will, and at-
teIJiIted to bring it once more into the province ot the intellect. 
4 Ibid., IS5, 167. 
-
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Franz Brentano is a typical exanple of this modern trend toward realism. 
ie expressed. the newer VleWS on human knowledge in a psyehologieal centext, and 
IlOst profoundly intluenced the more modem theories of judgtl'lltnt and belief. 
In his study of judgment, Brentano maintained that judgment (bes not eon-
nst merely in a composition of ooncepts, as the Associationists like Hume and 
the Empiricists like Locke had contended. Brentano atfi1'llled, on the contrary, 
ithat cauposition nterely' precedes acmu judgJnent, and is oilly part of the pro-
pess of the representation of reality. The act of j1¥1gment is in itself unique, 
an operation d1tfer1ng wholly' frail representation, 1ihlcb at1'1nu or denies the 
!Content of the representation far reall ty. Further, the content represents the 
pbjective structure of realitYJ the judglltent accepts or rejects their correspon-
dence. 5 
Attempts to explain the character of this act of judgment ln the realm of 
~l1ef b7 philosophers after Brent&no has resulted in the typical present-day 
attitude or philosophy toward belief, 1Ih1ch will here be briefly: reT).ewed. 
Pursuing a eommon conviction that judgment is "an attltude of mlnd towards 
suggested fact, ,,6 distinguished from "thinking-about" or simple awareness of 
the suggestion, ("inasmuch u in the act of judgment there goes with the pre-
5See Peter Hoenen, S.J., Reality 8ld JUdf:!nt According to St. ThOm.U~ 
trans. Henry F. Tlblier, S. J. (Chicago, 195~7pp. 52::62. J!r. 'ROeneis 
terpretat10n of Hrentano has 'been 1'ol1CJn1d here. See also Alexander Ma1r, 
"Bellef," EneiClopaedia 2! Relis1;on !!!.2 Ethics, ed. James Hastings (New York, 
1910), II, lis • 
6 
Ma:1r, p. 459. 
lOS 
sented suggestion acceptance at" rejection on the part cL the subject," 1) Bald-
S 
win, for example, concluded that "bellef is tne subjective sid. ot judgment." 
That is, as tar as the act of judgment is concerned, it may be identified with 
the act or beliet; for in that act, "the subject orientates himsolt towards 
reallty,n 9 but realiv does not press itselt upon the subject. It 1iOuld seem 
that Realism. has cm tributed 1:1:> the mcdern vUw onl¥ the coo.v.i.ction that exis-
tence is involved in judgment and beliet, tor the typical present-da.Y M.ttitude 
still retains the old Empirical 8USpicion that beliet is indeed a subjective 
reaction to :reality, but that its intellectual JIlOorings are weak. Indeed, in 
10 
mexlerll minds, "beliet is antecedent to knowledge; If bit modem thinkers are 
follON'ing in the footsteps ot St. AUgllstine" whose taith sought understanding, 
with le8s assuranc e ot success than Auptine enjoyed. 
In spite at the limitations lilidl modern realism places upon the function 
ot the intellect in the act of beliet, however, realism. still acknowledges the 
pre.Slce ot the cognitive fac1x>r in belief, and do es not give OV'er the appre-
~ 
hension of malitv entirely to the ..a..11, and admits at least that cognition 
11 
serves a.s the "immediate point of reference" for the act of belief. StUl, 













important determinant of belief; and in this context, we "orientate oursel"es 
this wll3' and that according to need, bY' means of the paver of attention, which 
mvolves selection, self-determination. In brief ••• 'we will to believe, .J2 
as William James announced. 
The extent of agreement with respect to the basic elements proper to the 
concept of belief may be briefly indicated bY' reference to standard author! ... 
13 
ties. St. Thomas distinguishes four senses in which the term "belief" may 
be used, each of which is regularly employ-ed to modern phi1osophers. In its 
widest sense, beliet Rcomprehems every assent ot the human mind, whether it be 
given in virtue ot intrinsic or extrinsic ev1dence.R14 This usage, ~'F1Q1e~ 
15 16 17 bY' St. Thanas, is confirmed by Harent, am by' Alexander Mair, who as-
cribes it to J. S. M1ll in bis attack upon Hamilton. Seoordly, beliet is also 
18 defmed as "strong opinion" b7 St. Thomas. This use ot the term is described 
12 
Ibid. , 462. 
-13 S. Hard, S. J., "CroYal1ce," ~, ed. A. Vacant (Paris, 1903), III, 
2364-2396. Mair, pp. 169-465. A. Lalande, Vocabu1aire techni~ue et critique 
2!. !!:. PhUosop!p.e, 5th ed. (Paris, 1947), pp. 189-191. TiiTel I p7"91. 
14ryrrell, p. 91. 
15 St. ThOMas Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, Parma ed., VIII, 
---247. 
16 
Harent, col. 2364. 
17 Mair, p. 459. 
18 
230. 









by both Harent and Lalande19 as current in modern times. Thirdly, beliet, con-
sidered in a restricted sense" is customarily referred to as "faith," and "is 
20 
primarily intended by st. Thomas." In this sense, belief is defined as "the 
firm assent of the intellect which is given under the influence of the will on 
21 
the basis ot extrinsic evidence." Harent adds here that we are indebted to 
Bossuet tor the observation that this type of belief m;q be either "human· or 
22 
"divine" faith, depeming upon the origin of the testimony. 
Fourthly, and :nI)st apt for the present purpose of this thesis, is the use 
ot the word "belleflt to irrlicate "a sure assent which is placed under volition 
intluence because the object i5 not so distinctly perceived as to compel assent 
23 
of itself." Harent indicates this usage most clearly, asserting that it 1s 
remarkable how philosophers of the most heterogeneous sC,hools agree in placing 
24 belief sanewhere between knowledge and opinion. In thi s final sense of the 
term "beliet,· the "bellet of kriOwledge" (that is, beli.t which carries with i 
a tear that the opposite may be true), is characterized by philQsopaers a.ncien 
and modern as depending upon a less distinct perception of the objedt, and re-
quiring the innuence of the will. The role of tile af'fective faculties in be-
lief is precisely to supply'--in the production of certitude-.for the insuffi-
ciency ot the intellectual light which should proceed from the object. Laland 
19 4 Harent" co 1. 236. Lalande, p. 190. 
2OTyrrell, p. 91. 
215 •• st. Thomas Aquinas, s. T., II-II, q.2, a. 1, e., Parma ed., III, 10 
22 - -
Harent" col. 2364. 
23 
Tyrrell, p. 91. See St. Thomas Aquinas, !.!., II-II, q. 2, a. 1, Parma 
ed., III, 10, am Lalande, p. 190. 
24 
Harent, col. 2)64. 
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describes this popular use of tbe term "belief" :in modern times to the :Ln.nu-
ence of Kant; and Alexander Mair discusses the problem of belief almost entirel1 
in th is coo. text. 
What pertinent conclusions can be drawn hom this discussion? It would 
seem tha t the problem of subjectivity arises :in the sphere of belief, and finis 
iits soluticn ir. the jud~nt of belief' ald in tbe act of assent which is the 
formal elanent of belief. It is apparent that, generally speaking, all philo-
sophers agl"M that b.elief lies somewhere between la¥.>wledge and opinion. It 1s 
apparent, too, that belief is endowed with a certitude which opinion can never 
possess, and that, on the other hand, it is not to be confused with apprehen-
sion. In calsecpence of' this, belief' must be determined by aome other ele-
ments of' human nature, the w11l. In the determination of belief, scholastic 
philosophers will insist. upon a sufficiency of rat.ional motives fer asunt 
(extrinsic objective evidence in the case of supernatural faith, both extrin-
sic and intrinsic evidence in the case of natural belief), and 1t'11l maintain 
• 
that the act of belief must be elicited by' the intellect. Others w:iJ.l empha-
size personal need as a motive for bellef, or stress environment and education 
as influences in the act of belief, and look upon the lhole personality or the 
will as the primary subject of the act. All will agree that beUef represents 
a personal attitude toward reali V, because beliefs are accepted by man in a 
personal decision-for" in belief the evidence of known truth does not demand 
the assent of the intellect-in an act which is unique, not an intuition or an 
appreh..mlion, but· a:n act which expresses the definite attitude of the person-
ality tCMardS experience, and which is characterized by a personal endoraement 
of reality. This altogether unique act of' assent" which is the essence of the 
judgment of belief, has been shown to be considered by philosophers in the 
terms stated aboveJ but basicall¥, there are only two positions: either the act 
IOf assent is an act of the intellect, cOl'llll1anded by the will and. influenced b)" 
the other affective faculties, or it ~s an act of the will alone, infiuenced by 
the other affective faculties. The latter view is that of the Voluntarists, 
and it is also Kierkegaaro's view. His terminology differs; his concept of the 
act of belief differs slightly, in that his act of belief is identical with the 
act of true existence; but all the characteristl,c elements of belief are pre-
sent in his expana:tion of subjectivity, especially the element of personal .. 
tree decision and the 1nvolyement of the total personality in that deei.Jion. 
Kierkegurc:i's contribution to the elaboration of the concept of belief has 
not, therefore, been entirely original. lli.s doctrines h~e had their chief' ef-
fect through their timeliness in re-activ6.t!ng Protestant religious fervor. 
His contribution to the sphere of ChrisUan living has been of the same charac-
ter. His contention that knowledge is not virtue has long been .conmon coin in 
the realm o£ religious activ.L V. 
That belief. are perhaps the most effective and important foundations of 
activity is univex'sa.1lT admitted by all writers--Protestant and Catholic alike 
--both on the natural and on the supernatural level. It is usumed that our 
activities are based upon our certitudes of belief as well as upon our certi-
tudes of knowledge; but explicit studies of t.he character of belief as related 
to activity are rather infreque11ti. 
That there Us a differenco between "speculativeU and "practical" assent 
canDOt be denied. Preachers of all faiths invei~ against a sterUe acceptance 
of creeds without the translation of creed into action. 
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It is to Cardinal Newman that we a.re indebted for a detailed explanation 
of this distinction betwee.11 speculative and pra.ctical assent. His diiscussion 0 
notional# or speculative, assent and real~ or practical~ assent is well known. 
Notional assent is concerned with abstract propositions. It is merely an intel 
I'i I, 
',II 
lectual acceptance of truth, and need have no bearing upon life and conduct. ,I 
I 
Real assent, on the other hand, is not merely intellectual; it has for its ob-
ject "not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful, useful, 
admirable, heroic; objects wb.ich kirxlle devotion, rouse the passions and attach 
the aff'ectionsJ and thus it leads the WC\Y to actions of every kind# to the es ... 
tablishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus .gain in. 
25 
timate1y connected with what is individua.l and personal." In s...hort# it is 
the total personality, greatly intluenced by affective fa,(rt;ors, which is the 
true subject of assent. Perhap s Newman best aumrned up his idea of rea.l assent 
when he wrote, "Many a man will llve and die upon a dogma, no man will be a l'IJ.I.r-
26 
tyr for a conclusion." 
.. 
A similar attitude of mind, not developed into a philosophical doetrine, 
27 I~: is suggested by the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola. This at-
titude mq be br1efiy :mdicated as an example of the use of practical assent. 
The exereitant is asked by St. Ignatius to consider basic religious principles 
and their general application to life and conduct. Wh«1 assent is achieved 
25 




St. Ignatius of Loyola, The Seiritual Exercises# trans. John S. MoO"is, 
4th ed. (Westminster, Md., 1943).' 
III 
here (and only speculative assent is demanded.), the exercitant is then led to 
bring to bear all his faculties of iw.agination, and all the personal motives ot 
repen.t811ce and gratitude to an affect..ive state which culminates in the Election 
--a moment ot decision-based upon his speculative convictions, but demanding a 
complete reorientation of thought and activity, bolstered by all the powers ot 
will and imagination. The object ot the real assent is Sll.rely no different from 
that of the notimal assent which preceded it,; for the subject kl'lOWS 00 more 
than he did before. But his assent is mw rot JJl!!rely intellectual; it is alao 
practical. It involves a decision, a personal conrnitment to a way of life. 
This is the aspect ot belief which is emphasized. by Kierlcegaard, and by 
other authors of modem times. "Belief," they inSist, "expresses the definite 
28 
attitude of the personality towards its experience." ~e believe with the 
whole, mally-sided self." 29 
This is the character of' Kierkegaard's act of faith. It is a personal de-
cli.catlcn to Truth, in an act which is really the act ot existence, the act by 
.. 
which one "becomes" 'What he treely chooses to be, a Christian in the fullest 
sense ot the word. 
CRITICISM 
But to find. echoes ot Kierkegaard's own ideas in the COnlllon traditions of 
tbOl1eht and of Christian activity is not the same as recomnending lierkee:aard'. 
cbctrines withmt qualification. While there is much good in IC1erkegaardl s 
writings-for eXIUIPle. his devastating cri. tique of the "idea-theory" or truth, 
his emphasis upon the role of the existing i1'¥:i1:v1dual in the problem of know-
28 
29Mair, p. 462. 
Ibid. 
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ledge and being, his exploration of the cha.racter of etpico-religious truth in 
terms of subjectivity, r.is analysis of the nature of tersonal conversion and 
personal comm.itment to being and to Gocl--there is mt'lCh also that. destroys the 
value :i' his fi:rlshed work. His denial of' the validity of human reaSal in the 
sphere of faith, his denhl of the validity of objective truth, and his skf'pti-
cal resolution of objective uncertainty by an act of the l-Till are fundamental 
errors. 
The first of the Kierkegaardian roetrines :which vitiate his contribution 
to the elaboration of the notion of belief is his denial of the value of nason 
for faith. While he was justified in proclaiming the incompatibility o! re-
ligious tl"'J.th and the absolutist. reascn bequeathed to his cwn time by Hegel, a 
and althrugh his c::mpla,1nt that doctrinal knowledge lar [Jely fails to arouse a 
response in the practical order was lef;i ti.'!J&te~ madeJ still he erred basical-
ly by neglectill! to note that theology can beJ and is, both speculative and 
practical. It is true that theology is conc::erned primarily wit,tl mants knowledg~ 
of God; but theolou is also concerned wi th directing human actions of toward God, 
thereby fulfilling perfectly the demands of true wisdom-that virtue which 
judges and orders all things taurd mants f1nal erd. Once it becaftes clear 
that thoology is both speculative and I%'actical, one 'fIfI!IY pursue theological 
speculation withwt implying tlult su:il speculatim is due to a weakness of be-
Ij.ei on the one hand, or that there is a c~rom1se 1:0 be nade between super-
natural &Bsent am man's human faith. 
St. Augustine •• faith sought uncierstanding in order that faith might be 
strengthened, not in arder that understanding might abolish faith in this 1i.te. 
n.rkegaarci's faith f'lees understanding, embracing religiQts Bl1'sterie8 in all 
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their incomprehensibility. IC1erkegaard failed to realize that not all revealed 
truths are unknowable) lOme relig1.00.s truths are penetrable by human reason, 
but have also been revealed because of their importance for our salvation. H1a 
re.f'usal to consider these truths intellectuaJ.l¥ is merely the reaction of an 
anti-intellectual Lutheran Minister to revelation, and doe s not honor the facts 
of the situation as they are presented to the intellect. 
Secondly, a ,more basic error on K1erkegaarc1's part is f(11nd in his denial 
of the validity of objective truth. The object. <:L our knowledge may, of course 
be ccnsidered "uncertain" when we are dealing with pereeption. In all cases 1rI 
which the intellect is not bound to assent, because of a lack of intellectual 
clarity of t.he object presented the mind can be drawn, through distraction, 
through further questioning, or through unwillingness to face the issue, to 
turn aside frolll the objective evidence presented. Such evidence is "uncertain" 
only as long as assent is wi thhel.d. The uncertainty thereto re lies in the sub-
ject) it is not true to s81' that the evidence is of itself unc~11l in all 
cases. To speak <:L ·objective uncertainty"" in the realm of faith i1l to under-
Mine entirely the signit1cance of the content of faith. 
Even it it were to be conceded that the "uncertaintY" of objective evi-
dence, as present in some cases, is sufficient justification for generalizing 
that fact into an all-inclusive doctrine, lCierkegaard' s presentation of belief 
would still flounder in its most .f'undamCltal aspect : namely, his resolution of 
objective uncertainty by an act of 'til e vi 11. SUch a position completely sevU'! 
the connection of the intellect with certitude, and !lUSt end in intellectual 
skepticism. Kierkegaard is correct in maintaining that the contact of the sub 




attainable in the :ideal order; for it is true that judgment is necessary to 
e.tfect an ensaBement of the subject with its object as an existing subject. 
It is not, bowver, true to say that the intellect itself can in no way a.ppre-
hend existence, and that therefore decision m.ust substitute for intellectual ! I 
judgment. 
One argument to refute Kierkegaard when he sqs that intellectual. uneer 
ty can be resolved into certitude by an act or the will is loond in the fact 
that such a proposition involves a vicious circle. The uneC'ta1nty ot intel-
lectual evidence cannot become certa1n through an act ot the will if it is as-
aumed ! priori that the will is the tacul V which makes the uncertain a cer-
tainty through i tE decision, or, on the other hand, if it is assumed that Iier-
kegaard's propositi<n is rot ! priori, but is given in r~ity. 
If' the proposition is assumed ! priori, it mq be as gratuitously' denied. 
On the other hand, the proposition is def1ni1iely coosidered by Kierkegaard as 
actually given :in reality. He accepts with out question the fact. thlAt it is 
realJ.T true that the will is the ult1mat e faculty in the resolution 't,f inteUec 
tual uncertainty. If Kierkegaard's proposition is accepted at its face value, 
then, that proposition itself must be certified by an act at the will; it can-
not be aec.~ed as true, at: as given in reality-for truth is not frond in re-
ality, but onlJ' in decision. Thus, Kierkegaard irJt roduces a vicious circle 
into his reasoning, and invalidates his fumamental principles. Cmsequently', 
K1erkegul'C:i's voluntaristic theoI7 merely perpetuates a gratuitous skepticism, 
and cc:n tributes nothing to the solution of the real problem of belief. 
ThirdlY', suppose, on the other hand, th& Kierkegaard is willing to accept 




pot resolved at all and that the subject proceeds with the existential leap, 
embracing passionately all the contradictions thrcngh the decision of faith, and. 
therea.!'ter lives bravely for God in spite of the contradictions presented to his 
reason. 
The answer to this type of skepticism is t'WO-fold: first, Kierkegaardts 
voluntarism· is UIlH'arrantedJ secondly, it is dangerous. 
Kierkegaard's voluntarism is unwarranted, since, when skepticism withholds 
assent because of the presumed uncertainty of the evidence, it calls attention 
only to the fact that assent is under the control of the will, not that assent 
is the act of the will alone. Skepticism ignores the inter-causality of the 
will am the intellect (which is due to their reflectivity as spiritual powers) J 
and fails to real1ze that whether assent is f,:iven or not will depend, not wholly 
upon the will and the feelings, but, in large measure, upon the quality of the 
apprehension of the erldunce, -.nd. upon the direction of the act of assent by 
the specification of the intellect. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard' s skepticism and voluntarism. are dangerous, since 
theu deprive man of roth goal and guide in his acts of assent. Iierkegaard can-
not escape the aimlessness of irrational commitment to s:>me unapprehended 
"truth· lII&rely by" asserting that his interest is .focussed not upon the "what" 
or Christianity, which he takes for granted as kmw intellectua.l.l.3, but upon 
the "how" of man's relationship to it. He is so interested in mants subjective 
relationship to fltruthV through the blind activity of the will and the feelings. 
that he is will.ing that man be related to something which is not in itself true 
as long as man posits the relationship with the required intensity of feel1nglJJ 
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This is anti-intellectualism in its highest degree, and cannot but undo what-
ever good Kierkegaard has proci.lced by his thesis that fltruth is subjectiv1ty"." 
CONCLUSION 
The most fitting conclusion for this thesis is not a negative one, however 
and the judgment that Kierkegaard's basic position is anti-intellectual cannot 
serve as a sweeping negation of his whole philosophy. He has presented m.uch 
valuable evidence for his position, which deserves honest attention. He has 
provided new insights in-oo the psychologieal lif~ of man; and ttBse likewise 
our,ht to be tested for validity before judgment is made. Kierkegaardts great 
contribltion is that he has enriched the philosophical lexicon with significant 
elaboratims, and has revived md re-presented important but half-forgotten 
truths. In particular, his great concepts of "existence,." or "contingenq, U 
and of "freedom," which served as the bas1s for the whole body ot his thought 
and that of the Existentialist movement of which he is the acknowledged foun-
der, are of considerable int>ortance for philo80pQY alXi tor life •. 
of Kie:ricegaard md the Existentialists have been accused of dressirig up old 
ideas in dramatic and mysterious language and of presenting these disguised 
coDlllonplaces as origiral creatims. The accusation is not entirely fair. It 
may be true to say that these philosophers are enunciating commonplaces in the 
sense that they are advancing proposi tiona which tell us, in solemn and fre-
cpently obscure language, what we already know--for example, that we are finite 
contingmt, unstable, and rree--but their dramatic treatment of these truths 
is justified in view or their desire to Ii ttract our attention, by' means of 
tragically tortuous verbal dis play, to significant truths which are indeed 




It would. seen that their ooncern is well founded; for both in philosophy 
and in life, human finitude and instability md dependence are generally not 
treated with anguished and passionate interest. Perhaps they sho\1ld not be so 
treated; perhaps a (letached view of philosophical problems is the surest means 
of achieving an unclouded vision of the truth. Kierkegaard did not think so; 
and pertups his mt1.on of passionate int:.erest in hUMn existence, human con-
tingeneyand human freeoom is a laudible am le~timate approach to tM pro-
blem. For example, it is elear from the foregoing pages of this thesis that 
Kierkegaard's concern with these mt1.ons (a.lthough his ooncem had been char-
acteristie of his thought from thE; start) developed si.gni.ficantly dlr.i.ng his 
attack upon the Detena1n:i.sm of Hegel. He objected that Hegel had ignored the 
true mUons of man's cpntingency and freedom because he had ignored the pre-
eminent irrportance of the existing individual, zmd that Hegel had replaced the 
re~ity of the contingent world with the notion of m inexorably-evolving idea 
Students of Kierkegaard remind us that In hi s attack upon phUosopir¥ as a 
mole, he was attacking only this Hegelian brand of absolutist thou"ght; for 
that was the only system "With which he was well acquainted. 
But is not the same kind of over-simplification and over-abstraction the 
curse of all systematie systems-even those systems of nrxl crate realism which 
protess to fW their problems rooted in reali1\1 am their solutions applica-
ble to reality? Systems of thollght tend to beeane doctrinal; and succeeding 
gEnerations of phUosophers find it more and more dift1cult to proceed induc-
tively when facing peremial problems. Original problems, once solved, becOl8 
simpli.fied and tailored for use as stereotyped "examples" to be used as peda-






students to begin the history of philosophy anew by struggling with problems 
which have already been solved in the history or philosophy, still the doctrine 
itself tends to become more and more abstract and theoretical as the origina.l 
problem tends less a.nd less to be a real problem. As more and more illustrativ 
"texts" are consulted, philosophy tends more and more to become a project of 
thought rather than a search tor real causes of reality and of really existing 
beings, or the appl1eation of real principles to real problems. 
A corrective muat be applied from time to time, calling attention once 
again to real existence as the origin. and touchstone of philosophy, to man's 
contingency as the radical source of his instability and ronfusion, to man's 
freedaft as the subjective source of his salvation from instability and confus-
ion. In short, we must be reminded from time to time, as IC.ierkegaard reminded 
the thinkers of his day, that we need philosophies S!! life, not philosophies 
about We. JCierkegaard. and his intellectual heirs have applied this correctivt 
to philosophy in modern times, and we are indebted to t.hem for a~tempting to 
revive in the mims of philosophers, and even of casual readers, an interest in 
the human situation. 
Not only in philosophy 1s the lack ot interest in human existence and hu-
man individuality and hlllUll treedom apparent. The same lack of attention to 
"authentic" ex1stEllce and indivicha11ty is found in society generally. Our III 
twentieth century has witnessed a great revival of the "herd mentality" against 
which Kierlcegaard raged in the nineteenth centurn and man's loss of individual. .. 
ity is apparent in many spheres of human activity. 
Politieally, totalitarianisms of various kinds bave waxed and waned, each 
taking its toll. of hU1lll&D. individuality, .treed.om, and dignity. NaZism, Fascism, 
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Communism, Socialism and the Welfare State have all, each in its own way, eon-
tributed to the formation of featllreless "masses," and the strong individual 1'8& 
today beeome a rarity, to be a.dm1.red but not imitated. 
Even :in free democracies, such as our own country, responsible individual-
ism has beeoma a qualltu to be avoided. "Public Opinion, tt an attenpt to ereate 
a universal" will thl'O.1 goh r!'l>dern man' s desire for eooformity at any cost, is 
only a minor manifestation of the a> cial and intellectual leveling process whil')' 
is now at work. 
Socially, modern man's perfection has come to consist in his conformity in 
all things with his fellows in every activity of life; and even the "newsworthy'" 
exceptions, the heroes and heroines of the root1on pictures, seem identical with 
one another, m.d irxUvidualized only in their possessing more cr less of the 
same thinr:. 
Hodem man is now de.fimd in terms of his .fUnctions in society--biolog1eal, 
economic, or social. Do we not speak of our friends and acqllain~ane., in terms 
of the services which they rE>..nder to society, 1ilen we describe them 1b others? 
A.t one time, not so long ago, a man could be identified by ascertaining froll 
what neighborhood or parish he came} he acquired his characteristic features at 
least from the small group of people with ltlom. he asoociated. Today, a man is 
individualised only according to his social, economic, or biologieal function 
as a I!W'}mber of a faceless group. 
What corrective can be applied to recall to modern man the eircumstances 
of his human existence? Twentieth-een1nry man must learn anew the lessons of 
individual Sld social responsibility through intelligent use or his precarious 
treasure of tree self-detendnation. He must do this in order to counteract 
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the sense of his contingmcy and insecurity, a lesson which he has learned onl¥ 
too well. 
Will Kierkegaard prove to be the savinr corrective fer the over-abstractio 
of philosophy, and for man's preoccupation mth his intnediate social needs? 
EmergEncy correctives, like the old-time leech and the puree, are apt to be 
drastic and extreme. For this reason, Kierkegaard's unqualified existential-
ism may be looked upon by some as the only answer; but Kierkegaard has been d 
just over one hundred years, and perhaps it is. time for a Jlk)re modified ap-
proach, in which a solution tor the problem of hUJ'll\n existence, of human con-
tingmcy, tI'ld hUlllUl freedom can be found throud'l a moderate realism which takes 
advantage of the invaluable insights of Kierkegaard' s original protest, wi th-
out ooll'lllitt.1ng itself to his intellectual despair. 
'roo problem. cmfront:1ng such a mocerate realism is wide and conplex. We 
are deaUng with ext.remes: Essentialism versus existentialism; the view of man' 
perfection and happiness as contemplation versus the view of ma,nts .perfection 
&s effected throurh sane ld.nd of action; the primacy of the i,1te1lebt versus 
the primacy of the will. These problems, of conrse, are too wide and too COM-
plex for treatment in this thesis; but a feH' remarks concerning Kie:rkegaardts 
basic concepts d existEllce, contingency, ani freedom, can be valuable in the 
application of correctives to modern philosophy and modern society. 
Professor Etienne Gilson~ a brilliant philosopher and historian of philo-
sophy, has made it the object of his book, Being !!!! ~ Philosophers, to 
point out that in the age-old vacillation of philosophers between the extremes 
of essentialism and existentialism, the adherants of neither extreme can be 
success.tUl for long, since neither extreme is a eonplete answer for the problem 
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of philosopbT, the problem of being. Thollistic philosoplV", on the other hand, 
as the moderate tulcruJll between the two, alwqs aa:l.nta.1ns an easy balance be-
tween essentialism and existentialism. For the Thomistic phUosopher, created. 
being 1s neither essence nor existence, blt a synthesis or a>m.posite of essence 
and existence, transcendentall.7 related to each other as act and potency I each 
-
incomplete in itself, and needing the other for cOllpletion. 
It is in this CDntext that Kierkegaard's eontribution of the notion ot ex-
istence, though in itself greatly exaggerated, and requiring the application ot 
a corrective, provides an unbelJ.evably rich elaboration ot the notion of exis-
tence. His contribution serves, first ot all, as a permanent and necessa17 re-
minder ot the claims ot real existence upon the phUosopher. Secondl3, his 
description ot the human situation in existence, with all ot its uncertainty, 
its anguish and insecuri1\r, its contradictions and its dSftanc:ls, points drama-
tically and tragically to the rad1eal instability ot human existence which is 
GIlly implied in a detached and disinterested anall'sis ot the es!Senttal compo-
s1tlon at the heart of the nature ot an. 
The o>ntribltion ot X1el'kegaard' 8 concepts ot contingency and treedom. to 
the platform. of lIIOderate realism. cannot be 80 readily usessedJ no reputable 
spokesman has yet indicated 1il at Tbomistic pbilosophT bas to learn troa ICier-
kegaard's analysis of buman cont.ingenq cd treedom. However, it seas to be 
correct to sIlT that tbe Thomistic philosopher has, on the whole, made better 
use of the notion ot contingency thm K1erkegaard; tor the latter has been un-
o willing to malee the rational inference fl"Om effect to C8Il8e 1D ci.emonatrating 
the existence of God, and has preterred gratuitously' to alntain that intellec-
tual certitude i8 1lIposs1ble, that JI1'Stery i8 preferable to d.emonstration. 
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K1erkegaardl s notion of f'loeedom md free choice, however, can be of serv_ 
to the Thomistic philosopher in the DXXiern world; for he calls attention to the 
neeessi4;,. of choice, and to the responsibility of the individual for his choice 
He has stated and. analysed the corditions for authentic choice. He has point-
ed out in vivid terms what we Mean lben we SIl3', "We make ourselves what we are-
by' our choice, and what we mean when we speak of oo.r "true" selves. The tirst 
should signify' that our choices are the determinants of our character, and the 
resultant character is the determinant of .tutur~ choice, the latter should 
mean that we recognize in ourselves possibilities for progress and development 
which call for energetic and resolute action on our part. Kierkegaard' s fol-
lOlfers, Bartre, Camus, am Heidegger .. have igncred the object of choice which 
he so carefull3' described, and to which he demanded unconditional commitment. 
It is the ruty of the Christian philosopher to insist again upon Kierkegaard's 
fundamental postUlate: It is God alene 'Wbo is the goal of our choice and our 
dedication, the only s:rurce of human personal reintegraticn, the. onlY' complete-
ly 'WOrthY' ideal. " 
In general, it may be said that Kierkegaard can lUke a significant contri-
bltion to Thomisti c philosophy by providing a new perspective and a new in-
sight into facts of which ve are already aware. He directs our attention again 
to limits which mB3' be only lIIlrginal in our philosophical considerations or in 
our daily living. But he focusses our attention dramaticallT upon human fini-
tude, human l.1JII1tation, and human potentiality, ald thus he can be of service 
in the ccnstlUction of a Christian philosophy" of relig:lonJ for he also insists 
upon coosider:ing man, not as a member of tl"a crowd, absorbed in social, biolog-
ical, or economic functions, w t rather as an individual existing subject, who 
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discovers hiuelt in existence as a pUgrim on the W&;f to God, striving after 
the realizaticn of his ideals in God through his tendency bard God by means 
of a free dedication to God in a relationship which at once constitutes his 
highest duty and his greatest happinsS8. 
\''1 
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